KISSINGER
VANCE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Summer 1988 **$5.95 a copy**

Bipartisan Objectives for Foreign Policy
Henry Kissinger and *Cyrus Vance*

Afghanistan: The Accords	*Rosanne Klass*
The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis	*David Segal*
Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising	*Don Peretz*
The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later	*Milan Svec*
Gorbachev and the Soviet Military	*F. Stephen Larrabee*
Managing Strategic Weapons	*Sidney D. Drell / Thomas H. Johnson*
Arms, Aid and the Superpowers	*Stephanie G. Neuman*
Southern Africa	*Michael Clough*
America's Postwar Ethos	*Michael Vlahos*

WALLACE MEMORIAL LIBRARY
ROOM USE ONLY
R.I.T.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The reason we're a leader in so many areas isn't how much we talk but how attentively we listen."

–Jerome P. Kenney
President and Chief Executive Officer, Merrill Lynch Capital Markets

With first-quarter figures in, Merrill Lynch moves into the industry's first place in underwritten corporate debt and equity.

Total Underwritten U.S. Corporate Offerings, Jan. 1–March 31, 1988

MANAGER	AMOUNT (in billions)	MARKET SHARE
Merrill Lynch Capital Markets	$11.7	17.2%
Salomon Brothers Inc.	9.8	14.4
Goldman, Sachs & Co.	8.4	12.3
First Boston Corp.	7.6	11.1
Morgan Stanley & Co.	7.1	10.4

Source: IDD Information Services

These first-quarter results continue the record achievement of 1987–the year Merrill Lynch raised $158.8 billion, more than any other United States investment banking firm has ever raised in a single year in debt and equity worldwide.

Our leadership is the result, we believe, of our ability to understand our clients' needs and to respond to those needs with creative solutions in an ever-changing financial environment.

Merrill Lynch

A tradition of trust.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ISSN 00157120), Summer 1988. Vol. 66, No. 5. Published five times annually (September, December, February, April, June) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, N. Y. 10021. Subscriptions U.S. $28.00—Outside U.S. $35.00 per year. Second Class Postage paid at New York, N. Y. and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster, send address changes to Foreign Affairs, Neodata, P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, CO 80302.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our approach an organization is

In business, the pyramid principle can lead to a type of management in which those at the top keep those at the lower levels from exercising initiative.

At AIG, we've built a new kind of insurance group.

One that gives people at every level decision-making responsibility. This makes AIG far more sensitive to changes in the marketplace anywhere in the world. And far more responsive to your insurance needs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



to structuring a little bit different.

This approach explains why AIG companies are the largest underwriters of commercial and industrial risks in the U.S., and a leading global provider of life, accident and health insurance. To learn more, contact AIG, Dept. A, 70 Pine Street, New York, NY 10270. Then watch us turn things around for you.

Insurance Companies That Don't Think Like Insurance Companies AIG

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER

Expertise

Loan Syndication and Sales

This announcement appears as a matter of record only

TI Group plc

£300,000,000
Multiple Option Facility

Manufacturers Hanover Limited co-arranged this facility.

February, 1988

This announcement appears as a matter of record only

Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.

$1,200,000,000
Revolving Credit for the acquisition of

Tropicana Products, Inc.

The Seagram Company Ltd.

$600,000,000
Term Loan for the acquisition of

Martell & Cie.

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company arranged these transactions and acted as Co-Agent and Administrative Agent

April, 1988

This announcement appears as a matter of record only

Gencorp Inc.

$800,000,000
Revolving Credit

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company arranged this facility and acted as Agent

April, 1988

This announcement appears as a matter of record only

Hidroeléctrica Española, S.A.

$300,000,000
Medium Term Transferable Loan

Manufacturers Hanover Limited arranged this financing and acted as Lead Manager.

December, 1987

This announcement appears as a matter of record only

TLC Beatrice
International Holdings Inc.

a company formed by

TLC Group L.P.

$450,000,000
Senior Debt Financing

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company arranged this facility and acted as Agent

November, 1987

This announcement appears as a matter of record only

Federated Department Stores, Inc.

$1,200,000,000
Revolving Credit Facility

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company arranged this facility and acted as Agent.

March, 1988

©1988 Manufacturers Hanover. All Rights Reserved.

The Investment Banking Group

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Look inside and you'll find we're more than aircraft.



We've integrated more different electronic systems into more different airplanes than anyone else in the world.

Grumman electronic systems aboard our E-2C Hawkeye have doubled the power of this airborne surveillance system every five years. We're also developing ground and air electronic systems to manage a battlefield. And aboard the Grumman EA-6B Prowler are electronic jamming systems designed to neutralize enemy radars and communications.

Electronic systems make Grumman planes the best for the jobs they do. And electronic systems are creating new opportunities for Grumman.

Only GRUMMAN

GRUMMAN

® Registered trademark of Grumman Corporation

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



An Invitation

Your Oxford Summit

For three days this September, world business and academic leaders will meet at Oxford. One of them should be you.

The occasion is the fifth annual International Business Outlook Conference sponsored by the International Herald Tribune and Oxford Analytica Ltd. The subject is the world. In three days, in small seminar groups, participants will review the current political, economic and social forces shaping the global business climate.

At the same time the Conference offers periods of quiet reflection and relaxation with a social program appropriate to its distinguished setting.

The closing banquet, at Blenheim Palace, will be addressed by Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In a period of major elections, market crashes, intractable debt, and tenacious wars, this Conference has never been more important. We hope you can attend.

Herald INTERNATIONAL Tribune
Published With The New York Times and The Washington Post

The global newspaper

OXFORD ANALYTICA

A specialized consulting firm which draws its project teams from more than 300 senior faculty members at Oxford and other leading universities.

Clip your card here.

For information please send your business card to:
The International Business Outlook Conference
International Herald Tribune
63 Long Acre, London WC2E 9JH
Tel.: (44-1) 379 4302. Telex: 262009.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The new Continental will change the way the world thinks of American cars."
—*Car and Driver*

"Under the Continental's sleek sheetmetal lurks a suspension engineer's dream come true: computer-controlled air springs and dual-damping shocks at each wheel."—*Automobile*

"...it's a magic-carpet limo that shifts to tied-down sports sedan exactly when you want or need it to. Amazing!"
—*Motor Trend*

"This car translates much of the European standard of luxury into the American idiom. In so doing it redefines automotive luxury in the U.S. We think it will be a hit."—*AutoWeek*

The new Lincoln Continental. It's the world's most advanced luxury car. And that's not an opinion. It's a fact. For more information, call 1 800 822-9292.

LINCOLN
What a luxury car should be.

The Europeans would prefer we keep these opinions to ourselves.

Ford

Buckle up - together we can save lives

CONTINENTAL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We speak the language of French business.


Sanofi, Inc.
une filiale de
Sanofi
a pris le contrôle de
Jacqueline Cochran, Inc.
et
La Prairie, Inc.
Sociétés filiales de
American Cyanamid Company
Nous avons agi en qualité de conseiller financier de American Cyanamid Company
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Mai 1987
Fibema S.A.
en association avec certains autres investisseurs
a pris le contrôle de
Bennes Marrel S.A.
une filiale de
Whittaker Corporation
Nous avons initié cette transaction et agi en qualité de conseiller financier de Whittaker Corporation
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Mai 1987
ITT Corporation
a cédé le contrôle de
ITT Télécommunications
(représentant l'ensemble de ses activités internationales de télécommunications)
à
Alcatel N.V.
une société commune formée en association avec
Compagnie Générale d'Electricité
Nous avons agi en qualité de conseiller financier du conseil d'administration de ITT Corporation
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Janvier 1987
Yves Saint Laurent International S.A.
filiale de
Yves Saint Laurent S.A.
a pris le contrôle de
Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd.
une société filiale de
Squibb Corporation
Nous avons agi en qualité de conseiller financier de Squibb Corporation
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Février 1987
Compagnie des Machines Bull
a pris une participation importante dans le capital de
Honeywell Bull Inc.
(anciennement Honeywell Information Systems Inc.)
une société formée conjointement avec
Honeywell Inc.
et
NEC Corporation
Nous avons agi en qualité de conseiller financier pour le compte de la Compagnie des Machines Bull
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Mars 1987
U.S. $400 000 000
Honeywell Bull Inc.
Facilité de Crédit Bancaire Multi-Optionnelle
Nous avons agi comme conseiller financier de Honeywell Bull Inc. pour la conception et la mise en œuvre de cette opération de financement
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Mars 1987
Lear Siegler Holdings Corp.
a cédé le contrôle de
Jeanneau Constructions Nautiques S.A.
à la
Compagnie Financière Jeanneau S.A.
(une société constituée par le personnel de Jeanneau Constructions Nautiques S.A. et le G.I.F. France)
Nous avons agi comme conseiller financier de Lear Siegler Holdings Corp. et de son actionnaire principal Forstmann Little & Co.
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Septembre 1987
Goldman Sachs
République Française
Privatisation de la
Société Générale
Nous avons agi en qualité de Conseiller de la République
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Juillet 1987
Société Générale
Actions Ordinaires
Ces actions ont été offertes par le biais d'un Placement Privé aux Etats-Unis pour le compte de la République Française
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Sogen Securities Corporation
Juillet 1987

Goldman, Sachs & Co.

New York London Hong Kong Tokyo Toronto Zurich

Goldman Sachs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Give Foreign Affairs Today and Save!

(An ideal gift for birthdays, holidays, any special day)

SPECIAL GIFT RATE:

$23. Saves you $5 off the basic subscription price. (Regular subscription rate: $28.)



GUARANTEE: If Foreign Affairs ever disappoints, you may cancel for a full refund on all issues.

☐ Payment enclosed. (Payment in U.S. dollars must accompany all orders outside U.S. Add $7 per subscription for overseas postage.)

☐ Bill me

☐ Charge my
☐ American Express
☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard

Credit Card No.

Expiration

Signature

Please allow 6-8 weeks for delivery of your first issue.

ENTER YOUR NAME HERE

Name (Please Print)

Address

City

State Zip

SEND GIFT TO:

Name (Please Print)

Address

City

State Zip

Gift card to read From "_____"

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Published five times a year: September, December, February, April, June.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILED
IN THE
UNITED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 30 BOULDER, CO.

POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE

FOREIGN
AFFAIRS

Subscriber Service
P.O. Box 2615
Boulder, Colorado 80321

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUMMER 1988

Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy
Henry Kissinger and *Cyrus Vance* 899
Afghanistan: The Accords . . . . . *Rosanne Klass* 922
The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis . . *David Segal* 946
Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising . . . . . *Don Peretz* 964
The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later . . . . . *Milan Svec* 981
Gorbachev and the Soviet Military
F. Stephen Larrabee 1002
Managing Strategic Weapons
Sidney D. Drell and *Thomas H. Johnson* 1027
Arms, Aid and the Superpowers
Stephanie G. Neuman 1044
Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices
Michael Clough 1067
The End of America's Postwar Ethos . . *Michael Vlahos* 1091
Comment and Correspondence
Paul Kennedy, W. W. Rostow 1108
Recent Books on International Relations 1114
Source Material 1141
Index—Volume 66 1148

Foreign Affairs is published five times annually
by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Vol. 66, No. 5 © 1988

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

WILLIAM G. HYLAND
Editor

PETER GROSE
Managing Editor

LINDA S. ROBINSON
Associate Editor

LUCY EDWARDS DESPARD
Book Editor

PETER HAYES
Assistant Editor

SARA ROBERTSON
Assistant Editor

MAE G. BENETT
Assistant to the Editor

DOROTHEA A. HECHT
Staff Assistant

ROSEMARY HARTMAN
Assistant to the Managing Editor

DAVID KELLOGG
Publishing Director

MARGARET K. KABLE
Circulation Manager

GEORGE FISHER
Manager, Advertising and Promotion

SUSAN M. GREENE
Reprints and Permissions Assistant

SUSAN L. CONN
Assistant to the Publishing Director

MOIRA EILEEN COUGHLIN
Production Coordinator

Editorial Advisory Board

A. DOAK BARNETT
JAMES H. BILLINGTON
HARVEY BROOKS
HENRY GRUNWALD
PHILIP C. HABIB
JAMES HOGE
CARL KAYSEN
JOHN J. MCCLOY
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
WILLIAM M. ROTH
FRITZ STERN

The articles in Foreign Affairs *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* Foreign Affairs *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

Foreign Affairs is published five times annually by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial Offices: 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021. Telephone (212) 734-0400. Telex: 239852 CFR UR.

Manuscript submissions: The Editors will consider all manuscripts received, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Materials submitted will be returned only when accompanied by appropriate postage.

Subscriptions: Price for U.S. subscriptions, $28.00 per year; foreign, $35.00. Rates for air mail delivery are available upon request. To subscribe, write *Foreign Affairs*, P.O. Box 2615, Boulder, CO 80322, or call (212) 734-0400. For subscription problems, call (800) 525-0643.

Advertising: For rates and schedules, contact the Advertising Office (212) 734-0400. *Foreign Affairs* is represented by The Leadership Network, Robert F. Sennott, Jr., President, (212) 684-5500. *Foreign Affairs* is a member of the Audit Bureau of Circulations.

Reprints and permissions: Write *Foreign Affairs*, Reader Services, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, or call (212) 734-0400.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Henry Kissinger
Cyrus Vance

BIPARTISAN OBJECTIVES FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

We have decided to write this article together because of our deep belief that the security of free peoples and the growth of freedom both demand a restoration of bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy. We disagree on some policy choices. But we are convinced that the American national purpose must at some point be fixed. If it is redefined—or even subject to redefinition—with every change of administration in Washington, the United States risks becoming a factor of inconstancy in the world. The national tendency to oscillate between exaggerated belligerence and unrealistic expectation will be magnified. Other nations—friends or adversaries—unable to gear their policies to American steadiness will go their own way, dooming the United States to growing irrelevance.

We hope the next president will appreciate the value of continuity in American foreign policy. He should know that the country has been well served by maintaining principles which have kept us strong and prosperous for almost half a century under Republican and Democratic presidents alike.

In this year of political transition, and in a foreign policy setting where major roles are changing at home and abroad, we believe it vital to identify several crucial bipartisan objectives for the next administration, whether it be Republican or Democratic. In this year's political campaign, differences of opinion will exist between the candidates about the best ways to achieve these goals, and debate will continue past election day over specific policies and methods of implementation. However, if broad agreement on central foreign policy objectives can be achieved, the 41st president of the United States will be able to start his term with a strong popular mandate for leadership at home and abroad.

Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance are former secretaries of state.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

By the end of this century a number of the pillars on which the global order was rebuilt after World War II will have changed significantly. For the United States, our nuclear monopoly will have disappeared and our relative share of the world economy will be less than half of what it was forty years ago. Other countries, playing a variety of roles, already have had a major impact on U.S. interests: the economies of Japan, Western Europe and the "newly industrializing countries" are obvious examples; several countries have nuclear weapons capability and others are able to acquire it quickly. Old East-West security issues persist, but new issues such as state-sponsored terrorism and international drug trafficking have become urgent. At the same time, long-standing problems cannot be ignored: there will be a continuing need of the poorest countries and peoples for humanitarian assistance.

A growing list of constraints on American actions also must be considered: despite our vast military power, our ability to shape the world unilaterally is increasingly limited. Even with strong domestic support, we can no longer afford financially to do as much internationally by ourselves as was the case in the immediate postwar period. For many of our staunchest friends, the Soviet threat to the free world seems diminished, especially with the accession to power of a reform-minded leadership in the U.S.S.R. This perception tends to reduce Western dependence on America's dominant role. Thus the United States is called upon to exercise new, subtler and more comprehensive forms of leadership, and especially to play a major role in defining the threats to the alliance.

Since 1941, successive generations of Americans have accepted the global responsibilities thrust on the United States. It now appears that a growing number of Americans want the United States to be less active internationally than before. They urge that other nations assume greater risks, responsibilities and financial burdens for the maintenance of world order and international prosperity. We understand the frustration underlying this national mood, and agree that it must be dealt with constructively in the decades ahead. But we are also convinced that it is the duty of our national leadership to prevent international burdens from jeopardizing important American interests and the cause of freedom.

Our nation is on the eve of a new international era. At a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time of political transition it is important to have a national debate on how and where the United States should spend its diplomatic, military and economic resources in the decades ahead. These discussions should involve Americans from a broad range of occupations, because citizens in all walks of life are vitally concerned not only about their survival, but about the shape of the world in which they will live.

At the highest level of our political system, the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates should describe, not specific tactical moves, but their visions of America's role in the world. We hope that they will explain which international commitments they would reinforce, reduce or reallocate to others. And we hope that they will recognize that the United States has undertaken certain commitments in pursuit of vital interests which cannot be redefined on the basis of transitory fashions.

There are other constraints that have evolved in the past twenty years: the legislative branch of the government and the news media have both become increasingly powerful players in the making and implementation of American foreign policy; their roles are appropriate subjects for public discussion.

The legislative branch has clearly defined constitutional responsibilities in overseeing and funding U.S. foreign and defense policies. Congress must be well informed about the plans and actions of the executive branch, and no foreign policy is sustainable if a majority of the Congress, reflecting public opinion, is adamantly opposed. At the same time, Congress should not manage the tactics of American foreign policy nor should it overburden high administration officials with demands for redundant testimony. Surely there are better ways for the executive and legislative branches to consult than having the secretaries of state and defense spend more than a quarter of their time on repetitive congressional testimony.

A relationship of trust between the Congress and the White House is essential, even with policy differences. However, such a relationship does not operate automatically. When there is a vacuum in executive branch leadership, or when the Congress overreaches, the result is an attempt to legislate day-to-day foreign policy, thereby subjecting our national interest to the vicissitudes of short-term swings in the public mood and shifting congressional coalitions.

It is equally desirable to have a better appreciation of the considerable impact of the media on U.S. foreign policy deci-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion-making. Some tension will always exist between government, which seeks to use the press to make its case, and the media, which seeks to obtain more information. A more mature relationship is needed on both sides. Most clashes between the media and the government occur when journalists confuse their role with that of governing, or when officials consider favorable press coverage more important than policy results. A measure of restraint and understanding by both sides is essential.

As we define our choices we must consult with our closest allies and friends about the course of our deliberations, urge them to do likewise, and then share our findings. It is essential that we explore with our principal partners the pace and shape of the changes we envisage. Once common decisions are reached—as we believe it is possible to do—we should collectively manage change so as to enhance our long-term relations and our publics' confidence in our determination to remain close.

Over time we would anticipate that the American role in some areas of the world may become less conspicuous. For the foreseeable future, however, the United States must continue to play a major and often vital role. Far into the future, the United States will have the world's largest and most innovative economy, and will remain a nuclear superpower, a cultural and intellectual leader, a model democracy and a society that provides exceptionally well for the needs of its citizens. These are considerable strengths.

A United States that adjusts to new international realities and develops a broad consensus on its primary interests in the world will give cause for optimism. Only a combination of domestic ideological extremism, confusion between past and present, internal economic failings, xenophobia or loss of confidence can weaken the central role of the United States in world affairs.

III

For purposes of illustration we shall apply the principles we have discussed to some of the major foreign policy issues, beginning with the core issue of relations with the Soviet Union.

U.S.-Soviet relations. The possession of vast nuclear arsenals imposes on the two superpowers a special obligation to maintain world peace. Both have a moral and practical duty to prevent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a nuclear holocaust. But this common interest occurs in the context of ideological differences and geopolitical rivalry. America also has an obligation to ensure that the willingness to defend freedom and justice is not impaired by negotiations with the Soviet Union that raise unrealistic expectations.

Today the emergence of a rejuvenated Soviet leadership has raised new hopes for Soviet-American relations. We have both met several times with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and have spent considerable time with some of his close advisers. We found Gorbachev highly intelligent and determined to remedy the failures of the Soviet economy with socialist solutions. He is eloquent in arguing that he prefers to live in peace with the West and that he wants to reduce Soviet defense spending so as to transfer resources into the civilian economy. At the same time, we have no doubt that Gorbachev is also firmly committed to defend Soviet international aims.

What then is the practical consequence of these observations? What, for example, does Gorbachev mean when he speaks of a "balance of interests"? And how, precisely, would he define legitimate Soviet aims?

Our Soviet policy should not be determined by partisan politics in the United States, nor by the internal politics of the Kremlin. Our ultimate concerns must be Soviet foreign policy and our concept of U.S. national interests.

No American president can base his policies for dealing with the U.S.S.R. on the presumed intentions of a Soviet general secretary. We cannot predict whether his intentions may radically change under domestic political pressure. A successor may change policies, as has happened before. Nor can we pretend to understand the inner workings of the Kremlin well enough to know whether Gorbachev will succeed or survive. Even *glasnost* and *perestroika*, which are intrinsically appealing to the West, should not by themselves fundamentally alter how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union.

There is a significant struggle going on in the Soviet Union between reformers and conservatives in the party and government. But what divides them is, above all, the method of strengthening the Soviet Union. Of course we welcome evidence of greater internal freedom in the U.S.S.R. and the increased emigration of minorities. Quite naturally we favor the forces of change, but ultimately the West can only marginally affect the outcome of a struggle that derives from the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

internal failures and contradictions of the Soviet system and that is over issues not necessarily of direct concern to us.

Up to now the major—almost exclusive—object of East-West negotiations has been arms control. The purpose of these negotiations has been to contribute to the lessening of East-West tensions, to improve political relations and to ease communications between Washington and Moscow.

Each of us has participated at earlier periods in these negotiations. We agree with the motives underlying them. We continue strongly to support the concept of strategic arms control. At the same time, we would warn against putting too much of a burden on arms control and turning it into the sole barometer of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will be the first arms agreement ratified by both countries in more than 15 years. Because it covered the simplest and most easily separable elements in the arms control agenda and presented manageable verification problems, the agreement was reached while maintaining the essential elements of Atlantic cooperation.

Future agreements with the Soviet Union, however, will be much more difficult to conclude. The Strategic Defense Initiative has helped soften Soviet negotiating positions, but the place of space defenses in a future arms treaty or in future Western defense planning is far from clear. While still of concern to the Soviets, the value of SDI as a bargaining chip for the United States has declined as domestic opposition and budgetary objections to the project have grown. This is a good example of the need to work out a domestic consensus. Though we differ on deployment, research and development in SDI should be continued and gains that have come out of our SDI programs should be preserved.[1]

It is imperative that the next phase of arms control concentrate on conventional forces and weapons in Europe. The place of conventional arms and force reductions in any future arms control agreement will be of overriding concern to the West.

[1] Kissinger believes that defensive forces should be limited primarily in relation to the limits on offensive forces. He believes we must continue to develop SDI actively and ultimately deploy it, because of Soviet research in the field and because of SDI's potential future value to Western defenses. Vance also believes that we should continue research and development, but at a measured pace; he is highly doubtful that it will ever prove to be cost-effective militarily or advantageous politically for the United States to deploy even elements of an SDI system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We believe that NATO must examine its force structure and arms control plans in light of potential negotiations. Neither of us advocates further reductions in the "short-short" (battlefield) nuclear weapons in Europe without reductions in Soviet conventional forces and weapons.[2]

Unfortunately, the West has not yet done adequate homework on the key aspects of conventional arms control. There is no agreement on goals, on accurate data or the means of reliable verification of conventional forces and equipment. Even before a new administration takes office, the American government should concentrate its best intellectual and scientific resources on the issues surrounding the limitation or reduction of conventional forces. It is clear that any reductions will have to be highly asymmetrical in order to create a stable balance. This factor alone means that conventional arms negotiations are certain to become the most difficult arms control problem for the NATO alliance in the 1990s.

We also believe that the time has come to give much greater emphasis to the *political* dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. At this writing the Soviets have agreed to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. If carried out in a manner that permits the Afghan people to determine their own fate we consider this a significant development. The Soviets now rhetorically embrace "mutual" and "collective" security rather than unilateral advantage. In discussions with Western officials, they emphasize that their military strategies and doctrines are "defensive," and they seem to be more flexible in some discussions on arms control.

Nonetheless, the ultimate test of any government's intentions is not its rhetoric, but the concrete positions it adopts at the negotiating table and the specific actions it takes. Thus some of the issues that require a Soviet response are: international cooperation against state-sponsored terrorism; willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions in Soviet conventional forces

[2] While placing great importance on conventional arms control negotiations, Vance would not make the signing of an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, along the lines now being discussed, or the conclusion of treaties covering nuclear testing and biological or chemical warfare, conditional on the convening of a conventional arms control negotiation, or on its outcome. Kissinger believes further strategic arms control treaties should be negotiated side by side with conventional arms control; he believes that, at a minimum, the United States should have a clear idea of how the Soviets define conventional arms control in Europe, before proceeding with the conclusion of a strategic arms control treaty; moreover, he believes that the agreement for a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms needs to be linked to a joint executive and legislative examination of the impact of the agreement on the structure of American strategic forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so as to eliminate their military advantage in Europe; and steps to help end regional conflicts.

Our overall conclusion is that there is a strategic opportunity for a significant improvement in Soviet-American relations. The issue is how to take advantage of what may be a favorable correlation of forces. This requires a concrete American and Western political program.

The West should explore, with an open mind, what steps can prudently be taken to reconcile vital U.S. and Soviet interests. In this context, there will be an opportunity for an unprecedented kind of conversation between the next American president and the Soviet general secretary early next year. A new chief executive will be in the White House, and Mikhail Gorbachev will have completed his first four years in office. He will be preoccupied with drafting his country's 12th five-year plan, which will guide the Soviet economy during the early 1990s. Given the internal problems, and in light of the new balance of international forces, it is likely that the Soviet leadership may conclude that a serious and continuing dialogue with the United States is in its interest.

Thus, at the outset of their relationship, the new American president and the Soviet general secretary should initiate a wide-ranging discussion of where they want U.S.-Soviet relations to be at the beginning of the next century and how they propose to contribute to a climate of international restraint. The modalities of the contacts will have to be decided by the new administration, of course. The process could be started by trusted representatives of the new president and the general secretary charged with exploring what opportunities and limits each of their principals foresees in the relationship during the period they will both be in office. A dialogue could set the agenda and tone for further, more formal meetings of the leaders themselves devoted primarily to political issues.

Beyond this initial phase, we would favor regular U.S.-Soviet summits, so that meetings between the two leaders are not seen as rewards for good behavior or reasons for concessions or pretexts for signing agreements.

With the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, interest has revived in the prospects for Soviet-American economic relations. There are probably more opportunities for American commerce with the U.S.S.R., although trade with the West is not likely to alter significantly the pace and direction of the Gorbachev reforms. The American business community is al-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ready exploring what it sees as a potentially growing and more open Soviet market. We are not worried that expanded economic ties with the U.S.S.R. may aid in the creation of a serious economic threat. There seems to be no prospect that the volume of Western trade and finance could reach proportions that would radically improve Soviet economic prospects. The modernization goals that Gorbachev has set will not be fulfilled for decades, by which time the Western economies will have grown by even greater rates.

Nonetheless, the United States should reflect carefully and act cautiously in shaping its trade policy. First, great care must be taken with respect to technology transfers that would strengthen Soviet military capabilities. The Soviets continue to place the highest priority on acquiring, by whatever means, commercial and militarily sensitive information from the West.

We also hope that Western executives will understand that economic reform in the U.S.S.R. does not automatically mean new business opportunities. Indeed, there will continue to be legal, moral and political constraints imposed by each side on economic intercourse. Both of us have had serious doubts about the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, which made granting most-favored-nation status and financing facilities for the U.S.S.R. dependent on Soviet emigration procedures. Soviet emigration policy seems to be under review, but we have yet to see whether the changes will be sufficient to consider a modification of the U.S. position.

Atlantic relations. Early in his term, the next president will preside over the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Atlantic alliance. NATO is one of the most successful treaty arrangements in history. It has preserved the peace in Europe for four decades—the longest such period since the European state system came into being. It connects America with countries of similar cultural heritage. It must remain the keystone of U.S. policy.

But conditions have changed vastly since the early days of NATO. The U.S. atomic monopoly of 1945 has given way to nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R.; this situation, as well as other aspects of East-West relations, has aroused doubts in some quarters about America's continued commitment to the defense of Europe. A second important change since the 1940s has been Europe's economic recovery and the growing importance of the European Community as an economic and political entity; this tempts more intense economic competition with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States and raises some broader issues in European-American relations. On both sides of the Atlantic a new generation has matured which shares neither the sense of danger nor the emotional commitment to cooperation that characterized NATO's early years. Moreover, the era of more active diplomacy with the East that involves both U.S. and allied efforts creates new challenges and risks of competitive, separate approaches to Moscow.

In sum, the state of the Atlantic alliance encourages a new impetus in strategy, diplomacy and internal relations.

It is time for NATO to redefine its goals and rededicate itself to new missions. Immediately following the U.S. elections, the Atlantic partners should begin a broad reassessment of their mission and plans for the next decade—perhaps by appointing a distinguished group of private citizens to submit a report; such a reassessment should be completed in no more than 12 months. A revised alliance structure and force posture should emerge from this review, as well as clear parameters for conducting the next round of arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

The United States must make unequivocally clear that NATO cannot be defended without sufficient quantities and types of both nuclear and conventional weapons, so as to deter a nuclear adversary that continues to enjoy a conventional superiority in some significant categories and to possess nuclear weapons stationed inside its territory capable of reaching all of Europe. It is no service to the alliance to engage in speculation about extreme proposals or fanciful notions—such as the complete denuclearization of Europe, the total elimination of all ballistic missiles, pledges against the first use of nuclear weapons or exaggerated claims that SDI will provide an impenetrable shield. Such utopian visions undermine serious discussions of a common Atlantic strategy and stigmatize the very weapons on which a credible deterrence and effective defense must be based for the foreseeable future.

Europe will inevitably play a greater part and have a larger voice in the defense of its own territory. This reflects the reality of Europe's strength. Accordingly, the relative role of the United States is likely to decline, although not its commitment to defend Europe by all necessary means. Growing intra-European defense cooperation, possibly in the form of a European defense entity, should be endorsed. With the European Com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munity moving toward virtual economic integration by 1992, it is especially important that a revised structure for the defense of Western Europe also be in place by then.

As the European component in Atlantic defenses continues to develop, the United States will face an alliance whose partners will feel a greater sense of identity. The members of the alliance have often had contrasting views. Differences of views within NATO may not be limited to alliance strategies toward the Warsaw Pact countries. Distinctive West European approaches to crises in the Third World could become more common. We believe, nevertheless, that NATO leaders must understand that if divisions within the Atlantic community over issues outside NATO are permitted to fester, they will threaten the capacity of the alliance for cooperation and mutual defense within the NATO area, and hence the vital interests of each member.

We should not be apologetic about discussing openly the need to reform the Atlantic alliance. On the contrary, we should be proud that Europe has gained in strength and that this free association of democratic nations has served our common objectives so well. The alliance can manage change constructively by anticipating and adjusting in ways that are deliberate, rational and supported by public opinion. If NATO waits for a crisis—such as differences over how to respond to major Soviet diplomatic or military moves, or a severe economic recession in the West—the Atlantic framework will change for the worse under the pressure of unfavorable external events.

There is no significant political force in the West opposed to the existence of NATO. Political parties sometimes differ on how or when, but not on whether, NATO should be strong and vigilant. Politicians may disagree in their assessments of Mikhail Gorbachev, but the Atlantic alliance cannot base its policies on his fate. Finally, recent events in Poland serve to remind us that a stable relationship between Eastern and Western Europe remains on the agenda.

The strengths of the Western alliance derive from its common democratic values and its ability to respond, often in concert, when circumstances change or public attitudes evolve. The West is fully capable of reorganizing itself and thus emerging better prepared to continue to defend its freedoms and prosperity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

The world economy. America's role in the world has become directly dependent on the strength and performance of the U.S. economy. Foreign policy and economic policy have become increasingly interdependent.

When we served as secretaries of state, only a relatively small portion of our time was spent on international economic issues. Our successors do not have this luxury. Economic strength is today even more central to the way America is perceived by its friends and potential adversaries. U.S. political leadership in the world cannot be sustained if confidence in the American economy continues to be undermined by substantial trade and budget deficits.

For these reasons, the weaknesses of the U.S. economy may be among the most serious and urgent foreign policy challenges to the next president. Convincing economic discipline, clear and publicly supported long-term economic strategies, as well as equitable budget reductions, must be applied quickly if we are to halt the erosion of our international position.

It is increasingly obvious that our military prowess and even our nuclear capabilities do not by themselves contribute to the struggle for international markets; in this realm competitiveness, education, judicious government intervention, as well as price, wage and currency levels, determine success. The impact of the international economy on the daily lives of all Americans has drawn many more citizens, special interest groups, public and private institutions, businesses and elected representatives into seeking to influence U.S. foreign policy. The persistence of the American budget deficit has become a source of international as well as domestic concern. Great emotion is now attached to discussions of international trade and financial questions in our political debates—especially how we can restore our competitive position. Moreover, our citizens worry that the American standard of living is directly affected by economic decisions taken in foreign capitals that are less politically and militarily powerful than our own. This is not an argument against maintaining adequate defenses; it is to stress that this objective must go hand in hand with reducing our budgetary and trade deficits.

The primary responsibility of every president is to defend our national security. Given the range of American commit-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments and responsibilities, and given a continuing challenge to those interests, defense spending must remain a major budgetary outlay for the indefinite future. But the weaknesses of the American economy threaten to limit the resources available for maintaining our defense, foreign affairs and assistance budgets at adequate levels. Of course, changes in military posture and strategy should be made if assessments of the threat change, negotiations succeed or technological breakthroughs occur. However, too many major modifications of the American force structure now primarily occur not for these reasons but as a result of budgetary pressures. Even when reductions will not produce an abrupt deterioration in our strategic position, in the long run they could well weaken us.

The budget contraction is already beginning to complicate vital bilateral political relations and call into question whether the United States will be able to maintain some of its foreign military commitments, including those installations which give U.S. forces the ability to defend our interests, and those of our friends, throughout the world. Dramatic cuts in funds available to assist friends in the developing world are provoking serious political and humanitarian aftershocks in many of the poorer countries as well.

These reductions, including those in the civilian foreign affairs budget, also weaken the morale and performance of those Americans whose task it is to serve our country overseas. In the State Department, posts and positions are being eliminated not because they are redundant but because we cannot afford them. It is absurd that when the national interest dictates the need for emergency assistance of $200 million for the Philippines, we are hard pressed to find the money somewhere in our $4.5-trillion economy.

To sum up: America's ability to influence events abroad and ensure prosperity at home will be determined in large part by how rapidly we get our economic house in order. Fortunately we can still make these decisions ourselves. We must face the fact that our economy and consumption have become so overextended in recent years that the remedies will involve sacrifice and slower growth in our standard of living. If, however, we ignore these economic realities, American influence abroad will decline significantly and our children will pay the price of our inattention and excesses in weakened security and declining competitiveness.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

v

Japan. The stunning economic success and political stability that Japan has achieved have placed it in a privileged, but also precarious, position. Tokyo is experiencing what can be fairly described as the "problems of success." Its major trading partners want Japan to modify its practices of emphasizing its national efforts above all other priorities. This approach may well have been necessary for Japan during the period of postwar reconstruction, but now it is inappropriate for an economic superpower with global reach and impact. Many Japanese would prefer to leave their international economic and security practices intact; some political and business leaders in Tokyo, however, understand the need for changes.

There are many shrill and contradictory voices in this country proffering advice on how Japan should change. Some regard Japan's $60-billion trade surplus with the United States as the most urgent problem, and they insist that Japan modify its trading rules to reduce that imbalance substantially. Some believe that Japan should concentrate on providing massive economic and financial assistance to the developing world out of its substantial foreign exchange surpluses. Still others are convinced that Japan, which is fast becoming the most proficient non-nuclear military power in the world, should relieve the United States of some of its Asian defense burdens and increase defense spending substantially above the present level of one percent of GNP.

There can be no debate over the importance of Japanese-American ties. They are based on strong common interests—strategic and political, as well as economic. Preserving this relationship is vital to both countries. What is at issue is how best to proceed, not the value of the relationship itself. The United States needs a national strategy for dealing with our Japanese allies before we can ask our friends in Tokyo to work with us on strengthening our partnership.

We should start by recognizing that a root cause of the trade imbalance is the current superior productivity and long-range planning of Japanese industry. The so-called Japan problem is partly a result of superior Japanese competitiveness. The falling dollar has not yet curbed the American taste for Japanese imports, because they are presumed to be of superior quality. In the end, market forces more than governmental intervention will affect the trade deficit. At the same time, Japan needs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to accelerate its efforts to stimulate domestic demand and to eliminate unfair discrimination against foreign imports.

We warn against any attempt to deal with the deficit by pressing Japan to step up its defense efforts. Of course, Japan has the right to determine its appropriate security requirements. The United States can have no interest in urging Japan to go beyond that. Such a course would generate the gravest doubts all over Asia. It might deflect Japan from a greater economic contribution to international stability, through a cooperative effort by all developed countries to infuse capital into the developing world.

We consider it essential that the dialogue with Japan be lifted to a more comprehensive level. Japan will be one of the major powers of the 21st century. We are becoming more and more interdependent. The issue is how to deal with the consequences of interdependency, not how to reverse or change the relationship.

The American-Japanese dialogue must not be confined to mutual harassment and recrimination on an industry-by-industry basis. The two countries should seek to establish overall goals and work toward them. One step would be to establish an overall trade balance the United States would find tolerable; within that balance, Japan would have the choice of either reducing its exports or increasing its imports, thus removing the need for sector-by-sector industrial negotiations.

Even more important is a broad strategy for contributing to the growth of developing areas. Japanese capital, funneled through international institutions, could play a seminal role in this regard. This is also important, especially in Latin America, as a means of alleviating the debt problem. A Japanese commitment to recycle a percentage of its trade surplus toward aid and assistance in the underdeveloped world would be a major achievement. For only in adopting a common course can we sustain the global economic growth without which economic competition between Japan and the United States could degenerate into a disastrous political conflict.

China. No relationship has changed more dramatically over the past four administrations, of both parties, than America's relations with the People's Republic of China. Sino-U.S. friendship is one of few uncontested achievements of American policy in the past two decades of bitter debates. We are concerned that it not be neglected as we become more involved in a new

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phase of East-West negotiations. There is a strong bipartisan consensus in favor of developing the relationship further.

The broad improvement in Sino-American relations remains grounded in common strategic concerns, supported by a political dialogue. A new element, however, is China's economic modernization program, inspired by the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. China's economic reforms offer an avenue for developing stronger and mutually advantageous ties. Given our technological prowess, the United States can play a special role in the development of the Chinese economy without generating fears of U.S. domination. We believe that we should play such a role, for a strong and independent China is in the American interest in sustaining an Asian balance of power and in collaborating on broader global issues.

China has already taken decisions that offer opportunities to American economic interests. American business no longer expects profits on the scale originally contemplated during the initial stages of normalizing relations with China. Nevertheless, the existence of a market of over one billion people and an increasingly open economy are reasons for optimism over the long run about the future of our trade and investment in the P.R.C. It is short-sighted and unfair, however, to continue to include the P.R.C. in less favorable categories for the purposes of technology transfer and financing, especially when we encourage China to maintain adequate defenses because of the strong Soviet military presence nearby. Thus we favor the use of discretionary powers to encourage the transfer of technology to China, to assist economic growth.

Americans should take the long view, as the Chinese always do. China's position is changing. Its relations with its northern neighbor in particular, may be improving; this should not be disconcerting for us. We are confident that the Chinese leaders, now and in the future, will have a keen appreciation for China's geopolitical interests, which we believe will continue to be consistent with our own.

VI

We turn now to two regions where the United States has special interests.

The Arab-Israeli conflict. For the past forty years the United States has been the only major country able to engage all of the belligerents in peaceful efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli disputes. No progress toward peace has ever been achieved

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between warring Israelis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians, Palestinians—and now Lebanese—without the personal involvement of an American president and secretary of state, not only in the procedure but also in the substance of the issues. American influence has led to important diplomatic achievements by the administrations we served. Separating the adversaries geographically, negotiating an effective cease-fire between the major armies and then brokering the peace treaty and diplomatic recognition between Israel and Egypt were important steps in the direction of a lasting solution.

Unfortunately, the peace process has been stalled for the past decade, and the forces of conciliation and compromise in the area have been weakened. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 contributed to the rise of religious extremism, violence and foreign influence in that beleaguered nation. The tolerance of terrorism and the political intransigence of some radical Arab states have inflamed the atmosphere. The economies of the non-oil-producing Arab states—which are among the most moderate—are suffering. A deep political division in Israel over the peace process paralyzes diplomacy. The Palestinians are also divided and have not yet brought themselves to recognize Israel. Moreover, the long-festering, and deeply felt, Arab protests against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza fuel both Arab demands and Israeli reprisals, particularly as a new generation appears on the scene.

In the midst of this turmoil and within months of elections in both the United States and Israel, Washington has put forward a new initiative. At the center of this American proposal is the convocation of an international conference. Whatever the structure of the negotiations, we agree with the Administration that Israel should not be asked to negotiate with groups that are unwilling to renounce Israel's destruction, or that justify acts of terrorism against its population. We believe that Palestinians ready to abjure these goals should have an opportunity to participate fully in any peace process. We differ on the question of an international peace conference, but we agree that the ultimate issue is not procedure but substance.[3]

[3] Kissinger has serious reservations about an international conference on the Middle East; he believes that it would legitimize a formal Soviet presence in the peace process for the first time and that it would lead to a stalemate. Vance considers that an international conference could at least provide an umbrella for the first direct negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, and is therefore desirable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whatever the negotiating forum, America needs to develop a substantive position on the principal question in addressing the Palestinian issue. This can be summed up in three principles:

—Israel should not and cannot stay where it is in the occupied territories. The demographic trends there are running against Israel; the militancy of a hostile population will increase; radicalism will grow in the rest of the Arab world.

—At the same time, Israel has a right to secure and recognized frontiers. This elementary right was recognized more than twenty years ago in U.N. Resolution 242. Admittedly, in the missile age security cannot be absolute. We believe that a return to Israel's pre-1967 borders would not be compatible with Israel's survival. We believe, however, that Gaza and parts of the West Bank, including major Arab population centers, should be put under Arab control.

—The Palestinians have legitimate rights which should be recognized, provided they in turn unambiguously recognize the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized boundaries.

We are in no position to suggest a precise line on the West Bank. But we believe either the current American administration or its successor should develop a concept for a solution, in close consultation with all of the interested parties; coordination with Israel is obviously essential. The objective would be to develop a consensus on the basis for negotiations; if a consensus can be obtained then procedure will become secondary; if not, a stalemate is certain. The choice between the two outcomes will depend importantly on the creativity and purposefulness of whatever administration in Washington does the principal negotiation—almost surely the next one.

The western hemisphere. It is no longer possible for the United States to pretend that it alone can determine events from within or deter hostile forces from without in the western hemisphere. Since its own independence, the United States has felt a special concern for developments in the New World, although there has often been too much ignorance and arrogance in our policies and attitudes. The past presence of our missionaries, corporations and, on some occasions, U.S. gunboats and troops, in many of these countries are all part of a difficult heritage for Latin and North Americans. Recent troubles in these

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations have made it clear that we must deal with the problems of our region differently than before, and also differently from the way we defend our interests on other continents. While it may be necessary to retrench American commitments in more distant places, it is unthinkable that we should now pay less attention to the western hemisphere.

Canada. Canada is a close ally, a friend and an important neighbor. It is often said that Americans pay attention to Canada only when there is a problem between us, e.g., the question of acid rain. Regrettably, the United States does too often take its friendship with Canada for granted, and fails to nurture this crucial relationship. Fortunately, despite this neglect, for more than a century relations between the two countries have been exemplary. Our common border is the most open in the world. The recently concluded U.S.-Canadian trade agreement is a historic achievement and a model way for close trading partners to regularize their commerce. We hope that it will be ratified soon. Some observers believe that this bilateral settlement of our trading problems could serve as a broader international model, especially in the western hemisphere. It is symbolic of our special relationship with Canada that President Reagan recently agreed to transfer to Canada sensitive military technology which heretofore had only been available to Great Britain.

Mexico. Mexico may well present the most challenging problems for the United States in the western hemisphere. Most Americans appreciate the importance of Mexico to the United States. However, it is very difficult to know how to deal with the complex relationship.

Traditional foreign policy approaches are of little use: the usual levers of diplomacy, military power and international economic policies do not apply to a close and friendly neighbor, with which we are connected by so many intangible ties. The issues that we face in Mexico are almost all domestic in character: the flow of people, cross-border trade, energy, culture, education, financial and fiscal matters, drugs. Organizationally, it is important to have a central and high-level coordinator for U.S. policy toward Mexico with good access to the president.

The United States has led public and private efforts to provide new financing for Mexico's debt servicing, and the presidents of both countries have given high visibility to the special ties between the two countries. Mexico has liberalized

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

significantly its trading practices and joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

It would be unrealistic to assume that there is a simple, global solution for all of the issues in such a complex problem. We believe, however, that Mexican-American relations deserve high priority. Of particular importance is the handling of the Mexican external debt. How the United States and Mexico deal with the issue will strongly influence the broader question of Latin American debt.

The new presidents of the United States and Mexico should meet early and often. Relations with Mexico always will be delicate, and we must provide constant attention to maintaining a high degree of trust in a relationship that is enormously important and interdependent. The two leaders can try to anticipate key issues and particular problems on which they must focus, while encouraging active cabinet-level discussions of all outstanding differences.

Central America. The most immediate political concerns that we have in the western hemisphere relate to ending the wars in Central America while strengthening democratic forces and reducing Soviet and Cuban influence in the area. Central America provides a conspicuous example of an area where U.S. policy has suffered because of a lack of clear-cut national objectives that could be publicly debated and congressionally mandated. Confusion remains over whether our principal aim should have been to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, halt Nicaraguan support for insurrections elsewhere in Central America, eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence and military assistance in Nicaragua or democratize the Sandinista regime. Now the presidents of five Central American nations have taken on the responsibility for making peace.

Is there anything left for the United States to do to promote an acceptable peace in the region?

First, it remains very much in the U.S. interest to obtain the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet military advisers from Nicaragua, significant reductions in the armies and armaments in the region (especially in Nicaragua), a total ban on Sandinista help to guerrillas elsewhere, and the internal democratization of Nicaragua.

Second, the situation in Central America can be one measure of U.S.-Soviet relations: whether the Soviet Union is willing to suspend arms shipments into this area of our most traditional relationships.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Also outstanding is the issue of the level and scope of our assistance to the area. Four years ago a bipartisan commission appointed by the president unanimously recommended substantial economic assistance to Central America. That recommendation is even more important today and will gain in relevance if the Arias plan succeeds. Such aid should go primarily to regional development rather than to individual countries. The task of the United States should be to reinforce those institutions that give the Central Americans good reason to live productively and peacefully together.

Finally, the United States should also continue to support democracy within Nicaragua. Our diplomatic and material aid to those who work for a pluralistic economy and representative political process should be done openly.

Preventive diplomacy and preemptive reform can reduce the risks of extremist political infection and radical contamination. When confronted with such situations, the United States must define its interests early on and then develop strategies in cooperation with regional friends that will promote the likelihood of peaceful change and successor governments compatible with our own.

Latin American debt. One clear aim of the United States is to increase the likelihood that stable and democratic governments will survive in the region. To this end we must help them resolve critical problems of debt and development.

Most of the democratic governments that replaced military regimes in South America in recent years are fragile. Extreme leftist guerrilla movements, sometimes encouraged by powerful drug traffickers, pose serious threats to law and order. Violence and urban terrorism have increased while some in the military covet a return to power. Moreover, their massive external debts reduce significantly the capital available for growth and development.

At present, the principal Latin American debtors—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela—owe foreign creditors about $350 billion. Interest payments alone on these debts range between 19 percent of export earnings, in the case of Colombia, and 46 percent of export earnings, as with Argentina. These governments cannot expend a major part of their export earnings on servicing their external debts; the key issue is to stimulate economic growth.

Western commercial banks alone cannot resolve debt problems of this magnitude. Their governments must become more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fully involved, together with international financial institutions. Some new public and private monies must be provided so that Latin America can begin to grow again—which would also make it possible for the region again to absorb significant quantities of U.S. exports.

At the same time, the Latin Americans should restructure their economies to promote expansion of investments in the private sector from both domestic and foreign sources. Western nations other than the United States should make a major effort to buy more from these developing countries. For example, over the past several years, the United States has been taking over 60 percent of the manufactured exports from the developing world while Japan—with an economy more than half our size—has been taking only ten percent.

We cannot have a single policy for all of the region. We can, however, demonstrate concern and sensitivity for the Latin countries and tailor our strategy to meet individual cases. Many problems of the region can be solved with foresight and resources. If neglected, they will produce dangers to American interests that are much more serious than what has preoccupied us in Central America for the past decade.

VII

As is apparent from the foregoing, our next president will be severely challenged to guide us through a period of international transition and to secure a firm place for the United States in a changing configuration of nations. He must focus American resources and energies on areas where precisely defined U.S. national interests are at stake. He must not be reluctant to admit that there are important issues, even conflicts, in which the United States has no special role to play because our vital interests are not engaged. But he must not shrink from defending our interests.

It is true that this is a more restrictive approach to the defense of American objectives than that in the immediate postwar period. We believe, however, that America's international standing and national security need not be diminished because we adopt more selective and collaborative international strategies based on new realities. Our position can be strengthened by taking into account the growing strength of other regions.

We believe profoundly in the resiliency of the American people. They bring qualities to our foreign and national secu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rity policies that should reassure our allies and ourselves. Often in the past we have overcome great international challenges thanks to our adaptability and resourcefulness. The dynamic heterogeneity and individualism inherent in our society, which could cause chaos and confusion, have produced an array of talents—social, scientific and moral—that remain a formidable source of national energy. Imaginatively analyzing the new realities affecting America's role in the world should provide the next administration with prescriptions for its foreign policies. Through such understanding and discipline, our leaders can guarantee that the future security and well-being of the American people will be at least as well defended in the future as they have been in the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rosanne Klass

AFGHANISTAN: THE ACCORDS

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, representatives of the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan signed three bilateral agreements intended to end the war in Afghanistan. An additional "Declaration on International Guarantees" was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union as states-guarantors. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze also signed one of the three bilateral agreements as witnesses.

These documents, collectively known as the Geneva accords, have been hailed as the key to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a settlement of the conflict which has held the world spotlight since the Soviet invasion of December 1979. They have also been condemned by critics as a betrayal of the Afghan people and their ten-year struggle against communist domination.

The accords came into force on May 15, the date specified for the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The documents do not, however, deal directly with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan per se. This is consistent with the insistence of both the Soviet Union and its Kabul client that the Soviet-installed regime is the lawful government of Afghanistan, and that any Soviet involvement in Afghanistan is a purely internal matter to be determined by that government on the basis of bilateral arrangements between two sovereign states.

II

The first of the bilateral agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan, "Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention," binds the two parties to refrain from various specified activities that could constitute interference in one another's affairs. Its detailed clauses (Article II, paragraphs 1–13) effectively close off every means

---

Rosanne Klass is Director of the Afghanistan/Southwest Asia Center of Freedom House in New York, editor of *Afghanistan—The Great Game Revisited*, and author of an earlier book on the Afghans.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by which Pakistan could assist, or could permit its territory to be used to assist, the Afghan resistance.[1] On the other hand, it does not specifically mention in any way the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, or indeed any form of Soviet involvement. Both the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime insist that the agreement applies only to outside assistance to forces opposed to the regime, i.e., the Afghan resistance; this definition appears to have been adopted in the accords.

How intervention is defined also affects interpretation of the "Declaration on International Guarantees" signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, which commits them to noninterference and nonintervention. It also commits them to respect the Afghan-Pakistani nonintervention accord; the other accords are not specifically mentioned in the Declaration on International Guarantees.

The second bilateral Pakistani-Afghan agreement deals with the "Voluntary Return of Refugees." While repeatedly calling for such a return to be voluntary, this accord envisages the return to be completed within 18 months and makes no provision for refugees who may not choose to return to their homeland under present conditions or those that may evolve.

The withdrawal of uniformed Soviet military forces is mentioned only in the bilateral Pakistani-Afghan "Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan." Also called the fourth instrument, this is the agreement witnessed by Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze as the representatives of the guarantor-states "who have signified their consent with its provisions." Here troop withdrawal is finally mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6—but only tangentially, as a separate bilateral determination between the Kabul regime and the Soviet Union, coordinated with but outside of the accords themselves:

> In accordance with the timeframe *agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan*, there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign [*sic*] troops which will start on the date of entry into force. . . . One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months. . . . The phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the timeframe envisaged in paragraph 5 [emphasis added].

[1] All references to the text of the accords are based on the English-language text released by the U.S. Department of State after the signing of the accords. Article II of the agreement on noninterference and nonintervention, and the U.S. statement submitted at Geneva, are reprinted at the end of this article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This refers only to uniformed forces, and does not specify the number of troops present in Afghanistan or to be withdrawn; it includes no restriction on any future return of Soviet troops; it does not require the dismantling of massive Soviet installations, many of them underground; and it makes no mention of the thousands of other, nonuniformed Soviet forces and personnel in Afghanistan—military, civilian and KGB—who control all agencies of the Afghan government. According to official Soviet and Afghan statements, these categories are in fact specifically excluded from this clause. At a news conference on April 28, the Afghan regime's leader, Dr. Najibullah, said that even Soviet military advisers were permitted to stay under the terms of the accords, and would remain. The next day the U.S. State Department said its understanding was that "the Soviets had committed themselves to a complete withdrawal," including military advisers, but did not offer evidence of such a commitment or specify whether their continued presence would violate the accords.

The accords specify no procedures for enforcing, verifying or even monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops; for that matter, the accords contain no provisions for the enforcement of any terms. An unsigned annex sets out procedures for monitoring their implementation by United Nations personnel, but only by two five-man observer teams stationed in Kabul and Islamabad (enlargeable to a maximum of 50 men if necessary). Their job is to assist the U.N. representative, who apparently has no enforcement powers himself; complaints of violations will be confidentially referred to the appropriate governments and the U.N. secretary-general. Since the withdrawal of Soviet troops is based on a separate agreement between Moscow and Kabul, their withdrawal does not appear to be covered by even this minimal supervision.

Not part of the Geneva accords themselves is a brief additional "U.S. Statement" submitted in Geneva by Secretary of State Shultz, stating that "if the U.S.S.R. undertakes . . . to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the United States retains the right . . . likewise effectively to provide such assistance." This embodies the concept of "symmetry" enunciated by the State Department in early March in response to a severely critical Senate resolution concerning the cutoff of U.S. aid to the resistance despite continued Soviet military assistance to Kabul. This statement appears to contradict the guarantees being signed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The accords will almost certainly become increasingly controversial. They were rushed to completion and signature in a few weeks, after six years of glacial progress and stalemate; the negotiations were shrouded in secrecy until after the accords were signed. They have been hailed by their supporters as a vindication of the Reagan Doctrine that will force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, end the war and create an opportunity for Afghan independence and self-determination. Critics of the accords insist that they will not accomplish these objectives, and that they represent a reversal of U.S. policy as repeatedly stated since the Soviet invasion by two administrations and the Congress, with widespread public support. The key provisions, some say, are unworkable and unenforceable. The State Department's legal analysis remained classified even after the accords were signed.

What then are these accords all about? How were they arrived at, and what is likely to be their effect?

III

On April 27, 1978, after two centuries of Russian efforts to gain a foothold, the Soviet Union seized virtual control of Afghanistan through a bloody military coup carried out by its agents in the Afghan air force and tank corps under the guidance of the Soviet embassy in Kabul.[2] As a result the Afghan communist party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was installed in power. Within a few months, the population began to realize the nature of the new regime, and thousands of Soviet advisers, backed by 15,000–20,000 Soviet troops, arrived to direct the process of setting up a communist regime, headed initially by Nur Mohammad Taraki with Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin. Spontaneous armed opposition to the new regime erupted nationwide, taking shape under the banner of Islam. After a power struggle within the PDPA, Taraki and Amin emerged triumphant; later Amin had Taraki killed and took over alone, from September to December 1979.

On December 24–27, 1979, faced with the possible over-

[2] This is not merely ancient history. Leon Trotsky said: "The road to Paris and London lies through Kabul and the cities of the Punjab." In his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev mentioned that the road network the Soviets built in Afghanistan in 1956 was created with Soviet military use in mind.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

throw of communist control, the Soviet army invaded. Special forces accompanying the invading Soviet army killed the erratic and insubordinate Amin on December 27, after the failure of clandestine Soviet assassination attempts. Babrak Karmal, then in the Soviet Union and more thoroughly controlled by the KGB, was proclaimed the new president and arrived in Kabul a few days later.

Moscow apparently expected the need for an overt Soviet military presence in Afghanistan to be short-lived, and in any case expected that international reaction would be manageable. This proved not to be the case; with the added element of a struggle for national independence against the Soviet occupation, the resistance spread and intensified, attracting more and more world attention and gaining wide international support. The Soviet Union then dug in for a long-term war of subjugation along lines developed in its century-long conquest of Central Asia; in addition to the military action, the Soviets began the systematic creation of an infrastructure for permanent political and economic control. These policies continued and were even intensified by Mikhail Gorbachev after he became the Soviet general secretary in March 1985.

The United States, which had accepted the 1978 coup with equanimity and responded in a low-key manner even to the killing of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in February 1979, reacted with shock to the Soviet invasion. It refused to recognize the Karmal regime. The SALT II treaty was withdrawn from the Senate, and the policies subsumed under "détente" were derailed. It became the official policy of the United States—enunciated by Presidents Carter and Reagan and supported, with unusual bipartisan unanimity, by both houses of Congress and the American public—to provide all necessary aid, both military and humanitarian, to the Afghan people for the stated purpose of helping them to regain the independence, self-determination and freedom of their country.

Despite an initial flurry of activity, however, the United States undertook no major role in efforts to negotiate a settlement, leaving that to the United Nations. In a special session convened immediately following the invasion, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan, a resolution repeated every year thereafter with increasing support (despite stren-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uous Soviet lobbying).[3] The General Assembly resolution of November 18, 1981, authorized the secretary-general to attempt to negotiate a political solution to the crisis. Negotiations were begun in June 1982. The formal parties to the "proximity talks" were the Kabul regime and the government of Pakistan. Since Pakistan refused to recognize the Kabul regime, they were conducted indirectly by the intermediary, U.N. Undersecretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez, who shuttled from capital to capital or, in Geneva, from room to room.

In these talks, the United States and the Soviet Union were officially consulted; in fact, Soviet advisers were always present at negotiations to instruct their Afghan clients. The government of Iran, which had refused to participate without the inclusion of the Afghan resistance, was officially kept informed. But neither the organized Afghan resistance nor any other representative of the non-communist people of Afghanistan, including the millions of refugees, was included in the negotiations or kept officially informed.[4] Pakistan in effect served as negotiator on their behalf.

The negotiations were formally convened in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution of November 1981, which listed four essentials for a political solution: (a) the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and nonaligned character of Afghanistan; (b) the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever; (c) the immediate withdrawal of the "foreign" troops from Afghanistan; (d) the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honor.

But in fact the Geneva negotiations were not conducted on

[3] The failure to identify the "foreign troops" involved left the door open for Moscow and Kabul to continue to claim that the Soviet Union was asked to send in what they always describe as the "limited contingent" of Soviet forces (under clause 4 of the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty signed by Taraki on Dec. 4, 1978) to help Afghanistan defend itself against invading U.S., Pakistani, Chinese and other foreign forces. Moreover, no move was made to deny Afghanistan's seat in the General Assembly to the regime installed, maintained and controlled by the aggressor.

[4] Resistance leaders and others were informally kept abreast of developments by the governments of Pakistan and to some extent the United States and Iran, but, as confirmed by U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar on April 27, 1988, the resistance had no official standing of any sort in the negotiating process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this basis; they proceeded on a very different agenda proposed by the Kabul regime in 1981, an agenda for ending "outside interference" while retaining communist control of Afghanistan and legitimizing the regime. This was not generally known, in large part because of the extraordinary secrecy that enwrapped the negotiations from their inception until after the ink was dry on the accords. Aside from scraps of information selectively leaked, this remained the case even after Mr. Cordovez reported in late 1983 that the negotiations were "95 percent complete." The uncompleted five percent, of course, was the issue of Soviet withdrawal. At that time the withdrawal of Soviet uniformed forces would probably have led to the collapse of the Afghan regime, which was still extremely shaky and had consolidated few agencies capable of sustaining it against overwhelming popular armed opposition. Negotiations remained stalemated for the next four years while the Soviet Union worked to remedy that situation.

As for the United States, policy toward Afghanistan had been characterized for nearly 70 years by what one former American diplomat described as "ignorance, incoherence, inconstancy and appeasement."[5] U.S. policy was long marked by a dismissal of Afghanistan's strategic importance.[6] Even after the invasion, the State Department and other agencies viewed the Afghanistan issue primarily as a factor in U.S.-Soviet relations, i.e., an impediment to progress on other more important issues. Not until 1984–85 did Washington discernibly begin to address policy regarding Afghanistan itself, and then only under pressure from concerned members of Congress.

The primary spokesmen for the issue were, in the Carter Administration, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and, in the Reagan Administration, U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and the president himself. All of them took a strong position, enunciating a clear-cut U.S. policy of support for the

[5] Leon B. Poullada, "The Road to Crisis, 1919–1980," in *Afghanistan—The Great Game Revisited*, New York: Freedom House, 1987, pp. 63–65; see also other writings by the same author.

[6] Characteristically, before 1978 American intelligence officers in Afghanistan were under instructions to pay attention only to activities of Soviet and other foreign nationals, not to those of Afghans. As a result, when the first communist coup occurred in 1973, they failed to anticipate it, and then failed to recognize its significance. When the second coup occurred in 1978, they were not only taken by surprise but had little or no information about its participants and nature. Many U.S. officials did not expect continued Afghan resistance after the Soviet invasion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Afghan resistance for the purpose of restoring genuine Afghan independence and self-determination. This policy received virtually unanimous support from both houses of Congress. American aid to the resistance (and U.S.-supported aid from other countries) was initiated by Dr. Brzezinski shortly after the invasion but it was neither sufficient nor effective for some years. Those responsible for implementing stated policy made no consistent, energetic effort to do so.

The behind-the-scenes struggle over the provision of effective military aid to the Afghan resistance was protracted and tortuous. From 1985 Congress increasingly pressed for effective action, but there was a struggle for policy control and bureaucratic turf-fighting among the agencies concerned. Moreover, a disproportionately large share of U.S. aid went to the most extreme, radical, anti-Western groups, which had no broad base of political support among the Afghan people but drew their strength from the financing they received from Libya, Iran, elements in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the radical international Muslim Brotherhood and the United States. This funding was used to create power bases that they would not have been able to win on their own. It also undermined efforts to establish greater operational and political unity among the resistance groups.

In 1984 Congress voted several million dollars in humanitarian aid (food and medical aid in particular) for the civilian population inside Afghanistan. The State Department, however, failed to disburse the funds, leading Congress to set up the Joint House-Senate Task Force on Afghanistan chaired by Senator Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.H.). Tensions between Congress and the State Department over policy and its implementation continued to grow.

The State Department was accused of resisting efforts to undertake strong economic, diplomatic and political measures against the Kabul regime. Congress unanimously called on the secretary of state "to make vigorous efforts to impress upon the Soviet leadership the penalty that continued military action in Afghanistan imposes upon the building of a long-term constructive relationship with the United States." As late as October 1987 Congress, again unanimously, complained that although the Administration's policy on Afghanistan called for steadily increasing pressure on all fronts—military, political and diplomatic—such pressures had "decreased rather than increased; in the absence of a coordinated and aggressive policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the administration regarding the war in Afghanistan, the Congress has been forced to implement unilaterally numerous programs to bring 'steadily increasing pressure' to bear on the Soviet Union."

IV

Meanwhile, the situation both in the field and in negotiations began to change significantly. Following his accession to power in early 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev intensified Soviet military action against both the resistance and the civilian population in Afghanistan; he also moved to solidify and support Afghan communist control, and escalated pressures on Pakistan through political means, military incidents and greatly increased terrorist subversion. At about the same time, under congressional pressure, significantly enlarged and improved covert U.S. aid, estimated at $600 million a year, began to flow to the Afghan resistance. Rather suddenly, the almost-forgotten Geneva negotiations emerged from obscurity to be proclaimed the focus of all hopes and expectations for a solution to the Afghan war—with the withdrawal of Soviet *military* forces their primary if not their sole goal.

The first sign that something might be stirring beneath the surface came in December 1985, when Mr. Cordovez announced that the State Department had committed the U.S. government to serve as co-guarantor (along with the Soviet Union) of any agreements that might at some future date emerge from the negotiations. This appeared to be a reversal of stated U.S. policy; it was promptly denied by the White House and President Reagan himself.

When Mr. Cordovez insisted that such a commitment had been made, the State Department issued a series of contradictory explanations and denials, leaving it unclear whether anything had or had not been promised; whether whatever had (or had not) been done had the approval or even the knowledge of the president; and whether it would or would not be binding. State Department officials said that nothing had been promised but that whatever had been offered was dependent on "satisfactory" accords.

In early 1986, however, a former high-level official privately described the commitments as a "180-degree turn," and in 1988 former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane told columnist William Safire they were "a fundamental change in policy" about which he had not been consulted. In February

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1988, two articles in *The New York Times* reported that commitments had indeed been made in 1985 without the president's being informed until the story broke in the press. A few weeks later, Safire reported additional details of how it happened. But the initial controversy over possible secret commitments undercutting official U.S. policy simmered down as lack of progress at Geneva made the issue appear academic.

In 1986, about the time that the rebels' use of Stinger missiles began to hamper Soviet control of the air, Mr. Gorbachev began first to hint, then to say openly that he might be ready to withdraw Soviet ground forces, even as Soviet forces were intensifying the war against both the resistance and the civilian population. In September 1986 Gorbachev claimed to be withdrawing several thousand troops, calling in the world press to witness the supposed "withdrawal." It turned out to be only the regular semiannual Soviet troop rotation in which the troops being withdrawn had already been replaced. (This could recur: Gorbachev's later insistence on beginning the Soviet troop withdrawal in mid-May 1988 may have been related to the fact that this was again the scheduled time for troop rotation.)

He also made his famous reference to the Afghan war as a "bleeding wound," but he was speaking of it as Afghanistan's wound. It is not true, as widely believed, that the Soviet Union had, then or now, suffered a military defeat, taken heavy casualties or paid a debilitating economic price in Afghanistan.[7] It is true that the Soviets failed to achieve a quick success that would erase the issue from international attention, and as a result suffered some political setbacks and faced others. The increasing effectiveness of the resistance forces may have prodded the Soviets to conclude they would face growing problems in the future. Equally important, however, by 1986 Moscow had had time to strengthen its puppet regime in Kabul. With international attention focused solely on the withdrawal of uniformed Soviet forces, Moscow could shape a scenario that would defuse international criticism while leaving the U.S.S.R. in effective control.

Throughout 1986 and 1987, the Soviets and their Afghan

[7] Nor does it admit to a defeat. The Soviet public has always been told that their troops are in Afghanistan to "fulfill their internationalist duty," and they are now being told that that duty has been successfully fulfilled, that the threat of outside aggressors and radical Islam has been ended by Soviet steadfastness and the Geneva accords, and that their sons can now come home proudly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clients made extensive preparations inside Afghanistan. These were of two sorts; the first to consolidate control—through such organs as the secret police (KHAD, now called WAD), Border Guards, mercenary tribal militias, as well as a reconstructed military; through a tightening grip on the Afghan economy; and through a Sovietization program affecting all aspects of Afghan society. The second was to set up a facade of legitimacy for the regime in preparation for the political campaign launched at the end of 1986 to persuade the world that peace was nearly at hand.

Babrak Karmal, installed in power by the invasion, had proven unable to control the divided Afghan communist party, let alone the country, and was unacceptable to world opinion; in 1986 he was replaced by the KGB-trained former head of KHAD, Dr. Najibullah. Throughout 1987 cosmetic changes in political institutions were made: a hand-picked Loya Jirga (Great National Assembly) was convened; a new constitution adopted; rigged but ostentatious local and parliamentary elections held; and a "government of reconciliation" announced, a recycled version of Babrak Karmal's failed "broadening the base" campaign in 1981. A law was issued legalizing political parties other than the PDPA; however, the parties must provide the regime with a complete list of their membership and funding sources and wait two months for approval.

In November 1987 Soviet sources began to float rumors of an early Soviet military withdrawal. With the next Geneva negotiations scheduled for February 22, 1988, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said that a Soviet troop withdrawal could begin on May 1 if accords were signed by March 1. (This was a concrete formulation of the 60-day implementation interval already agreed upon.) Shevardnadze's statement got little public attention until, the Geneva meeting having been postponed by two weeks, Mr. Gorbachev made his dramatic public proposal on February 8 to begin withdrawing troops on May 15—if the accords were signed by March 15. Moscow also agreed to complete its withdrawal in nine months instead of the four years it had demanded five years earlier. This was greeted as a startling breakthrough.

Mr. Cordovez, the Soviet Union and the Kabul regime promptly called upon the United States to fulfill its 1985 commitments, and the State Department, though still hedging on whether they existed, responded as though they did. It then became known that the United States would be committing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself to cut off all U.S. military aid to the resistance when the Soviet troop withdrawal began.

V

At this point a great deal of hectic and confusing activity began, both publicly and behind the scenes, as proponents pressed to get the accords signed by the Soviet deadline and skeptics attempted, without success, to find out exactly what was in the still-secret agreements.

The Soviets and the Kabul regime were pressing for swift acceptance of the accords, without changes and by the Soviet-imposed deadline. The Afghan resistance and refugees were opposed to such a settlement. President Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan came under great Soviet pressure, including a campaign of subversion and terrorism on Pakistani soil, to sign the accords. He found them so defective that his government initially refused to sign without significant changes. When the Pakistan government raised questions about issues not resolved by the accords, the Soviet Union at first threatened to cancel its troop withdrawal if the accords were not signed by its deadline, and then reversed itself, saying that withdrawal would begin whether the accords were signed or not.

Meanwhile in the United States, Congress had been attempting to ascertain and influence the U.S. government's position and role in the proposed settlement. In late February the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings at which Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert A. Peck testified:

> The obligation which the United States would undertake as a "guarantor" would relate exclusively to our own policies and actions. We would bear no responsibility for the actions of others, or for the successful implementation of the agreement as a whole. We and the Soviet Union would agree to the same basic commitment regarding noninterference and nonintervention. We would be prepared, if completely satisfied with the agreement, to prohibit U.S. military assistance to the Afghan resistance. We would expect the Soviet Union to show reciprocal restraint under the Geneva accords in stopping its military support for the Kabul regime. . . . The commitments of all the parties would enter into effect on an agreed date following signature; at the present time this is expected to be at the end of 60 days.

At the same hearing, Vincent M. Cannistraro, assistant to the assistant secretary of defense for international security

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

affairs, testified that the only monitoring force—the ten to 50 men mentioned in the annex—would be

> intended to function as an observer or monitoring group rather than as a peacekeeping force . . . to conduct investigations . . . in response to reports of alleged violations of the Geneva agreement. . . . They have virtually no capability to influence, restrain or otherwise adjudicate local disagreements over alleged violations of a cease-fire or withdrawal accord. . . . The force would . . . have to have a physical presence at each major activity within the country and at each major border crossing.

That seems an impossibility for 50 men in a mountainous country larger than France. Moreover, though it is unclear in the accords, the U.N. teams will apparently not monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Press comments indicate widespread confusion on this point.

These statements, particularly Mr. Peck's, outraged some senators. On February 29, 1988, Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd declared on the floor of the Senate, "I am shocked at the language. . . . I am not only shocked, I am stunned. . . . This does not comport with what Secretary Shultz and the President have said to me. . . . This would be a sellout by the United States, if I understand it correctly . . . and it would be a shameful sellout." Told that the State Department had declined to provide Senator Humphrey with the text of the accords, Byrd continued: "The Senate must not be kept in the dark," and asked whether "the Administration may be so eager to come to an agreement with the Soviets on a START treaty, so eager for a summit that [it] may be about to enter into an agreement detrimental to the interests of the Afghan resistance. This country ought to be very careful," he added, "that it does not commit a dishonorable act to accommodate the Soviet Union."

The Senate unanimously passed a resolution calling for the continuation of U.S. aid of all kinds to the Afghan resistance as long as Soviet aid goes to the Kabul client regime, along with a number of other requirements for a satisfactory diplomatic solution.[8]

Under Senate pressure, the State Department reformulated U.S. policy to require "symmetry," i.e., U.S. military aid to the Afghan resistance as long as the U.S.S.R. provides similar

[8] *Congressional Record*, Vol. 134, No. 21, Feb. 29, 1988, p. S1608.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

aid to its client regime in Kabul, a policy reiterated in the statement submitted by Secretary Shultz in Geneva on April 14. How this position is to be reconciled with the accords, including U.S. guarantees to ensure noninterference, has not been revealed. Furthermore, given the geography of the region, it is unclear just how the United States can, practically speaking, deliver significant support to the Afghan resistance if Pakistan fulfills its obligations under the accord on noninterference and nonintervention.

The Soviet Union immediately denounced the Senate action and the new U.S. policy of symmetry, accusing the United States of obstructing peace. Moscow also declared that Soviet aid of all kinds to the Kabul regime would continue indefinitely; the Soviets claim that, unlike aid to the resistance, its aid has legal status under bilateral agreements going all the way back to the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1921, and is unaffected by the accords.[9]

Pakistan, strengthened by Senate and other support and concerned about defects it saw in the accords, still did not want to accept the present Kabul regime as cosignatory; it called instead for the establishment of an independent interim government acceptable to the majority of the Afghan people. It argued that this should occur before the signing took place for two reasons: to sign the accords with the Soviet-installed regime in Kabul would in some degree grant it long-sought legitimacy; and without a government acceptable to the Afghan people, most of the more than three million refugees who have been living in Pakistan for nearly a decade would probably refuse to go home.

The March deadline came and went, and was extended. President Zia held firmly to his position despite intense pressure. As April began and the Soviet withdrawal deadline approached, high-level officials began shuttling between Moscow, Washington, Islamabad and Kabul in a burst of feverish activity. The Kabul regime kept a low profile and apparently played a minor role, but Najibullah finally went to Tashkent, where he met with Gorbachev. In Geneva, U.N. Secretary Cordovez and Robert Peck for the United States insisted that the nego-

[9] In recent months, interestingly enough, the Soviets have chosen to invoke this 1921 treaty rather than the 1978 one previously invoked—perhaps because it long antedates the communist takeover in Kabul. The choice has certain drawbacks, however, since the Soviet Union violated several clauses in the 1921 treaty with the ink scarcely dry, including one promising the return of Afghan territory seized by the tsars.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tiating session would not adjourn without a signed agreement, however long it took. Senator Humphrey flew to Pakistan and Geneva, cabling President Reagan to report the unanimous opposition of the Afghan resistance to the accords under negotiation. One resistance figure told an American despairingly: "Everything we fought for is lost. We have been betrayed."

The Soviet Union's pressure on Pakistan included a scarcely veiled threat to reactivate Afghan irredentist claims against its Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, raising the specter of communal strife. Terrorist activities in Pakistan intensified. The State Department, too, undertook a strenuous effort to persuade Pakistan to drop its reservations, accept the Kabul regime as cosignatory and sign. Eventually, under the intense pressure from all quarters, including its domestic opposition, the government of Pakistan agreed and the accords, still totally secret, were signed on April 14 to enter into force, despite the late signing date, on May 15 as the U.S.S.R. had insisted.

VI

The primary virtue claimed for the accords is that they will lead to the withdrawal of Soviet uniformed forces from Afghanistan by February 1989. Although the Soviets had said they would withdraw in any case, supporters point out that the accords offer the advantage of a specified timetable. Yet, as noted, there is no mechanism for verification or enforcement of the Soviet pledges.

Neither is there an authoritative definition of what comprises a "complete" withdrawal. The Soviet Union has never made public the exact size of its "limited military contingent" in Afghanistan, and deployment has varied with military needs. The method of troop rotation (which takes place twice a year throughout the entire Soviet army) is that new troops are introduced in small units over a period of time and are dispersed to various posts, while those whose tour of duty is finished are subsequently sent home en masse. In the nearest thing to an official Soviet figure given so far, an editor of *Pravda*, in a recent interview with the Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*, said that there were 90,000 troops in Afghanistan. For several years the U.S. State Department has been saying that the number is "approximately" 115,000. Some independent analysts have estimated deployment varying from 150,000 to 170,000 in recent years. This range is very large indeed; what is the correct number? Nobody but Moscow

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knows. This greatly complicates efforts to ascertain whether the Soviet Union has fulfilled even the vague and limited obligation mentioned in the Geneva accords.

Information provided by captured or defecting Soviets and Afghan communists indicates that several thousand Soviet Central Asian troops of all ranks have been seconded to the Afghan armed forces, particularly the KHAD-controlled Border Guards. They are reportedly infiltrated into all important units, wearing Afghan uniforms and are to remain there, assuming Afghan identity. How will such reports be checked, and if they prove to be accurate, what action will be taken?

How far will Soviet troops be withdrawn? Will large numbers be stationed immediately across the border from Afghanistan, where they can continue to conduct sorties against the Afghan resistance? Will Soviet aircraft continue to carry out attacks against Afghan territory from bases in the U.S.S.R. as they have in the past? What will happen if the Afghan regime, faced with increasing opposition, invokes the 1978 or 1921 treaty to ask that troops return at some time after the withdrawal? None of these questions was addressed in the accords or by subsequent statements.

What are the prospects for the bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on noninterference and nonintervention? If carried out to the letter this accord, particularly the specific provisions of Article II, would bar the government of Pakistan from providing any sanctuary or assistance to the Afghan resistance or any other opponents of the present regime in Kabul—and from allowing anyone else to provide such assistance through the territory of Pakistan. Few details are overlooked; even allowing the press to interview opponents of the Kabul regime could be construed as a violation (paragraph 12). It is this agreement above all that aroused so much opposition to the signing of the accords. As guarantor, the United States essentially committed itself to cut off aid of any sort to the Afghan opposition, and to make sure its ally, the government of Pakistan, does the same.

As for Afghanistan's pledge not to intervene in Pakistan: the bombings, assassinations and other terrorist actions, threats and subversion carried out there by KHAD/WAD agents have not stopped. On one day, April 10—just before the signing—there were four incendiary explosions and bombings in four different cities, including the massive destruction of the Pakistani arms dump near Islamabad which left nearly a hundred

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dead and more than a thousand wounded. President Zia openly labeled the Islamabad explosion sabotage, and Pentagon and Pakistani sources have identified it as the work of KHAD. One analyst described it as "a classic *spetsnaz* operation." Other, less dramatic incidents continue.

The U.N. General Assembly's call for a commitment to Afghanistan's territorial integrity is negated by the refusal of both Moscow and Kabul to acknowledge the Soviet annexation of the Wakhan Corridor, which occurred de facto in May 1980 and was confirmed by a secret treaty in June 1981. It was announced on Kabul radio, then hastily denied, but an Italian journalist managed to get into the Wakhan and photographed the Soviet flag flying over government offices.

"Preservation of the nonaligned character" of Afghanistan is equally dubious; the Kabul regime has adopted the simple expedient of announcing itself to be independent, nonaligned, neutral and nonsocialist, repeating the formula on such occasions as the anniversary celebrations of the Russian October Revolution and the birthday of Lenin.

A massive program of Sovietization is being imposed on every aspect of Afghan society. Since 1978, and especially since 1986, hundreds of agreements, treaties and protocols have been concluded between the Afghan regime and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern-bloc countries, particularly East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria and, in the last year or so, between individual Soviet republics, oblasts and cities and their Afghan counterparts. These give the Soviets and their allies total control of Afghanistan's economy, its rich natural resources, education, media and other social and political institutions. Political and economic structures are being set up to control and possibly detach the mineral-rich provinces north of the Hindu Kush ranges from the southern areas which have been so devastated by the war.

This extensive network of agreements was not addressed in the accords, but it and other factors raise questions about genuine independence and self-determination for Afghanistan, an issue removed from the agenda before the talks began. As specified by the Kabul regime: "No questions concerning the existing regime in Afghanistan, its type of government or other of its internal matters can be discussed."

Many are assuming that the Kabul regime will quickly collapse as soon as Soviet forces are gone, its members fleeing to sanctuary in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe or possibly a Soviet-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

controlled northern zone of a newly divided Afghanistan, where a government infrastructure rivaling Kabul has already been created. But it is not certain that the Kabul regime will speedily collapse; it now has in place a group of military and paramilitary forces that may be capable of maintaining the regime, especially if the resistance is isolated and deprived of aid.

Much has been made of the fact that the Afghan army fighting the resistance is filled with conscripts who have little loyalty to the regime and are often actively opposed to it, and who desert, often to the resistance, at the first opportunity. This is true of the infantry. It is not true of the air force and the tank corps, the branches which carried out the coups of 1973 and 1978, whose personnel are for the most part trained in the Soviet Union and selected carefully for indoctrination. Several analysts estimate that by now roughly 90 percent of the Afghan air force officers are loyal to the regime, as are many of the Border Guards, armored divisions, commandos and other quality ground forces created since 1981. Defectors also report a secret Afghan army numbering 18,000–20,000, which has been trained in the Soviet Union, is loyal to the communist regime and has been held in reserve to replace Soviet forces when they are withdrawn. Since it is estimated that only 15,000–20,000 of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan are used in the actual fighting, such a trained reserve army might effectively replace them. In addition, the regime has established well-paid paramilitary forces totaling more than 100,000, including locally based tribal militias. Even if the personnel in these forces are not ideologically committed to the regime, they have in many cases gone too far along the path of collaboration to be able to turn back; their future and even survival now depend on the survival of the regime.

KHAD/WAD, the secret police trained by and modeled on the KGB, has taken over key positions in all major government ministries and departments. Directed by 1,500 Soviet KGB officers, it now has an estimated annual budget of $160 million (covering operations in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan), 4,000 Afghan officers who have received advanced training in the Soviet Union, and many thousands of agents. Even if some of the latter are coerced or bought, they too are now dependent on the regime for their own survival. The survival of the regime depends not on its control of the entire countryside but on its control of several key cities—above all, Kabul, which has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reportedly been turned into a fortress. In the past year or so, its defense perimeter has been extended to 30 kilometers and so reinforced that some resistance units which once operated freely in and around the capital can no longer even penetrate its defenses.

This does not mean, of course, that the regime cannot be overthrown. It has many internal problems to contend with, in addition to the resistance and the almost universal hatred of the people. But the assumption that it will, in the words of Robert Peck, "splinter and fall of its own weight even before the final Soviet pullout . . . and [that] its early demise will be inevitable" seems unduly sanguine. The present leadership may not necessarily remain in place. Najibullah might step aside or be forced out as president, to be replaced by one of several Soviet-controlled agents without visible communist party connections. Such a figure could claim to head a noncommunist "government of reconciliation." But it would be so in name only, no more acceptable to the resistance than the present regime; in this scenario the war would most likely continue.

VII

Prospects for the voluntary return of approximately 3.5 million Afghan refugees currently in Pakistan do not appear very bright. The text of the bilateral agreement on refugees is vague and unclear about implementation. It emphasizes that return of refugees is to be "voluntary"; after 18 months the signatories are to "consider any further arrangements that may be called for." It is not clear how millions of refugees are to be persuaded to return to live under a government they detest, reject and have fled, particularly when the most likely alternatives they would be returning to face are either continuation of the present regime, with or without the addition of a few non-PDPA faces, or a state of insurrection and continuing warfare.

The Afghan regime promises in Article II of this accord to grant returning refugees the same rights, privileges and obligations it offers to its other citizens—promises which for nine years have proven to be unsuccessful inducements. Over the past years only a few thousand have responded to such invitations to return made by the Kabul regime. The phrase "in safety and honor," used in all General Assembly resolutions to describe conditions enabling the Afghan refugees to return to their homes, appears nowhere in the accord. The Kabul regime

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

claims to fulfill this requirement by its offers of "amnesty" (with varying conditions attached), which simply invite the refugees to return and accept, on the basis of unguaranteed promises, the regime in existence.

All reliable surveys of the refugees indicate that they will not return home until "the Russians" have left their country. However, this should not be taken as an indication that Soviet troop withdrawal alone will result in a mass movement homeward. The vast majority of the refugees are unsophisticated farmers and villagers who see no difference between Soviet personnel, Afghan communist party members, Marxist sympathizers and collaborators. To ordinary Afghans, they are all the same—"the Russians and the servants of the Russians."

In his most recent report (February 26, 1988), the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights states that no significant number of refugees will go home until a government in which they have confidence has been established—which by definition excludes a communist or Soviet-dominated regime. His report vindicates Pakistan's earlier demand for an interim government before the signing of the accords, lest their signing legitimize and entrench the present regime and the refugees refuse to go home.

What if the majority of refugees do not choose to return voluntarily at this time? There are disturbing reports that the assistance on which they survive may be cut off, leaving them no alternative but to go home. It is unlikely that the government of Pakistan would order its troops to attack the refugees, and unlikely that Pakistani troops would turn their weapons on Muslim women and children even if so ordered, but certain Pathan tribes in the Administered Tribal Territories (where most of the refugee camps are located) have threatened to evict the Afghans forcibly. The likely reaction of well-armed resistance men to any attempt to move their families by force can be easily imagined, and could result in grave turmoil in Pakistan. In this event, the international recognition of Pakistan's hospitality to millions of destitute refugees for nearly a decade would be buried by an image of inhumanity.

The land to which the refugees would return has been transformed by Soviet weaponry and tactics into a desert wasteland. Out of 22,000 villages in prewar Afghanistan, an estimated 15,000 have been destroyed and another 5,000 made uninhabitable. Most refugees will have no homes to return to—only heaps of rubble—and no money with which to recon-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struct their lives. Millions of farm animals have been deliberately slaughtered. The millenia-old irrigation systems on which farming depends have been destroyed, the orchards and vineyards cut down, the fields strewn with an estimated five million mines. Water supplies, health care, educational systems, road networks—all have been wiped out, especially in the belt south of Kabul, which Najibullah has offered to put at the refugees' disposal.

A massive international program of reconstruction and resettlement aid, to be budgeted at one billion dollars for the first year, is planned by the United Nations. U.N. sources have said that this aid will be channeled through the Kabul regime, which will not only help to support the regime but will give Kabul leverage in rural areas that it has not been able to achieve in ten years of war. Officials of private humanitarian agencies fear a repetition of the Ethiopian tragedy: the resettled refugees would be forced to accept government control or face starvation. There would no longer be a relief infrastructure in Pakistan for them to return to.

VIII

The role of the Soviet Union is formally established by its signature on the Declaration on International Guarantees, and on the Afghan-Pakistani nonintervention accord as a witness. But it remains unclear what precisely it has agreed to do. Since interference is defined in a way that fails to cover the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, it is unclear just what "interference" the U.S.S.R. has guaranteed to halt. Does interference include the presence of well over ten thousand Soviet, East-bloc and even Cuban military, economic and political advisers?[10] They were not under discussion in Geneva, and Soviet and Afghan leaders have flatly declared that these advisers will remain in Afghanistan.

What then is the value of the Soviet role as guarantor of this accord? Is it solely as a parallel to the U.S. guarantees? Supporters of the accords might say that the Soviet guarantee opened the way to the policy of symmetry, which will enable the United States to match Soviet military aid to its clients with

[10] The ubiquity of such advisers has been frequently noted. When *Washington Post* correspondent Lally Weymouth visited Kabul in the fall of 1987 and interviewed President Najibullah, she reported a Soviet adviser in watchful attendance beside him throughout the entire interview. Afghans who knew Babrak Karmal socially said that while president he asked permission of his Soviet attendants to invite a friend to stay for lunch.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American aid to the resistance. A letter on this from Shevardnadze to Shultz is still held secret. Putting aside the practical and logistical problems of such U.S. aid, neither the accords nor the "symmetry doctrine" says anything about what the U.S.S.R. can provide to its own forces until their withdrawal is complete. The Soviet Union can therefore oversupply its own forces with enough weapons and matériel to last for a decade if it chooses—and there is nothing in the accords to prevent them from leaving it all behind when they depart. Moscow could then invoke the doctrine of symmetry, claiming to have voluntarily ceased supplying the Afghan army and calling on the United States to halt its aid to the mujahedeen. That is exactly what appears to be happening.

These are obviously accords that the Soviet Union was eager to see signed, preferably with but even without American guarantees. They fulfill the first and most essential requirement of its time-tested strategy for subduing resistance and armed insurrections, i.e., to isolate the area, the rebellious population and its forces. Once isolated, they can in time be crushed. Tsars and commissars alike have tested and developed this strategy, from the Caucasus in the 1850s to Turkestan in the 1920s; the process has usually taken about 20 to 25 years to complete. Thus, to their critics, the Geneva negotiations and the resulting accords have provided a solution to the wrong problem: an arrangement for the long-term Soviet consolidation of control in Afghanistan without the overt use of its uniformed military forces, and in a manner satisfactory to world opinion.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION

Article II

For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

(1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;

(2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;

(3) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;

(4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;

(5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;

(6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;

(7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting Party;

(8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;

(9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

(10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

(11) to prevent any assistance or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;

(12) to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;

(13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

*****

U.S. STATEMENT

The United States has agreed to act as a guarantor of the political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. We believe this settlement is a major step forward in restoring peace to Afghanistan, in ending the bloodshed in that unfortunate country, and in enabling millions of Afghan refugees to return to their homes.

In agreeing to act as a guarantor, the United States states the following:

(1) The troop withdrawal obligations set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Instrument on Interrelationships are central to the entire settlement. Compliance with those obligations is essential to achievement of the settlement's purposes, namely, the ending of foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the restoration of the rights of the Afghan people through the exercise of self determination as called for by the United Nations Charter and the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan.

(2) The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetrical. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union that, if the USSR undertakes, as consistent with its obligations as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the U.S. retains the right, as consistent with its own obligations as guarantor, likewise effectively to provide such assistance.

(3) By acting as guarantor of the settlement, the United States does not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present regime in Kabul as the lawful Government of Afghanistan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

David Segal

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: A MILITARY ANALYSIS

The eighth year of the Iran-Iraq War is nearly over, but the conflict shows little sign of ending anytime soon. Despite the dramatic events of April, when U.S. and Iranian naval forces clashed in the Persian Gulf, 1988 appears destined to be just another year of bloody stalemate in a seemingly endless war.

Appearances, however, may be deceptive. In the course of the last year or so, Iraq has continued to make significant economic and diplomatic gains while holding its own militarily. Its clear edge in missiles and air power has made the "war of the cities" a decidedly one-sided contest. Much more importantly, with its recapture of the strategic Fao peninsula April 17–18, and despite serious setbacks in the north, Iraq may have actually managed to wrest the land initiative from Iran for the first time in six years.

To appreciate properly the significance of these developments, one must first understand the military situation that has prevailed since the Iranians drove the Iraqi invaders back behind their own borders in the summer of 1982. Since that time, Iran has been slowly winning the war on the ground, while losing it on the economic and diplomatic fronts.

That Iran, with an estimated 6.2 million men fit for military service out of a population of 45.2 million, could be winning a war of attrition against Iraq, whose 15.5 million population includes only 2.03 million men fit for duty, is hardly surprising. If anything, it is surprising that Iraq, despite over two dozen major Iranian offenses since 1982, has kept the numerically superior Iranians at bay for so long.[1]

II

The combatants face each other along a 730-mile front from Turkey to the Persian Gulf. Since 1982 the front lines

[1] Unless otherwise cited, all figures on manpower, armaments and military equipment are from *Military Technology*, No. 13/86, McLean, Va: Mönch Media, Inc., December 1986.

David Segal is a writer who specializes in military affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have approximately coincided with the international border.[2]

Along this vast front, only about 250 miles along the central sector, from Mandali, Iraq, to Bostan, Iran, provide the relatively flat, dry terrain and clear fields of fire that permit the high degree of artillery support, air support and armored mobility necessary for modern mechanized warfare. Iraq's superiority in armor, air power, mobility and training, and its ability to coordinate combined arms operations, show to best advantage on this ground. Every major Iranian attack in this sector has been a bloody disaster, and, if the choice were theirs, the Iraqis would undoubtedly want most of the fighting to take place here. The Iranians, naturally, have not obliged; their major effort is in the southern sector, with a respectable secondary effort in the north.

In the north, the nearly 320-mile front from Oshnoviyeh, Iran, to Khanaqin, Iraq, is mountainous, with peaks ranging from 3,000 to 10,000 feet in height and averaging around 4,000 feet. This sort of terrain allows restricted fields of fire and less effective tactical air support. Mobility is very limited for anything but troops on foot, and armor is largely restricted to a few easily blocked roads. Since air power, firepower, armor and mobility are Iraq's chief military assets, the northern sector is a difficult one for the Iraqis.

By the same token, the poorly trained and lightly equipped infantry formations that make up Iran's *basij* militia (Popular Mobilization Army) and the somewhat better-trained and -equipped infantry units of the *pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guards Corps) show to best advantage in such terrain. Despite the northern sector's intrinsic suitability for Iranian operations, it was not until March 1988 that the Iranians made what appears to have been their main effort in this area.

When they finally did so, the results were spectacular. Iranian forces captured several Kurdish towns, including Halabja, and penetrated to within 75 miles of Kirkuk and 15 miles of the Darbandikhan Dam. This brought the vital Kirkuk oil fields within range of Iranian missiles and the dam within Iranian artillery range. The dam, situated on the southern shore of Lake Darbandikhan, is about 18 miles from Halabja, and supplies much of Baghdad's electricity and water. Only the

[2] Iraqi forces still remain inside Iran in a number of places (notably in the central sector), and Iranian troops have captured territory inside Iraq (notably in Iraqi Kurdestan).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

timely arrival of Iraqi reinforcements and the massive employment of air power and chemical weapons saved it from Iranian conquest. Given this kind of success, further Iranian offensives in the northern sector can be expected.

Until this year the main Iranian effort has focused on the south, for several reasons. By gaining ground in the southern sector, the Iranians cut off Iraq's direct access to the Persian Gulf and brought its second-largest city and main port, Basra, within artillery range. Iran hoped to break Iraqi morale and bring down President Saddam Hussein by actually taking the city. Indeed, since 1982, the Iranians have made the capture of Basra their major military goal, just as the Union Army made the capture of Richmond its chief goal in the early days of the American Civil War. Iran has yet to learn, as the Union Army eventually did, that wars are won by destroying the enemy's armed forces in the field and its economic ability to wage war. As long as these remain intact, the capture of geographical objectives like Basra is of little value.

Still, it is along this 160-mile southern sector, from Bostan in the north to the Persian Gulf in the south, that the Iranians have launched their most serious attacks since their first offensive against Basra in July 1982. While the terrain is flat and open, it is also largely wet and marshy and thus unsuited to armored operations.

The sector's most notable geographic feature is the vast marshland of the Hawr al-Hawizah—80 miles long and as much as 60 miles wide—extending south from Bostan to about 20 miles north of Basra. Offensive operations here are almost impossible, but defense is relatively easy. On the other hand, the infiltration of small groups of lightly equipped infantry is also relatively easy; this favors the Iranians, who infiltrate the area and threaten Highway 6—the main road connecting Baghdad and Basra—from their swampland strongholds. This tactic forces Iraq to devote considerable resources to clearing out small Iranian units and keeping the road open.

Further south, from Basra to the Gulf, the land is dryer, firmer and better suited to Iraq's mobile armored tactics, except in the rainy season, from November through March. Here the Iranians have to attack across the Shatt al-Arab and numerous smaller waterways, facing Iraqi troops in well-prepared positions protected by interlocking fields of fire, preregistered artillery, barbed wire and minefields. While time and again this has proven a sure recipe for disaster, the Iranians

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

persist in making their main effort here, gradually grinding the Iraqis down by sheer force of numbers.

Most Iranian operations in the southern sector are characterized by the "big push" strategy that made World War I a byword for military incompetence, but Iran's stunning capture of the Fao peninsula in February 1986 was a notable success.[3] Unlike the usual Iranian attempts to smash through by brute force, the 1986 operation was an amphibious landing behind Iraq's river-line defenses. The Iranians took Iraq's main naval base at Fao and threatened to roll up the whole Iraqi line. This threat was only contained at the cost of heavy casualties to Iraq's best mobile units, including the elite Republican Guards Armored Brigade.

In April of this year, however, the same brigade spearheaded the Iraqi offensive that retook the entire Fao peninsula and drove the Iranians back to their 1986 positions behind the Shatt al-Arab. It may not be entirely coincidental that the Iraqi offensive was launched on the same day that the United States was keeping the Iranian navy fully occupied some 300 miles to the south. U.S. strikes against two Iranian oil platforms in the southern Gulf (in retaliation for Iran's mining activities, which had resulted in the April 14 incident involving the U.S. frigate *Samuel B. Roberts*) cost the Iranians six naval vessels.

Aside from shortening the front a bit, the Iraqi offensive on the Fao peninsula accomplished little of military value. The Shatt al-Arab remains closed to Iraqi shipping, as does the port of Fao. What is significant about the Iraqi attack is that it happened at all. The Fao operation, along with a much smaller raid against outposts of an Iranian armored division near Shush on the central front, demonstrates a new Iraqi willingness to seize the initiative on the ground, and may even herald a general Iraqi shift to offensive warfare.[4] If so, Iran will be on the defensive for the first time since 1981.

[3] At the time, several Iraqi sources told me that they had "certain knowledge" that Iran's decision to attack the Fao peninsula was based on satellite photos and intelligence provided by the United States. Their claims were later supported by Oliver North's 1987 testimony before the joint Senate-House hearings on the Iran-contra affair.

[4] The Iraqis claim the Shush raid as a major victory for the National Liberation Army (NLA) of anti-Khomeini Iranians who support Mujahedeen-al-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi. The raid was apparently conducted by regular Iraqi units and credited to the NLA for propaganda purposes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

Iran has held the initiative for nearly six years now, but has not been able to make its three-to-one manpower advantage tell; the reason is largely one of logistics.

A cursory look at the statistics clearly shows that Iraq has an impressive lead in major operational military items like tanks (4,000 to Iran's 1,040), armored fighting vehicles (3,000 to 750) and combat aircraft (632 to 70). But that is only the beginning.

The Iraqi armed forces are organized along Soviet lines and rely almost entirely on Soviet or Soviet-type equipment, which is rugged and easy to maintain under primitive conditions. Iran, by contrast, began the war relying heavily on U.S. and Western equipment, which is much more difficult to maintain and, because of its hostile relations with its former arms suppliers, extremely difficult to replace. Iran's U.S. and Israeli arms shipments during President Reagan's disastrous Iran-contra arms initiative, even together with American equipment obtained through other sources, are simply not enough for fighting a war. Because of this, Iran has had to seek military equipment elsewhere, obtaining considerable quantities of Soviet-type ordnance from China, Syria, Libya, North Korea and, according to some sources, the Soviet Union itself.

Indeed, almost all recent film of Iranian troops in action instantly reveals two things: most of the troops are *pasdaran* rather than regular army, and most of their equipment is of Soviet or Chinese origin. While the Iranians surely welcome this equipment, its integration into their logistics network is no simple matter. The state of Iran's armored forces provides a vivid example. When the war began in September 1980, Iran had 1,735 main battle tanks that used three different main gun calibers.[5] Today, Iran's 1,040 estimated operational tanks use seven main gun calibers and require a vastly greater assortment of spare parts.[6] Such a situation would overwhelm any country's supply services.

Iraq, by contrast, has greatly simplified its logistic situation. In 1980 Iraq's four main battle tank types needed four differ-

[5] Iran's tanks included 875 British Chieftains, 460 American M-601A1s, and 400 American M-47/48s, according to *The Military Balance, 1981–82,* London: Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 1981.

[6] These tanks include the Argentine TAM, the British Chieftain and Scorpion, the Chinese T-59, the American M-41, M-47/48 and M-601A1, and the Soviet T-54/55, T-62 and T-72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ent tank rounds.[7] The four types of tanks Iraq now uses require only three main gun rounds.[8] In addition, two of Iraq's tanks, the T-54/55 and the T-59/69, are essentially the same; their parts are interchangeable with each other and, to a large extent, with those of a third tank, the T-62.

The Iraqis have another advantage. They can rely on their main arms supplier, the Soviet Union, to keep up deliveries even as they openly buy additional arms from France, Brazil, Austria, China and other countries. Iraq can also count on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to help pay for those arms. Iran's sources of weapons, by contrast, are much more limited, and no one (Iran-contra players excepted) gives Iran weapons or sells on terms other than cash-in-advance.

Iran also has some major problems with battlefield logistics, i.e., bringing soldiers and equipment to the front from Iran's urban centers. Any movement along the roads, especially near the front, is subject to devastating strikes by Iraq's vastly superior air force.

Iraq, on the other hand, has an excellent network of roads running close to the front on a north-south axis. This enables the Iraqis to shift their mobile reserves rapidly to counter Iranian threats and pinch off Iranian penetrations. Highway 6 runs right along the front in the area of the heaviest fighting around Basra. Occasionally this route has been closed by Iranian attacks and shellings, but Basra is also connected to the rest of the country from the west by another highway and Iraq's main rail line. As an extra bonus, of course, all major Iraqi troop movements by rail and road are protected by the Iraqi air force.

IV

Even with all these liabilities, Iran would have easily won the war by now if the shah's well-trained, professional military had not been deliberately destroyed by the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. Indeed, one of Khomeini's first acts after he seized power on February 11, 1979, was to order a purge of the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces and particularly the officer corps, which he correctly regarded as a hotbed of monarchist sentiment. To make matters worse, the best and most experi-

[7] The tanks were the Soviet T-34, T-54/55 and T-62, and the French AMX-30.

[8] The Soviet T-54/55, T-62, T-72 and the Chinese T-59/69. Iraq still maintains its French AMX-30s, but they are not actively used.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enced officers had been trained in the United States and Israel and therefore were not trusted by the new regime. The air force, whose entire fighting element—the combat pilots—is composed of officers, was especially hard hit.

Following the initial Iraqi invasion of September 22, 1980, hundreds of experienced Iranian officers were hastily rehabilitated. Many went to the front directly from prison cells, where they had been awaiting execution. One, Colonel Bezahd Mo'ezi, became Iran's most distinguished combat pilot and most famous early war hero; but in June 1981 Mo'ezi took permanent leave of the Islamic Republic, taking a DC-10 cargo plane, deposed President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and several other opposition leaders with him.

By July 1982 the Iranian regulars, *pasdaran* and *basij* had stopped the Iraqis cold and driven them behind the old borders. Then, in a stunning display of ingratitude, the mullahs resumed their purge of the armed forces as soon as the immediate danger was over. That purge still goes on. It is perhaps the most devastating destruction of a military force by its own government since Stalin's Red Army purges of 1936–38. Precise information is very difficult to obtain and nearly impossible to verify, but it would appear that more than 5,000 Iranian officers have been executed by their own government, while additional thousands have been imprisoned or forced into exile.[9] Those who remain are supervised by "spiritual guidance officers," just as post-purge Red Army line officers were supervised by political commissars.[10]

The effect of all this on Iranian morale and combat performance can easily be imagined. In addition, the *pasdaran* were deliberately established as a rival military organization that would be loyal to the regime and subordinate to their own commander rather than the armed forces chief of staff. Today there are some 250,000 first-line *pasdaran*, organized in nine infantry divisions and an unknown number of air, naval and security units. These are augmented by some 500,000 *basij* militia, which come under direct *pasdaran* command. Eventually the more than two million soldiers of the regular armed

[9] This estimate is my own, derived from Israeli, Iraqi, Amnesty International, Iranian exile and domestic Iranian sources.

[10] Tehran's official daily, *Kayhan*, frequently boasts about this curious command structure. There is even a Ministry of Enlightenment (*Ershad*) to which the "spiritual guidance officers" report.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forces are likely to be incorporated into the *pasdaran* command structure.

Since *pasdaran* commanders were chosen for religious enthusiasm and political loyalty rather than military competence, their initial performance was poor. Seven years of war, however, have brutally weeded out the worst *pasdaran* leaders (as well as many of their unfortunate men) and left behind a battle-hardened cadre of experienced officers. As a result, *pasdaran* combat performance has shown marked improvement since 1986.

As things now stand, Iran has mobilized about 2.25 million first-line ground troops (two million army and 250,000 *pasdaran*) in addition to the 500,000 second-rate *basij* militia. Another million men (about 500,000 *basij*, 400,000 army reservists and 100,000 *pasdaran*) can be mobilized if needed.[11]

Iraqi manpower looks weak by comparison. The Iraqis have 475,000 first-line army troops, 450,000 second-line Popular Army troops and 75,000 trained reservists. Iran would appear to have a 4.8-to-one edge in mobilized first-line ground forces, a three-to-one edge in total mobilized ground forces and a 13-to-one lead in manpower reserves. But these figures do not tell the whole story.

While Iraq's quantitative and qualitative superiority in military equipment helps offset Iran's sheer numbers, the Iraqi army's superior training, organization and morale is at least as significant. Unlike the fearful and uncertain Iranian regulars, who are purged, spied upon and saddled with militarily incompetent "spiritual guidance officers," the Iraqi army has the full and enthusiastic support of its government.

If anything, the Iraqi government tries to gain popular support through close association with the armed forces. President Saddam Hussein, who is a political rather than a military leader, usually wears army uniform and often visits units at the front. Indeed, his presence at the front when Iraq retook the Fao peninsula in April 1988 was given wide publicity. While the Iraqi press avoids creating military heroes that could rival the Baath Party leadership, successful Iraqi commanders are almost always rewarded and almost never interfered with.

As a result, the Iraqi army has handily won nearly all the defensive battles of the past six years, and morale remains high

[11] The *basij* and *pasdaran* figures are estimates based on Iranian newspaper accounts. The figure for army reservists is from *Military Technology, op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

despite the fact that Iran has been gradually winning through sheer attrition. Quantitatively, Iraq has more than doubled the army's first-line manpower from less than 200,000 when the war began to about 475,000 today. Qualitatively, these troops are more mobile, better-equipped, -trained and -led than Iran's first-line army and *pasdaran* units.

Iraq's ground forces also include the 450,000 second-line troops of the Popular Army under the command of Deputy Premier Taha Yassin Ramadhan. Formed in 1970 as a sort of Baath Party militia to counterbalance the political power of the Iraqi regular army, the Popular Army has been transformed by the war into a highly effective local area defense force, organized into regional commands. Since its primary mission is local area defense, its troops lack the firepower, heavy equipment and mobility of the Iraqi regulars. Even so, they are better armed and more mobile than most of the Iranians they encounter. Indeed, these second-line Iraqis are essentially equivalent to many of Iran's first-line forces.

Theoretically under Baath Party command, the Popular Army is, in practice, subordinate to General Adnan Khairallah, the armed forces chief of staff, and regular army officers train and command its units.[12] This makes a big difference in combat performance and is the main reason why the Popular Army, so similar to Iran's *pasdaran* in theory, is an enormously superior fighting force in practice. Its role in halting the early Iranian offensives of 1982–83 was crucial, and even today, Iraq's mobile defensive operations would be impossible without the Popular Army units that screen and pin down the attacking Iranians.

V

In 1982, after the Iranians drove the Iraqis back behind their borders, Iraq's military situation was desperate. Lacking both numbers and the overwhelming superiority in firepower and mobility that it would later achieve, Iraq was forced into a "hold-at-all-costs" policy of static defense. Despite the failure of Iran's hastily planned and poorly executed initial offensives, 1983 and early 1984 were desperate times for Iraq, when it looked as if the country would be defeated through sheer force of numbers. Under such conditions Iraq resorted to the introduction of chemical weapons.

[12] Khairallah is President Hussein's brother-in-law. This surely is no coincidence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iraq's decision to violate the 1925 Geneva protocols forbidding the use of chemical weapons (signed by both Iraq and Iran) was not a hasty one. Indeed, as early as 1981—two full years before chemical weapons were used—the Iraqis had built three giant underground bunker complexes around Baghdad to protect top government and armed forces personnel from chemical attack.[13] When the Iraqis finally did initiate chemical warfare in 1983, they had to choose between the possible adverse effects of offending world opinion and the certain adverse effects of being overrun by Iranian soldiers. Under the circumstances, the choice was easy.

Iraq's use of chemical weapons has been essentially defensive, i.e., they have been primarily employed to disrupt Iranian offensives, not to launch Iraqi ones. Under the combat conditions of 1983–84, so eerily similar to those of World War I, chemical weapons were quite effective in neutralizing Iranian operations. Since then Iran has come up with effective countermeasures, and in 1987 Iran also apparently started using chemical weapons on the battlefront, specifically mustard gas and phosgene.[14] Meanwhile, with Iraq's introduction of effective mobile defensive tactics in 1984, its use of chemical weapons has been steadily declining. Iraq's sudden large-scale use of hydrogen cyanide, nerve gas and mustard gas in the Halabja area in March 1988 demonstrates how dangerous the Iranian offensive really was, but it was an exceptional case. Generally, since 1984, the Iraqis have been able to stop Iran's offensives without blatant violations of the 1925 Geneva protocols.

Following a massive influx of Soviet military equipment in early 1984, Iraq was finally able to abandon its static, defensive tactics for a more flexible, mobile defense. The new Iraqi strategy assumes that, with a three-to-one numerical superiority and the option of selecting the time and place to attack, the Iranians will usually break through Iraq's forward defenses. The mobile defense strategy calls for the less-mobile units to hold the line and channel the Iranian breakthrough, while mobile reserve units move in to destroy the attackers.

The Iraqi air force plays a vital role in these operations by destroying Iranian reinforcements in their staging areas and in transit. It also provides close air support to Iraq's ground units,

[13] *New Scientist*, May 17, 1984, p. 3.

[14] For details, see the report of the Secretary General to the U.N. Security Council, S/18852, May 8, 1987, pp. 13–19, 25–31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

knocking out Iranian armor and artillery. Interestingly, the Iraqi air force's recent French training seems to have improved its performance enormously, as rigid Soviet-style tactics have been abandoned. Pilot initiative is now encouraged, targets of opportunity are aggressively sought, and "close ground support" means just that. It is perhaps ironic that Iraq's air force has achieved an impressive operational effectiveness by abandoning Soviet doctrine even while using Soviet aircraft.

Iraq's new ground tactics deliberately allow the Iranians to penetrate a selected area of the front and pour in their reserves. Then, while artillery pins them in place and air strikes interdict their reinforcements, the Iranian penetration is cut up and annihilated by Iraqi armored and mechanized units attacking from one or both flanks with air, artillery and infantry support. Those familiar with U.S. Army tactical doctrine will note that Iraq's mobile defensive tactics have all the elements of "combined arms" operations, albeit in a well-rehearsed, "set-piece battle" atmosphere. So far these tactics have worked every time—largely because Iranian operations seem almost designed to bring about Iraqi victories.

Iranian objectives are nearly always geographical—cut the road, take the hill, capture the town—rather than operational—disrupt the enemy's command and control, knock out its artillery and support units, threaten its line of retreat and supply. In addition, Iranians tend to attack frontally and reinforce units that have bogged down or been stopped. They almost never bypass pockets of heavy resistance, reinforce units that have already broken through, or try to hit the enemy's flanks and rear areas. Even with its manpower advantage and a bravery born of religious conviction, such tactics are doomed against dug-in Iraqi positions with interlocking fields of fire, minefields to channel enemy attacks, preregistered artillery, mobile reserves and tactical air support.

Also, Iranian armored doctrine—at least as practiced on the battlefield—calls for massed infantry to achieve the initial breakthrough and for the tanks to exploit it. This is disastrous in practice. The infantry seldom achieves a real breakthrough, and the Iranians either use their armor piecemeal to support the infantry, or do not use it at all.

When the Iranian infantry does clear the way for armor, it is usually into a carefully planned Iraqi ambush. The Iraqis lure the Iranian tanks onto minefields and within range of concealed antitank guns and wire-guided antitank missiles,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pound the Iranians with air power, and cut them up with hard-hitting Iraqi mobile forces attacking from the flanks. It might seem as if the Persians have not learned much since Alexander the Great opened his phalanx to Darius III's chariots in order to slaughter them.

But Iran is still winning the ground war. Even though Iranian operations generally result in casualties twice as high as Iraq's, Iran can afford such losses. Iraq cannot. Thus, despite horrendous losses, Iran is inexorably grinding the Iraqis down.

VI

Iraq, however, has already decisively won the air war and is now using its powerful air force to cripple Iran's economic ability to keep fighting. If this can be achieved, the attrition of Iraqi manpower will seem unimportant by comparison. Air power is the only instrument that Iraq can realistically use to end an otherwise hopeless struggle on something resembling acceptable terms.

Iraq has used its air force to provide tactical air support for the army and to attack Iran's population centers and economic targets. From a military point of view, the value of the attacks on Iranian population centers, the "war of the cities," has been virtually nil. The only real value of these attacks has been their effect on morale. Even an ineffective Iraqi raid on Tehran boosts Iraqi morale—in much the same way as the ineffective Doolittle raid on Tokyo boosted American morale in early 1942. The enemy capital is the preferred target in this kind of exchange and, in this respect, until 1985 Iraq had the advantage because Baghdad is beyond Iranian artillery range. Iran's standard reply to Iraqi air attacks on Tehran was to shell Basra and other Iraqi towns along the border.

Then, in 1985, Iran acquired Soviet-made Scud-A and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles from Libya and Syria. With maximum ranges of about 90 miles and 175 miles respectively, these missiles were able to hit Baghdad from Iranian positions some 80 miles distant, and they could not be intercepted. Iraq was unable to retaliate with its own Scuds because Tehran is about 320 miles from the front, but several all-out raids on Tehran by the Iraqi air force discouraged further Iranian missile attacks on Baghdad. In any case, the Iranian missiles appeared to be in short supply.

Then, in the summer of 1987, Iraqi strike planes attacked Iranian targets along the Caspian Sea over 500 miles from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their own bases. Since this is well beyond their normal attack range, there was some speculation that the Iraqi planes might have refueled in the Soviet Union.

This year's major development in the war of the cities is the bombardment of Tehran by Iraqi missiles, nearly 150 of them so far. According to *Jane's Defence Weekly* these missiles are simply Scud-Bs with an added booster stage, but there has been considerable speculation that they may in fact be Soviet SS-12s, which are due to be scrapped under the U.S.-Soviet treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. The SS-12 is similar to the Scud-B and uses the same transporter/launcher, but its 560-mile reach puts it within easy range of Tehran or, for that matter, Tel Aviv. Both the SS-12 and the Scud are being completely phased out of the Soviet inventory.

The Soviets have chemical warheads for their Scuds. It would be surprising if the Iraqis have neglected to develop or obtain similar warheads for their own missiles, and it would be nearly as surprising if the Iranians have not followed suit. As of this writing, however, neither side has attacked the other's cities with chemical weapons, although Iraq has threatened to do so.

The greatest damage the Iraqi air force has inflicted on Iran up to now has been the result of attacks on economic targets. One unusual feature of this war is that both countries get virtually all the hard currency they use to buy imported arms and military supplies from a single commodity—oil. Thus a loss of oil revenue through reduced production, reduced exports or lower market price can seriously impair either side's ability to wage war. Economic warfare began in earnest in March 1984, when Iraq proclaimed a blockade of all Iranian ports and shipping facilities, with particular emphasis on Iran's vital Kharg Island oil terminal, which at the time handled over 80 percent of Iranian petroleum exports.

The Iraqi navy has never been a match for Iran's. Thus early in the war, before Iraq achieved complete air superiority, Iran was clearly winning the economic struggle, particularly after its artillery effectively closed the Shatt al-Arab to Iraqi shipping in June 1982. Meanwhile, Syria, Iran's Arab ally, shut down Iraq's main oil export pipeline, which ran through Syrian territory. As a result, Iraqi oil exports fell from a prewar level of 1.5 million barrels a day to under 700,000. Iran, whose air force was still functional at the time and whose navy dominated the Gulf, meanwhile boosted its own daily oil shipments to nearly three million barrels.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since then the Iraqis, by doubling the capacity of their Turkish pipeline, building a new pipeline to Saudi Arabia and transshipping their oil through Saudi and Kuwaiti ports, have boosted their exports above two million barrels per day, which, together with hard-currency grants and loans from various Arab countries (especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), is enough to finance their war effort.

Since March 1984, on the other hand, Iranian oil shipments have steadily declined. Persistent and effective Iraqi air raids on the Kharg Island complex eventually drove away foreign shipping and severely reduced the capacity of this all-important facility. Today Iranian oil is transported from Kharg by Iranian vessels, either directly to markets abroad, to the holds of foreign tankers in the southern Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, or to the storage and shipping facilities at Iran's Sirri and Larak Islands.[15] These islands, being 320 and 435 miles farther from Iraqi airfields than Kharg, are proportionately less vulnerable to air attack and serve as loading facilities for foreign tankers.

Despite these vigorous and ingenious measures, Iranian oil exports have fallen to about 1.5 million barrels a day by the most optimistic estimates, and perhaps as low as 500,000 barrels per day. To make matters worse, when Iran was exporting nearly three million barrels a day, oil sold for over $30 per barrel. As of late April, the price of oil stood at $17 per barrel. This is manifestly not enough to support the Iranian war effort, particularly since much Iranian oil is being sold well below market price and nobody is lending, let alone giving, hard currency to Iran.

The adverse effect of this is more decisive than is generally understood. Just as the British naval blockade in World War I put an economic stranglehold on Germany despite Germany's conquests on land, so in the same manner is Iraq defeating Iran. Iraq's economic warfare against Iran has the distinction of being perhaps the sole example in history of a successful economic blockade essentially carried out by air power alone.

VII

The very success of Iraq's air blockade compels Iranian retaliation. Just as Germany attempted to offset Britain's naval blockade through unrestricted submarine warfare, so Iran is

[15] The U.S. attack on Iran's Sirri platform in April is believed to have reduced Iranian oil exports by as much as eight percent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compelled to strike out at those Gulf states, notably Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, that provide Iraq with generous financial support and port facilities.

Iran's attempt to intimidate Kuwait and Saudi Arabia has been in high gear since at least 1986. In a systematic hate campaign, the Iranian media continuously denounced the two countries and charged them with allowing Iraq to use their air bases to attack Iran. Violence-prone antigovernment groups in the two countries were (and are) consistently praised in the Iranian media.

Then came the rioting at Mecca's Grand Mosque on July 31, 1987, in which over 400 people were killed. Iraq's English-language *Baghdad Observer* reported that former Iranian Interior Minister Akhund Nateq-Nuri was among those organizing the riot.[16] The Saudi government openly accused Iran of organizing the riots; the Saudi ambassador in Washington, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, said that Iran might go so far as to launch a war against his country.[17] The Mecca riots were followed by more violence: Iranian crowds attacked the Saudi and Kuwaiti embassies in Tehran; in August a mysterious explosion destroyed a Saudi natural gas complex;[18] and Iran began firing Chinese Silkworm missiles at Kuwaiti port facilities from its positions on the Fao peninsula.

These hostile acts, however, have not had the desired effect; if anything, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have moved closer to Iraq because of them. Any direct military threat that Iran might have posed to Kuwait evaporated when Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula in April. Thus, if Iran still intends to cripple Iraq's economy, its only real choice is to attack the shipping of Iraq's Gulf allies. Iran has tried to do this by indiscriminately laying minefields in international and neutral waters and by attacking neutral shipping throughout the Persian Gulf in the best Barbary corsair tradition.

The Iranians understand that such actions will provoke retaliatory action by one or both of the superpowers (indeed, in April the United States did assume wider responsibility for protecting neutral shipping in the Gulf), but they appear to be counting on the United States and the Soviet Union to prevent

[16] Aug. 11, 1987, p. 1.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] The explosion was officially blamed on an "electrical short," but unconfirmed reports of sabotage abound.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one another from taking serious action. Iran seems willing to risk episodic superpower retaliation for the chance, however slim, of achieving economic victory over Iraq. This sort of high-stakes political risk to gain a military victory is hardly unique to Iran. Indeed, Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 is, perhaps, the classic example of it. Unlike the Germans in 1917, however, Iranians have no reasonable grounds to assume they can cripple the enemy with their present methods.

Iran's continuing depredations against neutral shipping probably indicate that Tehran is counting on the United States and the Soviet Union to neutralize each other in the Persian Gulf. This would be a mistaken assumption, if recent Soviet actions and statements are any indication of the direction of Moscow's policy toward the Iran-Iraq War.

The Soviet Union's ideological hostility toward Iran's theocracy is now at an all-time high. Recent remarks by Dr. A. Z. Arabajan, head of the Iranian Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute for Eastern Studies, are quite revealing: "The so-called Islamic Revolution," he recently told me, "constitutes a step backward from the shah's rule from the point of view of serving crucial historical and economic tasks." This is a far cry from early 1979, when the Soviet press universally praised Khomeini's Islamic Republic as "progressive." Indeed, the Soviet Union now views Iran's Islamic expansionism as a serious problem.

Another indication of Soviet policy came from Gennadi Gerasimov, head of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, widely regarded as the chief spokesman for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Asked about Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf, Gerasimov replied: "We now have something which we haven't had for a very long time: a Soviet-American dialogue, not just on disarmament, but on all the issues. This includes regional conflicts. There are many problems made more difficult by our rivalry that we can solve together."[19] Finally, the Soviet Union pointedly did not condemn America's April 18 attack on Iranian oil platforms and ships.

The best clue to Soviet policy lies in Soviet actions. The U.S.S.R. continues to be Iraq's main arms supplier and is

[19] Talk by Gennadi Gerasimov at the Denver campus of the University of Colorado, Apr. 16, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thought to have provided all of the surface-to-surface missiles that have hit Tehran. Additionally, the chemical munitions used on Iraq's Soviet-made 122-, 130- and 152-millimeter guns and its BM-21 multiple rocket launchers appear suspiciously similar to standard Soviet chemical munitions for these weapons. Finally, there are the unconfirmed reports that the Iraqi planes that bombed Iranian targets along the Caspian Sea near the Soviet border in 1987 refueled in the Soviet Union. These reports seem plausible because the target areas were well beyond the known range of the Iraqi SU-20, MiG-19, MiG-23 and MiG-21 aircraft that attacked them.

The United States and the Soviet Union have both regarded Iran as a problem for some time now. If they are moving toward a consensus on how to deal with that problem, as certain recent developments seem to suggest, then Iraq will survive, and the war may end far sooner than most people now expect. If there is no U.S.-Soviet consensus but both countries continue their present policies, then Iraq should still be able to defeat Iran economically within about 18 months, perhaps sooner if it can maintain the initiative on the ground that it seized in April.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Don Peretz

INTIFADEH: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING

When demonstrations against the Israeli occupation erupted in Gaza last December 8–9, few Israeli politicians or military commanders expected them to last very long. They were perceived as merely another in the sporadic series of "riots" that had periodically—and only briefly each time—annoyed Israeli authorities since 1967 in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank ("Judea and Samaria") and the Golan Heights.

Soon it became clear that these disturbances were quite unlike those of the previous twenty years. Within days the Gaza unrest spilled over into the West Bank, and the authorities lengthened their estimate of the time required to suppress it: a few weeks, perhaps even a month or two. By late February, as the rioting continued, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his army commanders grew more impressed with the fundamental grievances behind the uprising, which in their judgment could be addressed only through a political solution, not by military force. Some field officers and members of the General Staff even adopted an Arabic term, *intifadeh* (uprising), used by the Palestinians themselves, to describe what was happening.

By chance in late March two dozen international political scientists converged in Jerusalem for a meeting sponsored by Bir Zeit University on the West Bank, for a long-planned conference on the deeper impact of the occupation. What we had foreseen as an academic meeting took on a more immediate agenda. We met with numerous Palestinian professional organizations and traveled throughout the West Bank and Gaza, visiting towns and villages, refugee camps, and hospitals crowded with hundreds of patients injured in the uprising.

Clearly, we observed, the *intifadeh* was having an enduring political, social and economic impact, not only on Arab-Jewish relations within the territories, but throughout Israeli society.

Don Peretz is Director of the Middle East Program at the State University of New York, Binghamton, where he has been Professor of Political Science since 1966. His most recent book is *The West Bank: History, Politics, Society, and Economy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Beyond the Middle East, it was obvious there would be ramifications for Israeli and Palestinian relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and Western Europe.

II

The *intifadeh* differs from previous disturbances in its intensity, its pervasiveness and its leadership. In mid-November 1987, a U.N. official in Gaza predicted—almost to the day—when the uprising would occur, for he perceived it as inevitable after twenty years of occupation, frustration and Palestinian disillusionment with larger political forces that seemed incapable of ending or even ameliorating their plight. Among the objects of their anger were not only the Israelis, the Americans and the United Nations, but all Arab regimes and at times the bureaucracy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Even the most benign policies could not deflect the mounting anger and frustration bred in the generation raised under occupation. Well over half the Palestinian population of the occupied territories has lived all their lives under Israeli domination, and most have lived in this situation for nearly all their lives. True, Palestinians have always lived under oppressive rule, initially Ottoman, then British and, since 1948, Israeli, Egyptian or Jordanian. But regardless of Egyptian or Jordanian harshness, rule by Israel seemed another matter altogether. Palestinians considered it far more degrading to live under a non-Arab regime, no matter what benefits, if any, that regime might offer.

By the end of 1987 frustration among Palestinian youth could not be controlled, even by the cooler heads among the older generation, the traditional "notables" or the occupation forces with their threats of increasing use of force. Despite promises to "improve the quality of life" from the Reagan Administration, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein of Jordan, the number of university students who had to accept menial labor in Israel was increasing. Young Palestinians, among the best educated groups in the Middle East, had only limited opportunities to apply their higher skills, especially since the return of thousands of workers from the Gulf states following cutbacks in oil production during the early 1980s.

The population of the occupied territories has been increasing at a rapid rate, faster than anticipated by Palestinian or Israeli demographers, resulting in teeming villages, towns and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

refugee camps. Stifling pressures of life in this cramped environment have been exacerbated by policies that restrict the expansion of Arab urban areas and have placed some 50 percent of land and most water sources under Israeli control, frequently at the disposal of the new Jewish settlers.

Discontent with deteriorating economic and social conditions has been politicized in what the Israeli press has characterized as "schools of hatred": the Israeli prisons and detention centers where tens of thousands have been held, for periods ranging from a day to a decade or more. According to Israeli estimates, some 300,000 arrests have occurred in the occupied territories since 1967. Assuming that a large percentage are multiple arrests of a single person, a modest estimate of the number of youths who have served time or been in detention is some 50,000 to 60,000.

The *Jerusalem Post* has described Ansar 2, one of the new detention centers for rock-throwers in Gaza, as "perhaps the single most efficient operational institution for the indoctrination of Gaza youth." The treatment received by inmates in Ansar 2 and in other detention centers is more likely to breed new terrorists than to teach political moderation. Twenty years of direct, daily contact with occupation authorities has, perhaps more than any other factor, created deeply ambivalent feelings of resentment and irrepressible frustration.

Added to the overflow of bitterness caused by the experiences of daily life in the territories was the Palestinians' feeling of abandonment by the outside world, particularly by their Arab brethren, who did little to end the recent "war of the camps" in Lebanon where Palestinians, many of them relatives of those in the occupied territories, were besieged for months by the Shi'ite Amal militia. The Arab League summit in Amman during November 1987 produced little apparent support for the Palestinians. Although the meeting was convened to deal with the Gulf war, Palestinians in the territories perceived the secondary attention it devoted to their problem as a slight, an attempt to avoid confronting the Palestinian issue head on.

By December these economic, social and political frustrations needed only a chance spark to create the long-anticipated explosion. It was provided by a relatively minor incident in which an Israeli military vehicle ran down and killed four Gaza laborers. Wild rumors spread that the Palestinians were killed intentionally, in retaliation for the stabbing death of an Israeli

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Gaza the day before. The incident precipitated spontaneous anti-Israeli demonstrations by school-age youths in a Gaza refugee camp. When the army arrived to put down the riots, soldiers were stoned, in what soon became a routine. Throwing stones, iron bars, insults and an occasional Molotov cocktail at the security forces has since become the hallmark of the *intifadeh*. Flying the banned Palestinian flag is another challenge to authority; when the flag is unavailable or confiscated, any public display of the national colors—red, white, green and black—is recognized as tantamount to a demonstration of resistance against Israeli rule.

What began as sporadic protest by random groups of restless youth not only spread, but developed into an organized resistance movement with an underground leadership, a definite political objective, and a well-planned and integrated strategy. From rock throwing, insults and the illegal display of national colors and patriotic slogans, tactics were devised to extend participation to the entire Palestinian community. These have included an economic boycott of many Israeli products, nonpayment of taxes to Israel, mass resignations of Israeli-appointed Arab police and local government officials, and week-long strikes closing down—except for a few hours daily—all trade, commerce, transport, education and other public facilities.

III

As the *intifadeh* rose from random violence, the ad hoc leaders confirmed their resolve to refrain from using "hot" weapons including guns and explosives, although Israeli intelligence and rumor among Palestinians indicated that caches of small arms were hidden throughout the territories. It was evident that they would be no match against the overwhelming weaponry of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Furthermore, passive resistance or small-scale violence gave the Palestinians a decided public relations advantage in the Western media, where sympathy was swayed by images of heavily armed troops with tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters and tear gas confronting unarmed civilians using only the weapons they could tear up from the streets. This disparity in the weapons available to each side assured a certain measure of restraint: the Palestinians refrained from killing Israeli soldiers, and the Israelis limited their use of force, at least for the first months. True, scores of Arab homes were destroyed in retaliation for anti-Israeli ac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions or suspected actions; there were beatings; tear gas was used on a wide scale; Palestinians were shot. But no villages were destroyed, and there were no mass expulsions or executions.

The *intifadeh* is not a strictly passive, Gandhi-style *satyagraha* movement of nonviolence. It is a mass civil resistance, new to the Arab-Israeli conflict, demanding self-determination and an end to occupation. From the perspective of those who see all Palestine (Israel, the West Bank and Gaza) as a single political entity, it amounts to a civil war between the two claimants to sovereignty of the land, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. For those who see Palestine divided between a Jewish state and some kind of Arab entity, it is a colonial war in which Jewish settlers, often backed by the IDF, have imposed their rule on a subject people.

The *intifadeh* already has had a widespread impact on the occupied Palestinian community, galvanized to action and unified as never before. Unlike the situation in the 1936–39 Arab revolt against the British Mandate, traditional cleavages among the rebels have now been closed. A major reason for the failure of the revolt a half a century ago was internecine struggle among diverse Palestinian factions, the notable families and different regions and classes, resulting in more Arabs killed by Arabs than by Britons or Jews. So far none of these traditional tensions have surfaced, perhaps because a new generation has taken control, a generation that refuses to recognize the "historic rights" of the notables, the propertied classes or leaders designated by the authorities.

The community seems to have overcome the characteristic divisiveness that long plagued Palestinian politics, to the point that assassins from one faction would deal directly with competition from another. In recent years this rivalry resulted in assassinations of dissidents such as Said Hammami and Isam Sartawi. Now representatives or sympathizers of the diverse PLO factions are collaborating. The various Palestinian groups backed by one Arab country or another—Syria, Iraq, Libya—have buried their differences, at least temporarily. Even Islamic fundamentalists, often bitterly at odds with secular nationalists, are supporting the uprising. This subverts the Israeli authorities' tactic of encouraging, or at least not interfering with, fundamentalist opposition to the secularists.

Although the leadership is still clandestine, it is assumed to be young, well educated, not tied to the traditionalists or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

notables, and closely linked to the extensive social communication networks existing among Palestinians. After their initial spontaneous uprising, local leaders apparently established a liaison with PLO chieftains abroad.

The new leadership represents diverse ideological trends, social backgrounds and occupations. Many are sons and daughters of the refugee camps, who have achieved upward social mobility through the expanding educational networks. A generation or two ago it was principally children of notables who acquired the wherewithal to become leaders. Since the 1950s thousands of Palestinians from *fellahin* families have graduated from universities. Now represented in all professions, many have become national leaders. Another leadership component is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) cadre which has run the network of refugee camp services for over thirty years. This group includes several thousand administrators, physicians, nurses, accountants, teachers, and health and social workers. They are the "technical service" of the national movement, a cadre with access to all levels of society, who may some day provide the foundation of a Palestinian civil service.

The new leadership also demonstrates that traditional Muslim-Christian tensions have been overcome. Although never as disadvantaged among Palestinians as in other Middle Eastern societies, Christians, even if militant nationalists, did not find it easy in the past to completely overcome the stigma of their religious background. Certainly now these interfaith tensions seem to have dissipated.

Israeli attempts to stem the uprising through thousands of arrests and imprisonments brought no quick respite. The larger the number of arrests, the wider the *intifadeh*. During March, in anticipation of Land Day demonstrations, some 1,000 "militants" were apprehended, bringing the total imprisoned at the time to about 4,000. But these detentions failed to prevent the special demonstrations planned for Land Day or slow down the countrywide resistance.

For the first time since 1967 nearly every Palestinian religious figure, Christian or Muslim, has spoken out against the occupation. Religious services at Christmas and Easter, which usually attract thousands of foreign visitors, were toned down, and Israeli officials charged with cultivating amicable relations with the church took note of the political undertones in statements from the various Jerusalem patriarchs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Women play a key role, often assuming leadership positions. Many are skilled professionals in medicine, education or law, who have set up emergency teams to treat the wounded or have organized child care to deal with pupils during the strikes or militarily imposed school closings. In Ramallah, women were instrumental in organizing volunteer patrols after a mass resignation by the local police. With strikes closing food stores most of the day, women organized provisions for those unable to shop at the designated hours, whose funds were drained as a result of economic deadlock, or whose breadwinners had been arrested or killed.

Another blow to the Israeli strategy for dealing with the West Bank has been the way traditional urban-rural tensions have been suspended. During the late 1970s Israel appointed a "civil administration" to devise new ways of coping with Palestinian nationalism. Actually the civil administration was subservient to the West Bank military commander. Its head was a reserve colonel, Menachem Milson, on leave from a professorship in Arabic literature at the Hebrew University. Milson convinced then Defense Minister Ariel Sharon to adopt a new West Bank policy. The key to their program was exploitation of traditional city-country tensions through creation of "village leagues" supported by Israeli authorities and rewarded with special privileges for their collaboration. The village leagues were extremely unpopular, and the Milson/Sharon strategy never paid off. If there was ever a hope of reviving this program, the *intifadeh* has demonstrated how farfetched it has become. One of the principal village league chieftains now supports the *intifadeh*, and West Bank villages are in the vanguard of the uprising. Many have become semi-independent Palestinian enclaves, physically isolated from the rest of the country, but centers of fervent nationalism.

The Israeli military simply does not have the manpower, without a much wider mobilization, to maintain permanent outposts in the more than 100 Palestinian villages. Thus villagers are often left to their own devices for weeks at a time, or until some incident draws attention to them. Most have joined the national strike, closing schools and municipal offices, raising the outlawed Palestine flag, posting forbidden directives from the leadership, and often setting up their own clandestine local committees. The euphoria of the uprising often leads to tragedy when troops unexpectedly enter a village on some pretext or another, resulting in clashes and heavy village cas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ualties. But these incidents only intensify support for the uprising and further undermine the hopes of some Israelis to widen cleavages between Palestinian peasants and city inhabitants.

In the first round of struggle between occupied Palestinians and the Israeli army the former seemed to have maintained the advantage. It was not a military victory but a political-social one. The *intifadeh* took Israel by surprise, creating political turmoil within the country; it raised Palestinian national consciousness, created a new sense of solidarity and once again focused world attention on the Palestine problem. But there was a heavy price, not only in casualties, but in the precarious economies of the West Bank and Gaza.

IV

Since 1967 the economies of the territories have been dependent on Israel. They were described by one scholar as "an auxiliary sector of both the Israeli and the Jordanian economies." A substantial section of the workforce in both Gaza and the West Bank was employed, mostly in unskilled labor, within Israel, and income it provided was responsible to a large extent for the spate of new homes, household goods, automobiles and other consumer items that spread throughout the territories, especially in the West Bank. While the territories were flooded with imports from Israel, little if any industrial development took place. Gaza and the West Bank became major markets for Israeli products, importing far more from the occupier than they exported to it. Over the years Jordan became the principal market for exports, mostly agricultural, from the West Bank. Both Gaza and the West Bank became dependent on Israel as a major source of employment and income, and for many daily consumer items such as clothing, preserved foods, and the like.

The economic impact of the *intifadeh* began to be felt after the first months. Due to strikes, the number of workers traveling to Israel each day greatly declined, and household income fell. The leadership declared an economic boycott, but Israel also used economic measures to fight the uprising. Periodically the lines between Israel and the territories were closed, shutting off all economic intercourse. Equally important, the bridges between the territories and Jordan were blocked for lengthy periods, cutting off the West Bank's largest export market. After several months there was nearly total economic stagnation, with little prospect of improvement any time soon.

Some nationalists regarded the severance of economic ties

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the outside as only a temporary setback. They argued that it would teach self-reliance, that austerity would be good for Palestinians, and that indeed, they had become overdependent on Israeli imports. The Bir Zeit conference heard calls to the bourgeoisie to give up their automobiles and return to the simple village life.

Kabatiya, a village of some 7,000, was cited as an example. It was closed off by the army in late February when a villager suspected of collaborating with the Israelis was lynched. After several weeks of siege, Kabatiya seemed to be going back to premodern self-sufficiency. Deprived of electricity, running water, fuel, fresh food supplies and telephone service, the villagers resorted to the devices of an earlier era. Idle tractors were replaced by donkeys; branches pruned from trees were used instead of kerosene for cooking fuel; many households started small vegetable patches to supplement food smuggled past the Israelis; local wells, long abandoned in favor of piped water, were started up again. Villagers may well hold up under these conditions and show much greater resilience than inhabitants of the larger West Bank towns and cities like Nablus, Ramallah and Jerusalem. There is a limit to the resources available to the tens of thousands of workers from Gaza and the large towns and cities of the West Bank.

For five months of the *intifadeh*, morale remained high and consensus prevailed. A mythology began to develop around martyrs to the cause, those who were killed, beaten and imprisoned. Many boasted of their capacity to stand up to the Israeli army, to confront the tanks, armored vehicles and helicopters. Much of the humiliation experienced for twenty years gave way to a new sense of personal dignity. But it is still too early to determine how long the 1,750,000 Palestinians under occupation will remain united in the face of economic hardship, growing unemployment and the inevitably mounting Israeli use of force and repressive measures to put down the rebellion.

V

In Tel Aviv, Haifa or Ramat Gan there is little indication that the *intifadeh* has affected the daily routines of Jewish Israel. But beneath the surface calm the Palestinian uprising has stirred a political turmoil as serious as any since the state was established. Its repercussions could become as far-reaching as those caused by the wars of 1967, 1973 and 1982. Neither the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

average Israeli nor his government can take the occupation for granted any longer. Although public opinion has been almost equally divided between those supporting continued Israeli control (either through annexation or maintaining some form of military presence) and those who accept the principle of "land for peace," there still is a broad national consensus against establishment of an independent Palestinian state anywhere between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. That consensus prevails, but has been shaken by events since December. From advocates of outright annexation to the most willing compromisers, there is recognition that the uprising has created a totally new phase in Palestinian-Israeli relations. There are, however, wide differences over how to deal with the situation—differences over short-term tactics for suppressing the revolt, and over how to achieve a long-term political resolution.

The army high command seems to be politically neutral, not outspoken on questions about the future of the territories. It regards the tasks assigned to it by the politicians as unpleasant, but necessary; as required less for national security than to maintain law and order. The commanders acknowledge that they were unprepared to deal with a mass civil uprising but fault the government for lacking clear objectives. Just how fine a balance should be kept between restraint and the use of force? Technically, the IDF is as capable of dealing harshly with civil unrest as was Syria's Hafez al-Assad in the city of Hama or King Hussein during the 1970 Palestinian uprising in Amman. With sterner measures, the *intifadeh* could probably have been put down in short order but, as one IDF officer remarked, "the people of Israel would not allow it."

Early on, army intelligence officers whom I met concluded that the uprising was indeed spontaneous, not caused by outside agitators or programmed by PLO directives from abroad. The PLO too was taken by surprise, and had to catch up with events so as not to be left without a role to play. Given the restraints on force imposed by Israel's own political considerations, a variety of tactics had to be improvised to comply with directives from the politicians. These have included use of live ammunition, rubber bullets, various forms of tear gas, beatings, curfews, mass arrests, occasional deportations, destruction of homes, sieges of unruly villages and various degrees of economic punishment.

In general, Jewish opinion supports the army's measures, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there are large segments at either end of the political spectrum that are critical. A fairly substantial group, including the new Jewish settlers in the territories, wants all restraints removed; another sector objects that their sons are becoming brutalized by involvement in riot control and suppression of civilians. There is no clear-cut party division on use of these measures, but generally supporters of Likud and parties to the right support the army unconditionally—although on occasion the settlers and their supporters in Israel have criticized the army for being too lenient. At times there have been altercations between the army, charged with maintaining law and order, and militant settlers who have disrupted Arab villages.

Labor Party supporters are less enthusiastic about forcible measures, but they usually agree that the job, although unpleasant, is necessary. Outright opposition to harsh measures comes mainly from the small opposition parties to Labor's left. There have been a few cases of conscientious objection to military service in the territories. Many more young men, it is believed, fulfill their reserve obligations in the West Bank and Gaza but stand aside, often with officers turning a blind eye, when an unpleasant task such as the beating of stone-throwers is ordered. A number of Israelis drafted for service in the territories have leaked to the press accounts of army brutality they observed firsthand.

The uprising has not yet precipitated any major changes in political party platforms concerning the Palestinians, but there are definite indications of changing attitudes and perceptions to be found in the press, in the Knesset and in the statements of individual political leaders. An increasing willingness to "humanize" the Palestinians is evident, even in the grudging respect paid by field commanders to the courage young Arabs display in their altercations with the troops. Statements like that of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, that the Israelis would crush the Arab rioters "who are grasshoppers compared to us," were dismissed by officers with whom I spoke as empty, foolish rhetoric.

Many Israeli myths previously used to obscure rational analysis of relations with the Arabs are being deflated. This has led to a reevaluation among Israelis of the PLO reality. Arguments about refusing to negotiate with the PLO because it is "terrorist" are more frequently disputed in the press now than before. Several retired generals and mainstream politicians, while not commending the PLO, now hold that it is not merely a terrorist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

organization but a political one as well, and one with which Israelis may soon have to enter dialogue. Likud's boycott of the PLO is probably motivated less by repugnance for terrorism than by fear that recognition will imply an acknowledgment of Palestinian political rights.

The *intifadeh* has dispelled most notions that a liberal or enlightened occupation can be sustained. Hardly any Israeli newspaper or politician boasts any longer of benefits Israel has brought to the occupied territories, as they did just a few months ago. Such arguments now come chiefly from Israel's supporters abroad. Most Israeli factions have recognized that continued occupation will require harsh, even brutal measures, and that if there ever was an enlightened occupation, its time has passed. Reporting to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee recently, Defense Minister Rabin termed the uprising a continuation of the 1982 war against the PLO in Lebanon, a war that many saw as a strategic mistake. But Prime Minister Shamir, who was one of the architects of that campaign, still regards it as an accomplishment; he characterizes the *intifadeh* as part of the continuing Arab war "against the existence of the State of Israel," definitely not civil disobedience against the occupation. Consequently, he asserts, the uprising must be fought as would any other war for Israel's survival.

The uprising has widened more than ever the deep chasm between Israelis who would retain the territories and those willing to give them up. This dispute has been a major political division since the occupation began in 1967, but now partisans of each side have become more adamant. Doves, such as former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, see as more urgent the need for territorial compromises in exchange for peace. The territories are not only a threat to the future security of the Jewish state because of the 1,750,000 Arabs they contain, but because they have become a clear and present danger to Israeli political stability. The *intifadeh* has stimulated the Labor Party, despite its many internal divisions over the territories, to take a more positive stand in support of peace initiatives, like that of Secretary of State George Shultz and the proposed international Middle East peace conference.

On the other hand, Likud and the parties to its right link the uprising with the peace initiatives, castigating both as part of a conspiracy to end Israel's very existence. Among right-wing politicians it has again become respectable to discuss

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"population transfer" as the way out. At a public forum in Tel Aviv during March, former General Rehavam Ze'evi called for investigating this approach, although he admitted that he was not yet sure of its feasibility. Nevertheless, he stated, an "agreed" Arab transfer was "Zionism by definition," the most "humanistic solution to the Palestine problem."

Neither supporters nor opponents of annexation can deny that the uprising has redivided Eretz Israel ("the Land of Israel") along the pre-June 1967 frontiers. For all practical purposes the Green Line (demarcating the 1949 armistice frontiers with Jordan and Egypt), which former Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared in 1977 "no longer exists," has been reconstituted. At the time, Begin declared the line had "vanished forever," so that Israelis could "coexist with the Arabs in Eretz Israel." Now the army frequently reimposes the old barriers, preventing Jews, except settlers with homes there, from crossing to the territories, and noncitizen Palestinians from entering pre-1967 Israel. Even Jerusalem, enthusiastically described by its mayor, Teddy Kollek, as a united city of Jews and Arabs, is no longer united in daily life. For the past several months the former Jordanian sectors have withdrawn into isolation as their Palestinian residents have closed down shops, schools and most public activity. Today few Jews venture into the inhospitable Arab quarters.

The reemerging Green Line has severed many of the economic links with the territories developed during the past twenty years. The economic warfare used by both sides is less disadvantageous to Israelis than to the Palestinians. The most visible manifestation is that many of the 110,000 to 120,000 Arab workers from Gaza and the West Bank no longer report for work in Israel. This hurts most in construction, agriculture and services—industries in which up to 40 percent of the labor force is Arab. In response to the Palestinian boycott and army barriers, the Ministry of Labor now authorizes several Israeli employers to import foreign workers. In some industries experiments have begun with mechanization and automation to replace low-paid Arab workers.

Israeli products worth up to one billion dollars annually, especially textiles, construction materials and food products, were until recently sold in the territories. The Arab boycott has caused a substantial decline in these exports, even closing down some production lines. Israel may suffer temporary recession, but in the long run prospects are that ways will be found

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to replace Arab labor and West Bank markets. On the Palestinian side there is less flexibility, and consequently greater danger of living standards being lowered and economic development being retarded for a long period.

Israel's 700,000 Arab citizens have become more directly involved than other Israelis in the crisis. Perhaps it was inevitable that they would be drawn into the confrontation. Most have families in the territories or in surrounding Arab states, and since 1967 they too have been "Palestinianized." Between 1967 and 1987, Israeli Arabs reestablished their links with the Arab world and with the Palestinian consciousness via the West Bank. They gained access to the Arabic press, were exposed to nationalist ideologies, and reunited with former relatives and friends. The psychological and physical barriers that had separated them for a generation gradually disappeared, so it was no wonder that, while loyal to Israel, they also found a new Palestinian identity. Few Jewish Israelis countenance this "dual loyalty," although they still have expectations that non-Israeli Jews will support the Jewish state.

Since December Israeli Arabs have become more outspoken in support of the *intifadeh*, and on several occasions they have conducted large, peaceful demonstrations to support it. At the end of December and again on Land Day in March a large part of the Israeli Arab community joined general strikes in concert with Palestinians in the territories. At a rally of 20,000 in Nazareth during January, Abdel Wahab Darousha, Labor's only Arab Knesset member, publicly resigned from the party in protest against Rabin's policy of "force, might, beatings." These demonstrations of Palestinian national awakening, although tolerated by the Israeli authorities, have become worrisome to the public and have elicited warnings from politicians that Arab citizens should not go too far.

Events in the West Bank and Gaza since December have not caused significant outward changes in Israeli society, but they have raised new questions about policy toward the occupied territories and the peace process, about Arab citizens and Israel's own humanistic values. The *intifadeh* has revealed once again that Israel is deeply divided on these issues, so divided that it will be a long time before clear-cut or definitive answers are found. Even if the uprising hastens the next election, scheduled for November, it is unlikely that divisions on these issues will be resolved by the voters.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VI

The *intifadeh* has drawn international attention to the Palestine problem, from which it had recently been diverted by the Gulf war and tensions in Afghanistan and Central America. Events in the occupied territories have raised the Palestine issue to high priority within the European Community and reactivated the Reagan Administration's Middle East peace initiatives. During March the European Parliament adopted resolutions critical of Israeli policies in the territories, leading to protests from Jerusalem against European "encouragement" of the PLO. The 12-nation parliament also voted overwhelmingly against ratifying a series of trade agreements with Israel.

The Europeans seem to have become convinced that the Palestinians cannot be bypassed in the search for peace in the Middle East, that they are as essential in negotiations as Arab leaders in Cairo, Amman, Damascus and Riyadh. The era has passed when Palestinians could be regarded as refugees whose fate would be decided by others representing their interests. In my view the "Jordan option," giving the occupied territories some form of self-rule under Hashemite suzerainty, has therefore been recognized as a nonstarter. Neither the Jordanian government nor the Palestinians in the territories any longer perceive King Hussein as a viable interlocutor, nor will the Palestinians any longer agree to rule by a foreign monarch. The small group of notables and merchants who represented Jordanian interests in the territories have been overwhelmed by the recent unrest and they too must go along with demands of the *intifadeh* or become politically irrelevant.

Although the *intifadeh* has reawakened the interest of the Reagan Administration in the Arab-Israeli conflict, giving it priority once again in American diplomacy, the U.S. response has been received with little enthusiasm, either by the Palestinians or by Israel's prime minister. Secretary of State Shultz' shuttle diplomacy and his new proposals for peace negotiations have elicited only a negative response from leaders of the uprising and from PLO leaders abroad. Palestinian leaders favor an international conference with a mandate to reach a compromise settlement, but only reluctantly accepted Shultz' complex plan to determine the future of the territories, and provisions it contains that would base negotiations on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338. The chief defect in the plan—a defect that undercuts any value the Palestinians may see in it—is that it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seems to circumvent the key issues that have been major objectives of the *intifadeh*, i.e., immediate termination of Israel's occupation and an acknowledgment of Palestinian rights to establish their own government, free from outside interference, either Israeli or Jordanian.

Although the Shultz plan does recognize "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and provides for Palestinian participation in negotiations as part of a Jordanian delegation, these "concessions" are no longer as attractive to Arab moderates as they once were. The difficulty is compounded by the refusal of mainstream Israelis, hawks or doves, to accept an independent Palestinian state in any form.

It is this impasse that the Shultz plan circumvents, but until the issue is confronted, the *intifadeh* is not likely to be quelled for good. And while conflict between Israel and the Palestinians lasts, there is little hope of achieving the settlement envisaged in the new Shultz plan.

The net result of these events is re-Palestinianization of a conflict which began in the 1920s and 1930s as a struggle between Palestinian Jews and Palestinian Arabs. After establishment of Israel in 1948 the conflict was internationalized, between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. Since December the action has again centered in Palestine itself, between the two peoples most directly involved in struggle for control of the country.

A major Israeli theme has been that peace is elusive because "there is no one to talk to." But even if Arab regimes refuse direct negotiation, the *intifadeh* has made clear that Palestinians are the more important partner in any settlement. Should Israel achieve agreements with other Arab states, like the peace treaty with Egypt, these will do little to end the conflict within Palestine. The *intifadeh* demonstrates such agreements will most likely have little effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians.

Unfortunately the *intifadeh* also indicates that Palestinian-Israeli relations are at an impasse. The minimum that the inhabitants of the territories are now willing to accept is full self-determination and total withdrawal by Israel, demands that no mainstream Israeli party or political leader will concede. Fewer than 15 percent of Knesset members consider these valid negotiating points. Nor has the Israeli public overcome its fear of an independent Palestinian state. While demonstrating Palestinian determination and courage, the *intifadeh* has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also deepened Israeli apprehensions about whether an independent Palestine would remain a peaceful neighbor.

The uprising has intensified the contest of wills between Israelis and Palestinians, a contest in which Israel holds overwhelming military and economic advantages. Many Israelis are willing to take all risks necessary to test Palestinian determination, believing that Israel can hold out longer, that Palestinian solidarity will crumble as it did in the past. Palestinians who see beyond the euphoria sparked by the *intifadeh* acknowledge that much more difficult times are ahead, that December 1987 may have been a Palestinian version of the 1916 "Easter Rising," a revolt which opened a struggle that lasted years before its goals were approached.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Milan Svec

THE PRAGUE SPRING: 20 YEARS LATER

The 20th anniversary of the 1968 Soviet military intervention that cut short the promising reforms of the "Prague Spring" will be commemorated in an environment unforeseen by political observers then or even just a few years ago. Moscow is no longer the most orthodox and belligerent guardian of the hard-line interpretation of communist doctrine. The Kremlin now portrays itself as one of the most daring innovators in the communist world. Instead of behaving as an aggressive power ready to pressure other countries into compliant behavior, the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev now advertises its broad flexibility and "new thinking" in foreign policy.

Public opinion in many countries, especially in Western Europe, seems increasingly receptive to the Soviets' sophisticated advances and ready to give Gorbachev the benefit of the doubt. Ironically, in traditionally heretic Prague, Gorbachev's fresh ideas are still fiercely resisted, at least by the most orthodox faction of the party leadership.

Eastern Europe continues to be one of the most complicated factors in Moscow's calculations. The region retains a potential for unexpected upheavals, which could take place not only in presently reformist Poland or Hungary but also in conservative Czechoslovakia or the communist quasi monarchy of Romania. In fact, there are many indications that the long-standing antireformist consensus in the Czechoslovak leadership is crumbling fast.

Reversing this trend seems next to impossible. A continued multiplication of domestic problems, occurring in the midst of rapidly changing international conditions, is exposing the inability of most East European leaders to govern in the old way, as well as the refusal of their societies to be governed as before.

Milan Svec is Senior Consultant at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. He was Deputy Chief of the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington, 1982–1985, and was granted asylum in the United States in 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lenin used to describe such conditions as "a revolutionary situation."

Faced with these pressures for change, many in Eastern Europe's ruling circles are assuming a wait-and-see attitude, finding it safer to keep their options open for a future round of political infighting (or possible upheavals) than to chain themselves to the unpopular measures that would be necessary to cure present crises. Paralysis and uncertainty at the top thus prevail at a time when bold decisions and a firm commitment to uphold them are urgently needed.

Gorbachev is obviously aware of the challenges he faces in Czechoslovakia and in the whole region. That is why he is paying more attention to Eastern Europe than any of his predecessors except Stalin. He has turned out to be a rather innovative and imaginative manager of intra-bloc affairs, which has helped him stay on top of events thus far. But Gorbachev has not been able to devise a shockproof, long-term policy for the region. The present Soviet maneuvering, no matter how adroit, is taking place in a situation of deepening crisis, not in a post-crisis upswing. Today's relative calm may therefore be only misleading and temporary.

II

The Prague Spring was a necessary outcome of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe under Gorbachev's predecessors. If it had not appeared in Czechoslovakia in 1968 it would have erupted somewhere else at another time. The movement also signaled the end of a certain phase in the development of communism, which had either to try to reform itself, or—if reform was not attempted—to enter a period of qualitatively new and deeper crises. (And, of course, such a situation would later create the need for even more radical reforms, or bring about the withering away of the whole system.)

Following the Second World War, Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe was decreed to be the second phase in the victorious struggle of the world proletariat, and those who opposed it were declared class enemies. Czechoslovakia played a special role in this process. In free elections to the Constitutional National Assembly on May 26, 1946, the Communist Party won 38 percent of the votes and became the strongest political party in the republic. When the communists seized power in February 1948 in a bloodless coup, Soviet ideologists

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

described this as additional proof of the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theory of historical determinism.

At the time, the U.S.S.R. was the only country with substantial experience in building an entirely new, communist social system. Since the "victory of the proletariat" in Eastern Europe was supposed to usher in an era in which all communist countries would share "common interests," the ideological conclusion was clear: Eastern Europe must follow Moscow's example and leadership.

This satisfied Stalin's paranoia and his imperial ambitions but later fatally harmed intra-bloc cooperation. If the management of affairs among communist countries was supposed to be so conflict-free, Moscow could afford to rely at home and in Eastern Europe on the most obedient (albeit usually the least capable) cadres to conduct this policy. Indeed, for decades the people in charge of intra-bloc relations in Moscow and Eastern Europe were usually the least competent within the party and foreign policy establishments. For years the Soviet and East European communists totally neglected developing an effective structure and mechanism for managing intra-bloc cooperation. When such structures were later built, their design was already outdated and ineffective compared to the rapidly developing system of West European integration.

Simple-minded East European conservatives relied much more on Moscow's influence in helping them remain in power than on their domestic performance. They paid more attention to following Soviet examples than to solving domestic problems. Gorbachev recently recalled the situation in these terms: "As regards our friends in the socialist countries, they usually kept quiet, even when they noticed something of concern. Frankness was frowned upon, and could be 'misunderstood,' so to speak."[1] A false sense of calm in Eastern Europe repeatedly resulted in Moscow's lack of attention—and, at times, neglect toward the region—when there were no "surprising" upheavals there.

Probably the most disastrous result of such an immature Soviet policy was the Kremlin's decision to invade Czechoslovakia. It should be clear by now to any shrewd politician in Moscow that, by totally relying on the subjective information of their loyal vassals, Soviet troops intervened in Czechoslo-

[1] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York: Bessie/Harper & Row, 1987, pp. 162–163.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vakia to rescue the positions of a relatively narrow group of frightened antireformers, rather than to save communism. Moscow's overreaction was also caused by the fact that the dogmatists in the U.S.S.R., East Germany and Poland were at that time excessively sensitive to reformist influences from abroad, because of their reluctance to address their own growing problems in an innovative way.

The 1968 Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia was swift and effective, but the political operation was, at least initially, a disaster. Moscow explained its action at home and to the world in the TASS statement of August 21, 1968, which claimed that "party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have requested the Soviet Union and other allied states to give the fraternal Czechoslovak people immediate assistance, including assistance with armed forces." To this day, however, that appeal has remained unpublished in Czechoslovakia, and the individuals who allegedly requested the invasion have never found the courage to say so publicly.

After failing for two days to install a new party and state leadership, the Soviets had to free the imprisoned Prague Spring leader, Alexander Dubček, together with some of his Politburo colleagues, and negotiate with them in Moscow. Later, under the pressure of international opinion and developments in Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin allowed the Czechoslovak leaders to return to their official positions in Prague, where they remained in power for seven months, continuing to adhere to their "Action Program" of April 1968. The Czechoslovak press was, meanwhile, operating relatively freely.

III

Initially, the Kremlin was at a loss to find an acceptable explanation for its invasion. Since the Czechoslovak Communist Party and government originally declared the invasion a denial of the basic norms of international law, and since these condemnations remained on the record, the Soviets knew it would not have been prudent to remain silent. The lack of an acceptable explanation could have been interpreted as portending aggressive intentions against the West. The objective was thus to find a putative motive which would reassure the West that it was witnessing a conflict confined to the communist world. In order to achieve that, the reasoning had to be based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, as applicable to intra-communist relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After making a series of inconsistent claims, Moscow finally came out with a new theory which later became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. On September 25, 1968, *Pravda* declared:

> There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement.

An attempt was made to reconcile the obvious contradiction between this statement's declaration of "freedom" for Eastern Europe and the implied limits to that freedom, through the claim that, in accordance with communist ideology, "the norms of law . . . cannot be interpreted in a narrowly formal way, outside the general context of the class struggle."

Leonid Brezhnev formally sanctioned these principles in his speech to the Congress of Polish Communists in November 1968, where he also explained:

> It goes without saying that such an action as military aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary enforced step; it can be sparked off only by direct actions of the enemies of socialism inside the country and beyond its boundaries, actions creating a threat to the common interests of the camp of socialism.

Paradoxically, it was mainly among the Western public that there was any acceptance of the Brezhnev Doctrine as evidence of the strong influence of communist ideology on Soviet foreign policy. In Eastern Europe and in most of the communist parties around the world, the Brezhnev Doctrine symbolized the beginning of a period when Moscow would not abide by Marxism-Leninism in any consistent way, neither in its domestic nor foreign policy, but only use it, or twist it, in an attempt to impart seemingly noble motives to its increasingly cynical actions.

Brezhnev, of course, never believed in the ideological basis of his doctrine. What he understood and pursued was power politics. The reformist Czechoslovak leaders learned this to their astonishment from him directly, in the Kremlin after the invasion. The former secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Zdeněk Mlynář, now

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

living in the West, has reported that words like "sovereignty" and "national independence" did not come up in Brezhnev's lecture to them at all. There was only one overriding motive in it: "During the war," Brezhnev told the Czechoslovak leaders, "our soldiers fought their way to the Elbe, and that is where our real Western borders are today."

Brezhnev openly ridiculed the resistance of the communists of the world to the intervention. "Comrade Tito and Comrade Ceaușescu will say their piece, and so will Comrade Berlinguer. Well, and what of it? You are counting on the communist movement in Western Europe, but that won't amount to anything for fifty years."[2]

It should be obvious from such remarks that, even while Brezhnev's subordinates were feverishly working to supply the ideological backbone for his doctrine, he was making it clear to the Czechoslovak reformers that it was Soviet power politics, not ideology, that they must understand. As communists, speaking to Soviet communists, the Czechoslovak reformers might have stood a chance. They could have relied on communist doctrine and resisted Soviet pressure. But as the leaders of a small nation facing an emperor in his imperial capital, they had no chance.

Ironically, it was chiefly because of their continuing belief in communism that the Czechoslovak reformers so boldly defied Moscow at times. If they had fully realized that Brezhnev was thinking in terms of naked power, they undoubtedly would have been much more cautious. They failed to understand that a new phase in Soviet policy had begun. The Kremlin was increasingly reluctant to abide by Marxism-Leninism if such fidelity demanded significant concessions. On the other hand the Soviet Union was not ready to surrender so convenient a cover for its imperial ambitions, or to open its outdated ideology to modernization.

Yet, eventually, a heavy price was paid for Brezhnev's growing imperial duplicity: the erosion of ideological and moral values among the peoples and leaders of the communist countries. Most of the leaders Gorbachev now faces in Eastern Europe have accepted Brezhnev's rules. No matter what they say, they are power-players and opportunists more than ideological communists. They think in terms of how to outmaneu-

[2] Zdeněk Mlynář, *Nightfrost in Prague*, New York: Karz Publishers, 1980, p. 241.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ver everyone else, including Gorbachev. They have forgotten—or more likely never learned—how to govern.

It took real hard-liners and leftist forces in Eastern Europe and elsewhere to applaud the Brezhnev Doctrine. They regarded it as an expression of a justifiably tough Soviet approach to the class struggle with a relentless enemy. Moscow's eager courting of Western countries shortly thereafter, however, undermined the faith of these radical forces in Moscow's "class judgment." No matter what they were saying publicly, left-wing leaders in Eastern Europe—and especially in Prague—could not really understand Moscow's aims. They regarded the greater, détente-inspired openness in communist countries as a retreat from class principles, which offered the West new opportunities for ideological subversion. To many reformers and other people in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, Soviet behavior after the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine was fresh evidence of Moscow's unvarnished hypocrisy.

As a result, Moscow started feeling the heat. This was the reason behind its renewed stress on the "class" explanation of its courting of the West. As Brezhnev declared in June 1975, "détente became possible because a new correlation of forces in the world arena has been established." *Pravda*, meanwhile, claimed that "peaceful coexistence does not mean the end of the class struggle between the two social systems." On the contrary: "The struggle between the world proletariat and the bourgeoisie will continue until the final victory of Communism on a world scale."[3] The Soviets even began openly saying that it was necessary to *impose* détente on the reluctant forces of world imperialism.

As might have been expected, Moscow was unable to have it both ways. In the end, reacting to growing Western demands to make détente a two-way street, the Kremlin instead escalated East-West tensions. In a series of tough actions, the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan and resorted to a policy of intimidation in order to prevent the deployment of U.S. Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. From the point of view of communist ideology, such an approach reinforced the belligerent interpretation of the class struggle and contradicted the substance of détente and peaceful coexistence, which have been the mainstays of Soviet policy for at least the past twenty years.

[3] F. Ryzhenko, "Peaceful Coexistence and the Class Struggle," *Pravda*, Aug. 22, 1973.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the point of view of realistic policy, Soviet moves during the early 1980s were counterproductive miscalculations.

IV

In order to move away from such a disastrous course, General Secretary Gorbachev has had to rethink not only the Brezhnev Doctrine but also the whole of Soviet foreign policy and its relation to communist ideology. He has had to do this in an environment similar to that preceding the 1956 uprising in Hungary, the Prague Spring and the rise of Solidarity in Poland in 1980–81. All of these events took place at times when there was a heated struggle for power in the Kremlin, when Moscow had started criticizing existing problems at home and talking about needed reforms, when Moscow was intensively involved in other areas of international relations and was neglecting Eastern Europe even more than usual, when Moscow was not projecting the image of a worthy guardian of Marxist-Leninist wisdom and when conditions in at least one East European country had become unmanageable by traditional methods.

When Gorbachev came to power, not only were all of those preconditions at hand, but new disquieting factors had taken shape as well. The most visible among them were a simultaneous, radical deterioration of political and economic conditions in most of Eastern Europe, a diminishing Soviet ability and willingness to bail out the most troubled countries, and a sharp decline in the influence of communist ideology worldwide. In order to prevent the worst, Gorbachev has had to develop new political approaches quickly and move on several fronts at once.

First of all, Gorbachev needed much more room to maneuver both in his domestic and foreign policy. There was only one way he could accomplish this: he had to expose to modernization some formerly sacrosanct canons of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and corresponding political reasoning. For example, as late as in 1984, the *Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* declared that militarism was growing in the West and explained that "the struggle with militarism is one of the most important tasks of world revolution and Soviet foreign policy."[4] This conclusion corresponds to the very basis of communist doctrine, which portrays imperialism as the highest form of capi-

[4] See Paul Quinn-Judge, "Soviet Shift in World Policy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 16, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

talism and regards it as inherently aggressive. Gorbachev's predecessors, meanwhile, regarded stability and the absence of significant change in Eastern Europe as a precondition for the effective pursuit of the two main Soviet goals in Western Europe: weakening the U.S. commitment to NATO and preventing effective European unity. Now, faced with a strong NATO and the growing unity of Western Europe—which are both, to a great extent, consequences of the inept policies of his predecessors—Gorbachev wants to create a situation in which Western Europe will be willing to weaken its ties with the United States voluntarily while broadening its economic contacts with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

In order to achieve this, however, Gorbachev has needed to redefine Soviet policy in terms that would open new opportunities for him to influence Western Europe by inventive propaganda and diplomacy. The core of his new concept is the idea that the development of modern weapons makes it virtually impossible for any country to achieve security by military means alone. Instead, security must be created first of all by political means. Another factor militating in the same direction is the growing interdependence of nations, caused by the development of the world economy, the growing threat of environmental pollution, and so on.

Such a transformation of the basic principles of Soviet and communist foreign policy thinking requires that Gorbachev address some crucial ideological questions, which he formulated in a speech delivered last November 2, at the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution: "Is it possible," he asked for example, "to count on the natural logic of an integral world, in which general human values are the main priority, being able to limit the range of destructive actions of the egocentric, narrow class-based features of the capitalist system?" He specifically referred to Japan and early postwar Italy and West Germany as examples showing that, indeed, capitalism might develop in certain conditions without militarism. He also reasoned that transformations taking place in the capitalist economy have helped to reconcile its contradictions.

Such ideological adjustments have enabled Gorbachev to develop his new concept of "our common European home" or the "all-European house," which he first presented when visiting Czechoslovakia in April 1987. In his main address in Prague he declared:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We assign an overriding significance to the European course of our foreign policy. . . . We are resolutely against the division of the continent into military blocs facing each other, against the accumulation of military arsenals in Europe, against everything that is the source of the threat of war. In the spirit of the new thinking we introduced the idea of the "all-European house" . . . [which] signifies, above all, the acknowledgment of a certain integral whole, although the states in question belong to different social systems and are members of opposing military-political blocs standing against each other. This term includes both current problems and real possibilities for their solution.

Besides creating for Moscow new opportunities in Western Europe, such an approach significantly alters the East European role in Soviet foreign policy maneuvering. Instead of constantly reminding his Warsaw Pact allies that there is a firm line between what is allowed in Eastern Europe and what would be punishable, Gorbachev has adopted a much more flexible approach. He suggests, in essence, that such a line is fluid and will depend at any given moment on the current state of East-West relations, especially in Europe.

It is in this context that Gorbachev's statement about the presence of Soviet troops in Europe, made at the Polish Party Congress in June 1986, should be read. "Our troops in other countries are not on dead anchor," he said. "But the anchors should be raised simultaneously and by all." The new Soviet flexibility regarding relations between East and West Germany points in the same direction.

This policy allows Moscow to manipulate Eastern Europe with new efficiency. First of all, instead of hoping to regain greater independence *despite* Moscow, many East Europeans regard the concept of a "common European home" as a more readily available road to better times than an anti-Soviet revolt. Also, should such a policy of flexible approach fail, many in Eastern Europe would blame the West for their continuing troubles, especially if the latter had not appeared forthcoming enough. Gorbachev is thus cleverly trying to turn East Europeans into direct tools of Soviet foreign policy who will patiently await the anticipated rewards for their cooperation.

Paradoxically, the new context of Soviet European policy will likely make the continuing presence of Soviet troops less irritable to East Europeans, because for the first time they can hope that these forces really will be withdrawn someday, and that Soviet interference in East European internal affairs will gradually decline. The perspective of the "common European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

home" also offers Moscow an unparalleled opportunity to escape the haunting prospect of having Eastern Europe as a permanent burden on the Soviet economy.

Gorbachev originally tried hard to improve economic cooperation among communist countries. But, as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze declared last summer: "A period of time that is both not great and yet not small has already passed since the incorporation of the new forms. And the results? One can speak only of the most modest of positive changes so far." The situation has not become any better since. It is in this connection that Shevardnadze spelled out a serious warning: "It is in no way necessary to proceed from the fact that relations with friends must be of a loss-producing nature."[5]

Burdened with increasingly uncompetitive products, East Europeans will be hard-pressed to improve their economies and are likely to redouble their efforts to induce Western Europe to provide them with modern technology. The rapidly deteriorating state of the East European economies, however, poses sharp practical limitations on the development of their ties with Western Europe, and they are thus not likely to proceed beyond the point that would make Moscow nervous. The new context and modernized ideological backbone of Gorbachev's foreign policy is thus designed to allow East Europeans much greater room to maneuver, but also to force them to assume greater responsibility for their own economic health.[6]

In order to make full use of this new policy without endangering Soviet interests or provoking unpleasant surprises, Gorbachev pays close attention to developments in Eastern Europe. He meets often with East European leaders, putting pressure on them to install competent people to handle relations with the Soviet Union—officials capable of managing complex agendas, who, for their part, now find that this area offers them much more opportunity for influence and rapid promotion than it did in the past. Gorbachev has also elevated foreign policy cooperation with his allies to a new level and has chosen much better qualified people to administer this aspect of Soviet foreign policy.

This differs significantly from prior practice. During my

[5] *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR*, Sept. 10, 1987, pp. 3–6.

[6] For more on this subject see Milan Svec, "Removing Gorbachev's Edge," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1987–88, pp. 148–166.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tenure as deputy chief of mission at the Czechoslovak embassy in Washington (1982–85), I usually learned much more about developments in U.S.-Soviet relations from my American contacts than from the top Soviet diplomats. Also, at that time, the Soviets in Washington reacted angrily to my opinion that NATO was not likely to have to pay as high a political price as the Soviets had predicted for its deployment of U.S. Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and to my suggestion that Moscow should try to prevent the deployments by offering new concessions in arms control negotiations. I got the impression that Moscow did not want to hear *any* dissenting views, either from its allies or from its Washington embassy.

Moscow was even angrier when, later, the Hungarian and East German leaderships publicly resisted Soviet pressures to sever certain contacts with the West after the shortsighted Soviet walkout from the Geneva talks in 1983 (about which the East Europeans had not been consulted). Servitude, not wise counsel, was what Moscow desired most of all during that period. And, indeed, people in Eastern Europe to whom this mode of behavior came naturally immediately recognized their opportunity. Contrary to the views prevailing in the West, it was not Moscow that asked the Czechoslovak hard-liners to criticize the Hungarian and East German resistance to Soviet pressures. Certain conservatives in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia took it upon themselves to publicly remind their East European colleagues that Soviet leadership should be followed no matter what. Little did they realize that just a few years later they would be the ones defending the right of each communist party to an independent course, because of their fright at the possible impact of Soviet reforms on Czechoslovakia.

The last thing Gorbachev desires is a repetition of such an embarrassing situation. He has taken it upon himself, therefore, to tie East European leaders to his policy by consulting them frequently. This will make it much more difficult for his allies to try to abandon his bandwagon if some of his moves fail later on. The new approach to Soviet-European relations, ideological affairs and the management of intra-bloc relations has eliminated a number of pressures that might otherwise have already provoked situations that would have tested Gorbachev's core attitude toward the Brezhnev Doctrine. From this point of view, Gorbachev's foreign policy reforms have been successful in Eastern Europe, at least temporarily.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V

Compared to his successful handling of overall Soviet foreign policy and the East European role in it, Gorbachev's approach to internal developments in communist countries remains beset by contradictions. It is the weakest point in his "new thinking."

Gorbachev's present approach to Eastern Europe runs in two directions: he wants to have the area under stable communist and Soviet control; at the same time, he would like to transform it from a liability into an economic and political asset for the Soviets. He has yet to figure out how to meld these two contradictory elements into a coherent policy.

For years, orthodox and change-resistant leaders in Eastern Europe have either been the Kremlin's loyal allies, or have exercised rigid domestic controls, or both. Most would do anything for Moscow except embark on bold reforms. If left unreformed, however, East European economies could deteriorate to a critical degree and become an unbearable burden on the Soviet economy. Abler and more creative leaders in Eastern Europe would likely produce better results, but they would also undoubtedly distance themselves more from Moscow.

Gorbachev often calls for greater cooperation among communist countries. This would be easier to achieve with like-minded leaders. And yet, a mixture of more flexible leaders, conservatives and autocrats in Eastern Europe has some distinct advantages for the Soviets. Disparate East European leaders, often sharply at odds with each other, are unlikely to react in a unified way to resist Moscow's increasing demands that they improve the quality of their exports to the Soviet Union. Their disunity enables Gorbachev to manipulate them to his advantage.

The Soviet leader would like to win the East European peoples to his side and also have them pressure their governments to perform better. He is very cautious about this, however, so that he will not be held accountable in Moscow if things get out of hand.[7] By adopting a behind-the-scenes policy of tipping the balance in communist countries' domestic fights instead of imposing its will, Moscow can gain several advantages. It will not be directly blamed for the failures of any

[7] See Milan Svec, "Gorbachev's 'Both-Ways Approach' to Eastern Europe," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Apr. 27, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leader or the problems he has created, it will not have to provide resources to bail its man out of difficulties, and the losers in political infighting will not automatically turn against Moscow but will hope instead to win Soviet favor the next time. But this temporizing policy will not solve the growing problems in Eastern Europe.

This dual approach was clearly displayed during Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia in April 1987. Reform-minded Czechoslovaks openly hoped that he would push for a change of the conservative political line in Prague during his visit. A prominent Czech emigré journal in Paris, *Svědectví*, meanwhile, reported how a group of formerly prominent Czechoslovak communists, expelled from the party after 1968, had addressed a letter to Gorbachev offering him their services.[8] They incorrectly expected that he was about to purge the leadership installed in Prague by Brezhnev.

But Gorbachev would have none of this. His was a balancing act. He made it clear that, unlike his predecessors, he recognizes the existence of significant differences among communist states. On April 11, 1987, he was quoted by the Czechoslovak Communist Party daily *Rudé Právo* as saying: "We are far from asking anybody to copy us. Every socialist country has its own specific features." On the other hand, he added, "we do not hide our conviction that the process of reconstruction undertaken in the Soviet Union corresponds to the essence of socialism." Because the visit created so many expectations among the Czechoslovak people as well as pressures on Prague conservatives, Gorbachev felt it necessary to balance this by a warning to the impatient reformists: "There are different kinds of opportunists who have their own interpretation of the aims of the process of restructuring, and who only wish to take advantage of it."

Although Gorbachev refused while in Czechoslovakia to comment directly on his views about the Soviet military intervention that cut short the Prague Spring (claiming after his visit that the assessment of the 1968 events is primarily a matter "for the Czechoslovak comrades themselves"), he and other Soviet observers have made pertinent comments elsewhere—which, by the way, often seem contradictory. On the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev criticized the "arrogance of belief in one's omniscience" which is akin to

[8] *Svědectví*, Vol. XXI, no. 81, 1987, pp. 10–12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"fear of one's ability to master new problems." Somewhat earlier, on October 31, 1987, the correspondents of the Soviet press agency *Novosti* wrote in *Rudé Právo*: "As far as the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine is concerned, it is only a legend thought up and cultivated in the West." On the other hand, after decades of Soviet duplicity, East Europeans take care not to overlook some more ominous statements made by Gorbachev. "To threaten the socialist system, to try to undermine it from the outside and wrench a country away from the socialist community," Gorbachev declared at the Polish Party Congress in June 1986, "means to encroach not only on the will of the people, but also on the entire postwar arrangement, and, in the last analysis, on peace." Gorbachev's words on November 2, 1987, were also reminiscent of the Brezhnev Doctrine, when he declared that what is decisive in cooperation among communist countries is "what ensures a combination of mutual interest and those of socialism as a whole."

The joint declaration issued during Gorbachev's visit to Yugoslavia last March said that the two countries "have no pretensions of imposing their concepts of social development on anyone" and that they prohibit "any threat and use of force and interference in the internal affairs of other states under any pretext whatsoever."[9] But even this document stopped short of repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine, and was reportedly adopted only after the Soviets first unsuccessfully tried to include in it a clause saying that the two countries were mutually responsible for socialism.

VI

Faced with Soviet maneuvering and a continuing wait-and-see attitude on the part of the people in their countries, reformers in Eastern Europe have started a debate about how Gorbachev's *perestroika* (restructuring) relates to the Prague Spring reforms. The greater the similarity between the two, the bolder the argument that could be made for new radical reforms in Eastern Europe.

Comparing the Prague Spring with Gorbachev's reforms also became a very effective tool of pressure on the conservatives in Czechoslovakia. In an interview with the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* published on January 16, 1988, Czechoslovak

[9] *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist Party International Affairs Director Michal Štefaňak admitted as much. "It does not mean much to us," Štefaňak was quoted as saying, "that people in the West still say that restructuring and Czechoslovakia's reforms in 1968 are the same. The fact is that people in the East, within the socialist community, were beginning to say it. That was intolerable."

Yet even the hard-liner Štefaňak admitted, in the same interview, that restructuring aims at the same results that the Czechoslovak Communist Party sought to achieve in 1967–68. Former high-level Czechoslovak officials who lost their jobs after the invasion also agree with such a conclusion. They have pointed out that the two basic tasks set by the Czechoslovak reform policy in 1968—to ensure the intensive growth of the economy and to democratize the system—were now on Gorbachev's agenda in the U.S.S.R.[10] Dubček, quoted on January 10, 1988, in the Italian Communist Party newspaper *L'Unita*, even saw similarities between the Prague Spring and Soviet reforms, and he concluded that if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had had in 1968 the leadership it has now, "the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia by the five armies would have been unthinkable."

Increasingly nervous Czechoslovak conservatives have demanded that Moscow publicly address this issue and silence burgeoning speculation within the communist countries. Last December, Czechoslovak leader Gustáv Husák—unable or unwilling to embark on radical reforms himself—arranged a surprising transition of power in the Communist Party to his chosen successor, Miloš Jakeš. By taking the initiative into his own hands at a decisive time, and by retaining for himself the positions of president of the republic and ruling Politburo member, Husák made it extremely difficult for Jakeš to abruptly dissociate himself from his predecessor and blame him for growing domestic problems—the usual practice in communist countries. The longer Jakeš postpones radical reforms, the more likely it is that it will be he who will pay the price for past mistakes.

Contrary to the prevailing view, however, Jakeš is not as inflexible an ideologue as his prominent role in the party purges after 1968 might suggest. He has always been a loyal apparatchik, following whatever party line prevailed at any given time.

[10] See *Avanti!* (Rome), Jan. 3–4, 1988.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But I always found Jakeš more willing to listen to expert advice than any other member of the ruling group. He is likely to gradually adopt the Soviet reformist path. On the question of the Prague Spring, however, Jakeš continues to resist revisionism. In January 1988 Jakeš was able to declare after a discussion with Gorbachev in Moscow that, since both sides agreed in their interpretations of 1968, "we do not need to change anything."

Yet the debate continues. The comparison of *perestroika* with the Prague Spring is a necessary precondition for developing a suitable program of reform in Eastern Europe. Such an approach, however, must address not only the similarities but also substantial differences between the two.

The editor of the Soviet journal *Ogonyok*, Vitali Korotich, has noted, for example, that whereas Gorbachev is at the head of the current reforms and controls the process, Dubček lost control: "pressure from below ran him over."[11] There seems, indeed, a rare similarity of views on Dubček among people of different political backgrounds. The philosopher and prominent publicist of the Prague Spring, Ivan Svitak, now living in the United States, wrote in 1979 that Dubček "failed to grasp what was going on either prior to or after the occupation and so became the ideal liquidator of his own work."[12] This conclusion is consonant with the recent remarks made by a reborn reformer, Czechoslovak Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal: "I am personally convinced that it was a fundamental error to put Dubček at the head in January 1968. He was a weak man for that kind of period."[13] Zdeněk Mlynář, recalling the tenor of Politburo meetings under Dubček, has written:

> Clearly, meetings of the party leadership more resembled a debating society or, in contrast, the editorial board meeting of some magazine than an important state function. . . . In a number of situations, when all the possible circumstances bearing on a decision were known . . . and it was only up to him to decide, Dubček would put the decision off still further.[14]

Gorbachev's personality is obviously much different; he is the one who exercises the predominant influence.

[11] *Neue Kronen-Zeitung* (Vienna), Jan. 15, 1988.

[12] "Prague Spring Revisited," in *Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Ages Past*, eds. Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes. Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1979, p. 160.

[13] See "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Background Report 12: Czechoslovakia," Feb. 4, 1988.

[14] Mlynář, *op. cit.* p. 123.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No less important than the personalities of the reformist leaders is the substance of their programs and the course of actual developments in their countries. The question of how the communist party in each country regards its role and that of the press in the political process is crucial in this regard.

The 1968 Action Program of the Czechoslovak communists assumed a fundamentally new position toward the party's role in society. It stated that "the Party cannot enforce its authority . . . this must be won again and again by the Party's activity. . . . Communists must over and over again strive for the voluntary support of the majority of the people for the Party line." The Action Program came out strongly against the practice of "appointing party members to functions without regard to the principle that leading representatives of institutions of the whole society are chosen by the society itself."[15]

Czechoslovak reformers also spoke about the necessity to provide for "a division of power" and a "system of mutual supervision." They also criticized the "undue concentration of duties" in the existing Ministry of the Interior and wanted to build a new legal system in which court proceedings would be independent of political factors. Finally, they allowed the press to operate freely.

However, neither the government nor the public found it easy to define their new mutual relationship. As Mlynář has since pointed out, "a mechanism had been introduced capable of forcing change on the system. And it was not a party or state mechanism consisting of a democratic process within the structures of power but rather it was a kind of public lobby backed by a free press and the free expression of opinions outside the power structure." This development had a profound influence on attitudes in the Politburo. For example, during the Prague Spring, on an occasion when the Politburo member Josef Smrkovský failed to support an unpopular resolution despite previous promises to do so, he explained to a colleague: "Just look at the popularity charts in the news today. I have made it to the fifth place already."[16]

Gorbachev's approach to these critical problems, as well as to present Soviet reality, is substantially different. First of all,

[15] See "The Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia" in *Czechoslovakia's Blueprint for Freedom*, ed. Paul Ello. Washington: Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, 1968, pp. 88–179.

[16] Mlynář, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–103, 257.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for him the word "democracy" has a quite different meaning than it had for the Prague reformers or has for citizens of democratic societies. *Perestroika*, as he admits, "is not a spontaneous, but governed process . . . The *perestroika* drive started on the Communist Party's initiative and the party leads it." Likewise, "the press should unite and mobilize people rather than disunite them" and, obviously, unite them behind the party line. *Glasnost* can be tolerated as the party's tool but not beyond this point. Instead of thinking about how to improve and modernize the outdated communist system by introducing into it objective guarantees like the division of power and a system of checks and balances, Gorbachev regards *glasnost* as an "effective form of public control over the activities of all government bodies, without exception, and a powerful lever in correcting shortcomings."[17] But he does not explain how *glasnost* can control the ultimate power of the ruling party in a one-party system in which that party has the last word in every sphere of life.

Nor does Gorbachev suggest the abolition of centralism. He calls instead for a "new concept of centralism" which would "correctly balance" the two sides of democratic centralism, whatever that may mean.

Even this brief comparison of Gorbachev's reforms with those of the Prague Spring suggests that Gorbachev is much more firmly in charge of events in the U.S.S.R. now than Dubček was in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But it also reveals that the Czechoslovak reformers were boldly addressing the very core of existing problems and wanted to create an efficient mechanism for running a modern state. True, the party would have had to fight for the leading position in the society. But the reformers firmly believed that they would succeed in such competition. They wanted to subordinate the personal interests of individual leaders and their political fates to the supreme common interest—the survival and progress of the system.

Gorbachev is much more cautious and seeks most of the time to have it both ways: democracy, but controlled and centralized; a free press, but one that serves the interests of the party as a unifying and mobilizing force. One is justified in being skeptical about whether such policies are bold enough to cure the deep-rooted problems of the Soviet system and create a modern governmental mechanism.

[17] Gorbachev, *op. cit.*, pp. 55, 75–76, 79.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VII

Conditions in Czechoslovakia and in most of the rest of Eastern Europe have changed dramatically since 1968. Today's would-be reformers are much less confident of the success of their plans because the economies that must be reformed have deteriorated significantly. Moreover, there are no examples of successful reforms in any East European country. Bold attempts in this direction in Yugoslavia, Hungary and even Poland have hardly been success stories. Meanwhile, the people's alienation from their communist governments is stronger than before.

Any realistic reforms will mean—at least initially—harder work and less economic security for most people. Many younger people brought up in the communist system have no experience with private enterprise and know equally little about true professionalism on the job. Because the communists bear the responsibility for the economic crises caused by their mismanagement, they are ill positioned to impose sacrifices on the people without offering them something significant in return. Meanwhile, the growing technological gap between the communist countries and Western societies makes it even more difficult for the communists to stand in the way of democracy and a free market.

It is clear by now that any meaningful reforms would weaken the power of the communist parties in Eastern Europe. Communist leaders must take two essential but unpleasant steps in order to implement reforms. First, they will have to allow a broader representation of domestic forces in the government, which is the only way to garner enough popular support to implement tough reformist plans. Second, they will have to introduce measures of strict accountability and self-financing into the economy and not allow the center to alter arbitrarily the prices of market-produced goods. In the first case, the communists would be required to surrender some power immediately. In the second case the objective rules of the economy would gradually award power and influence to able professionals instead of favored party apparatchiks.

Communist governments are obviously reluctant to embark on the road of radical reform now. They are trying to manage their growing problems by careful maneuvering instead. As a result, however, the reforms being attempted still fall well short of meeting the accelerating economic crises, and therefore cannot prevent further deterioration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some of the more daring communist reformers know that if left unreformed, their countries will sooner or later reach a stage where the depth of their crises and their distance behind the West will make it virtually impossible for the communists to maintain a claim to legitimate power, or the right to initiate reforms at such a late date. But they also understand that they must win the fight for the reforms within the party leadership first, before trying to unite the people behind a reform program.

All these factors create a situation in Eastern Europe significantly different from that prevailing during the Prague Spring. In 1968 it was the Soviet, East German and Polish leaders who lost their nerve when confronted with the course of developments in Czechoslovakia, long before the majority of Czechoslovak communists had become alarmed, even assuming they would have become so. Now it is a Soviet leader who is suggesting that much greater tolerance be shown toward diverse developments in Eastern Europe. This fact, together with the absence of a reliable medicine for the crumbling economies of Eastern Europe, and the continued close scrutiny of their increasingly impatient and anticommunist societies, makes the cautious communist leaders of Eastern Europe unlikely candidates for defying Moscow.

This leaves the Kremlin with ample room for shrewd maneuvering and a much greater spectrum of options. But—and this is the greatest shortcoming of the Soviet and East European communists' policies in Eastern Europe—the current official philosophy of reform contains no solution to the core problem: the withering away of the old system of governance is already well in train. There is no foreseeable way to make the smooth transition to a better system, leaving Eastern Europe in a quite unpredictable situation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

F. Stephen Larrabee

GORBACHEV AND THE SOVIET MILITARY

Since his assumption of power in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev has embarked upon a program of far-reaching economic and social reform. One of the key factors determining the ultimate success or failure of Gorbachev's efforts will be his ability to persuade the Soviet military to go along with these changes.

The military represents a powerful force in Soviet society. As the institution most directly responsible for maintaining Soviet security, it plays a key role in defining the nature of the external threat faced by the Soviet Union. The military is also an important claimant on scarce Soviet resources. The defense industry has priority access to the best raw materials, the most advanced machinery and the most qualified workers. Thus any successful reform over the long run is likely to run up against powerful military interests. Similarly, any arms control agreement will need the military's support.

There are growing signs that Gorbachev sees a deep interconnection between his program of economic restructuring and the need to restructure military policy. Since coming to power he has made a number of important changes in the military-security area that could have important consequences not only for civil-military relations in the U.S.S.R. but for broader East-West relations. As the United States looks to shaping the U.S.-Soviet agenda in the aftermath of the fourth Reagan-Gorbachev summit, it may be useful to examine these changes in some detail.

II

Gorbachev's current relations with the Soviet military must be seen against the background of developments in the late Brezhnev period. Under Brezhnev the influence and power of the military had significantly increased; indeed, the early

---

F. Stephen Larrabee, a member of the National Security Council staff from 1978 to 1981, is Vice President and Director of Studies of the Institute for East-West Security Studies in New York. The views expressed here are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brezhnev years have aptly been termed the "golden age" of the high command.[1] During this period (until about 1975) the concerns of the armed forces were given precedence and requests for resources were rarely challenged. The presence of the military was also institutionalized in the Politburo in 1973 (with the promotion of Marshal Andrei Grechko to that body), giving it a direct voice in the highest decision-making body.

Relations with the military deteriorated, however, in the latter half of Brezhnev's rule as the rate of Soviet economic growth declined from four percent in the 1960s to a little more than two percent in the late 1970s. This slowdown accentuated critical resource allocation decisions and prompted the Soviet leadership to cut back on the rate of growth of defense spending. Whereas Soviet defense spending had increased at a rate of four to five percent in the period 1965–1975, it dropped to two percent from 1977–1983, with investment devoted to the procurement of new weapons showing no growth at all during the same period.[2] During that period, by contrast, U.S. defense spending visibly increased, especially after the election of President Reagan in 1980.

The slowdown in Soviet defense spending lasted too long to have been caused by technical problems or bottlenecks. Rather it appears to have been the result of a deliberate policy decision to peg the growth rate of defense spending to that of the economy as a whole. The decision, however, exacerbated party-military relations. Alarmed by the U.S. buildup, the Soviet military sought to exploit the political uncertainties surrounding Brezhnev's failing health to press for a greater share for the defense budget. Tensions grew to the point where in October 1982 Brezhnev was forced to defend his policy in an unusual meeting in the Kremlin before the entire top leadership of the military and Ministry of Defense. Brezhnev's speech had a strongly defensive tone. It seems to have been designed to impress upon the military leaders the need for spending constraints while at the same time reassuring them that their interests would not be neglected. Noting that the Soviet armed forces were equipped with the most modern weapons, Brezh-

[1] Jeremy R. Azrael, "The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976–1986," The RAND Corporation, R-3521-AF, June 1987, p. 2.

[2] See Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics," *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China 1984*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1984.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nev stressed that the Central Committee was "taking measures to ensure that they [the armed forces] have all they need."[3]

Brezhnev died several weeks later, but his death by no means put an end to these tensions. The military, led by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, then chief of the Soviet General Staff, continued to press for greater defense spending, emphasizing the need to meet the increased threat posed by the American military buildup.[4] Indeed, Ogarkov's continued stridency—and particularly his willingness to challenge the civilian leadership publicly on this issue—appears to have been one of the prime reasons for his sudden dismissal as chief of the General Staff and first deputy defense minister in September 1984.

Ogarkov's dismissal appears to have been designed to remove him as contender for the post of defense minister (the minister, Dimitri Ustinov, was known to be ill). Parallels to the case of Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov, who was dropped from the Politburo and lost his position as defense minister in 1957, are readily apparent, but there are also important differences. Unlike Zhukov, Ogarkov was not disgraced. He continues to hold an important position as head of the Western Theater of Military Operations and remains a member of the Central Committee. However, his current responsibilities are operational, and he is no longer in a position to challenge the civilian leadership on matters of policy as openly and as forcefully as before.

The occasion of Ustinov's death in December 1984 provided another indication that the military's influence was on the wane. The man picked to succeed Ustinov, First Deputy Defense Minister Marshal Sergei Sokolov, while a professional military officer, was a colorless and relatively undistinguished member of the old guard whose past record suggested that he could be counted on not to make waves or challenge party authority. As defense minister he maintained a low profile and rarely spoke out publicly on important defense or arms control matters. His lack of influence was underscored by the fact that unlike his two predecessors, Marshal Grechko and Ustinov, who were both full members of the Politburo, Sokolov was excluded from the top ranks of the leadership and was only a

[3] L. Brezhnev, *Pravda*, Oct. 28, 1982.

[4] See in particular N. V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite oteshchestva*, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

candidate member of the Politburo until his forced retirement in May 1987.

III

Unlike his predecessors, especially Brezhnev and Khrushchev, Gorbachev came to power with no strong ties to the military. Before coming to Moscow in 1978 he had spent most of his career as a provincial party leader in Stavropol, a position that would have given him little opportunity to interact with the military. Moreover, for much of the early period in Moscow he was primarily in charge of agriculture. Thus he had little background in defense and military affairs, although as "second secretary" under Konstantin Chernenko he undoubtedly gained greater familiarity with and insight into military matters.

Gorbachev's rapid rise to the position of general secretary coincided with a number of incidents that exacerbated party-military relations and that most probably influenced his general attitude toward the military and defense issues. The first issue was the deployment of the intermediate-range SS-20 missile; this appears to have been undertaken at the urging of the military in 1976–77, largely for military-technical reasons, without serious consideration of the long-term political implications for relations with Western Europe. The deployment proved to be a serious miscalculation. Rather than enhancing Soviet security, it resulted in the emergence of a new nuclear threat to Soviet territory—the deployment of NATO's Pershing 2 and cruise missiles—and led to a serious deterioration of Moscow's relations with the West. The decision to deploy the SS-20 appears to have been increasingly seen as a mistake by many in the upper echelons of the Soviet leadership, including Gorbachev himself, and as an example of the dangers of allowing purely military-technical considerations to drive policy and take precedence over broader political objectives. It thus probably reinforced Gorbachev's belief, emphasized at the 27th Party Congress and often since, that security is primarily "a political task," which cannot be assured by military-technical means alone.

Party-military relations were also exacerbated during this period by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rather than resulting in a quick victory as the military apparently had predicted, the invasion proved to be a serious military and diplomatic blunder, which damaged Moscow's relations, not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only in the Third World but also in the West, without bringing any appreciable military or political benefits. The political costs of the invasion, both at home and abroad, probably underscored to Gorbachev the risks of allowing Soviet policy to be dictated primarily by narrow military considerations. Moreover, the case of General Ivan Pavlovskii, who had been sent to Afghanistan on a fact-finding mission several months prior to the invasion and was rumored to have retired in disgrace one year later, strongly suggests that the military was held responsible for the miscalculation.

The third incident contributing to party-military tensions was the shooting down of the Korean Air Lines passenger jet in September 1983. The incident revealed major weaknesses in the Soviet air defense system. Moreover, it occurred just at a time when relations with Washington were beginning to improve, disrupting what looked like the beginnings of a promising thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations. The initial confusion and mishandling of the affair further damaged Moscow's credibility in the eyes of the world. The fact that the Far Eastern air defense command was shaken up soon after the incident strongly suggests that the party was dissatisfied with the military's handling of the affair.

Taken together with the conflict over defense spending, these three incidents appear to have prompted an effort by the party to reassert greater control over the military and defense matters. The dismissal of Ogarkov appears to have been the first concrete step in this process. It is highly likely that these incidents contributed to Gorbachev's general belief that the military factor had been given disproportionate weight in Soviet affairs, and that Moscow needed a more flexible foreign policy that relied more heavily on political-diplomatic means—two central tenets of Gorbachev's "new thinking."

IV

Indications that the effort to reassert party control over the military would continue or even intensify were visible almost from the moment Gorbachev took over as general secretary. During Chernenko's funeral in March 1985 there was a conspicuous absence of military representatives on the Lenin Mausoleum—a departure from past practice that seemed designed to emphasize civilian supremacy. In addition, the new party program adopted at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerably strengthens the role of the party in military affairs. The key passage states:

> It is under the Party's guidance that policy in the area of the country's defense and security *and Soviet military doctrine*, which is purely defensive and directed at defending against an attack from without, are developed and implemented.[5]

This reference to the party's role in the formulation of security policy and military doctrine was not contained in the 1961 program. As if to underscore the point, the new program notes that "the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] considers it necessary in the future to *strengthen its organizing and directing influence* on the life and activities of the Armed Forces."[6]

The increased role of the party in military affairs has been emphasized by military leaders as well. Writing in the party's theoretical journal *Kommunist*, for instance, Army General Alexei Lizichev pointed to the "*natural increase* under the new historical conditions of the *party's leading role* in the life of Soviet society." This precept, he bluntly added, "fully applies to the Armed Forces as well—with a consideration of the specific nature of the missions they carry out."[7]

Under Gorbachev, moreover, the military has continued to be excluded from the top ranks of the Politburo. Like his predecessor Sergei Sokolov, the new defense minister, General Dimitri Yazov, remains only a candidate member of that body. In addition, the military has lost two of the most important civilian spokesmen for its interests: Ustinov and Grigori Romanov, who was dismissed from the Politburo in July 1985. Their departure has deprived the military of important allies within the top leadership, a development that is all the more important because of the current lack of direct military representation in the Politburo. Within the Central Committee, moreover, the number of military representatives has remained relatively stable.

Gorbachev has also gradually begun to make some important changes in the top ranks of the military. Two of the most important changes were the retirement in 1985 of General Alexei Yepishev, head of the Main Political Administration,

[5] *Kommunist*, March 1986, p. 131, emphasis added.
[6] *Ibid.*, emphasis added.
[7] A. Lizichev, *Kommunist*, February 1987, p. 95, emphasis in the original.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander in chief of the navy, both of whom had close ties to Brezhnev. (Gorshkov, who died in May 1988, had held his position for nearly 30 years.) They were replaced by two officers about 20 years younger, General Alexei Lizichev and Admiral Vladimir Chernavin. Like Gorbachev, neither fought in World War II. They thus represent a new generation of officers, whose outlook is no longer dominated by the experiences of the war.

A second wave of changes came in the summer of 1986 in the wake of Gorbachev's trip to the Soviet Far East in July. Soon after the trip Vasili Petrov, the senior first deputy minister of defense, was retired. He was replaced by Piotr Lushev, commander in chief of the Soviet forces in East Germany. At about the same time two other deputy defense ministers, General Vladimir Govorov and General A. T. Altunin, were transferred. Govorov's replacement as head of the Main Inspectorate was General Ivan Tretiak, commander of the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations.

A third round of changes occurred in early 1987. These affected key positions in the ground forces, air force and navy as well as the General Staff. Significantly, they took place shortly after Dimitri Yazov, the head of the Far Eastern Military District, was appointed deputy defense minister in charge of personnel (February 1987). Like Tretiak, Yazov appears to have caught Gorbachev's attention during his trip to the Soviet Far East.

In short, since the summer of 1985 Gorbachev has carried out a major reshuffling of the top leadership of the armed forces, including ten out of 16 deputy defense ministers. In addition, he has replaced the chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the heads of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Poland and Hungary, as well as the commanders of the Moscow and Byelorussian military districts.

The most important changes, however, came in the wake of a highly embarrassing penetration of Soviet air defense by the young West German pilot, Mathias Rust, who landed his small Cessna 172 on Red Square on May 28, 1987. The incident led to a stiff rebuke of the military, which was criticized by the party for a major "dereliction of duty." This was followed by a number of important personnel changes, including the retirement of Defense Minister Sokolov and the dismissal of Marshal Alexander I. Koldunov, the head of the Soviet Air Defense Forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The retirement of Sokolov was not entirely unexpected. As noted earlier, Sokolov was clearly an interim appointment. And at 75 he was nearing retirement age anyway. But the Rust affair provided a convenient opportunity for Gorbachev to ease him out and put in his own man.

The choice of Deputy Defense Minister General Dimitri Yazov to replace Sokolov, however, came as a surprise to many observers. A relatively junior officer with a background in personnel, Yazov is typical of the new generation of officers whom Gorbachev seems to favor. As commander of the Far Eastern Military District he earned a reputation as an efficient commander and a strong supporter of *perestroika*, or restructuring. His writings have focused on ways of improving efficiency, raising troop morale and adapting high technology to military affairs—all themes stressed by Gorbachev as well.

In choosing Yazov, Gorbachev bypassed several more senior and better-known officers such as Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the current chief of the General Staff; Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces; and General Piotr Lushev, the first deputy defense minister. Equally interesting in this regard was the appointment of General Ivan Tretiak to replace Koldunov as head of the Soviet Air Defense Forces. Tretiak is a close associate of Yazov and their career paths have been closely intertwined. Both served together in the mid-1970s in the Far Eastern Military District, where Yazov was Tretiak's first deputy. When Tretiak was promoted to head of the Far Eastern Theater Command in 1984, Yazov replaced him as head of the subordinate Far Eastern Military District. And, as already noted, both men were recalled to Moscow, where they again worked closely together as deputy defense ministers for the Main Inspectorate and for personnel.

These two institutions—the Main Personnel Directorate and the Main Inspectorate—appear to be the key institutions through which Gorbachev has sought to conduct the process of *perestroika* in the armed forces. Initially the military appears to have regarded the idea of *perestroika* as something that applied to the rest of society, but not to them. But at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum Gorbachev explicitly made clear that the process included the military as well. Since then the issue of *perestroika* has been given increased attention in the military press. While the main emphasis has been on increasing discipline and raising troop morale, the military has also been called upon to admit previous shortcomings.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rust affair and Yazov's appointment marked an important turning point in this process. Since the Rust incident the military has come under increasing criticism, both in the civilian and military press. The tone and tenor of these criticisms make clear that the party leadership is less than happy with the pace of *perestroika* in the military. In a speech in July 1987, for instance, Yazov openly complained about "negative tendencies" in the military, and called upon the military to show a greater willingness to admit past mistakes.[8]

The bluntest criticism, however, came from Boris Yeltsin, the Moscow party leader who was dropped from the Politburo by Gorbachev in early November. At a party meeting of the Moscow district air defense cadres in June 1987, Yeltsin launched a blistering attack on the air defense leadership, accusing them of "bureaucratism, nepotism, personal capriciousness, and cliquishness."[9] Despite the decisions of the 27th Party Congress, Yeltsin complained, the district leadership had continued to act "as if the decisions of the Central Committee did not apply to them." The article reporting this attack also noted that a number of officers had been expelled from the party in connection with the Rust affair. Both the intensity and the openness of such criticism was unusual.

In effect, Gorbachev used the Rust affair to enhance party control over the military and intensify pressure for *perestroika*. At the same time, Yazov began to put his own men in key positions in the highest echelons of the armed forces. For instance, Yazov's successor as deputy defense minister for personnel, General Dimitri Sukhorukov, the commander of the Airborne Forces, had preceded Yazov as commander of the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia in 1979–80. Another Yazov associate, General Mikhail Sorokin, replaced General Tretiak as chief of the Main Inspectorate; Sorokin had preceded Yazov as first deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District.

Service in the Soviet Far East, in fact, has become an important springboard to promotion: six of the current deputy defense ministers held senior posts or commands there in the 1970s. The elevation of these officers, each of whom apparently has some tie to Yazov, has strengthened the "reformist" element in the top ranks of the Ministry of Defense. Indeed,

[8] See "Uglubliat perestroiku," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 18, 1987.
[9] "Po zakonam vysokoi otvetstvennosti," *Krasnaia zvezda*, June 17, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as Gorbachev accelerates his campaign to restructure and rejuvenate the top ranks of the armed forces, it would not be surprising if other holdovers from the Brezhnev era such as Marshal Kulikov, and possibly even Ogarkov, are retired.

V

Under Gorbachev the military's influence on arms control and security policy has also decreased. The military remains an important player, but in contrast to the Brezhnev period it is no longer able to dominate the policy process. At the same time the role of the Foreign Ministry and International Department of the Central Committee has increased in the formulation of national security policy. Many of Gorbachev's major arms control initiatives, in fact, appear to have been worked out by a small group of trusted civilian advisers in the Foreign Ministry and International Department with only limited involvement of the military.

Gorbachev has consciously sought to increase the arms control expertise within the Central Committee apparatus and Foreign Ministry. Within the International Department of the Central Committee a special section dealing with arms control has been created, headed by Lieutenant General Viktor Starodubov, who served on the Soviet delegations to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and the talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). A new Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate, headed by Viktor Karpov, the former head of the Soviet Union's delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), has also been set up in the Foreign Ministry. Karpov's deputy is a military officer, Lieutenant General Konstantin Mikhailov, who previously served on the Soviet General Staff.

The strengthening of the arms control expertise in the Foreign Ministry and International Department is designed to ensure that nonmilitary views are institutionalized into the policy process and has given Gorbachev an independent source of information on defense and security matters. At the same time Gorbachev has sought to enhance policy coordination and break down the rigid compartmentalization between the military and the other bureaucracies involved in national security affairs that existed under his predecessors. In sum, Gorbachev has sought to integrate the military more into the broader policy process, while at the same time strengthening the party's—and his personal—control over the process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In addition, the role of scientists and outside experts, particularly those in think tanks such as the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada and the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), has increased. While not policymakers themselves, many of these outside experts play important roles as advisers to Gorbachev and as conduits of new ideas on arms control. Moreover, the link between the think tanks and the policy process has been strengthened by the creation within the Foreign Ministry of a new Scientific Coordination Center. Headed by Vladimir Shustov, one of the ministry's top arms control specialists, the center is tasked with coordinating academic research on arms control and integrating it into the policy process.

The overall effect of these changes has been to create competing centers of threat assessment and to reduce the military's ability to dominate the formulation of arms control and security policy. At the same time, the military's requests for new weapons systems are being subjected to more careful scrutiny and weighed against other competing economic and political priorities. Increasingly, the military is being called upon to prove its case and justify demands for new weapons systems. In short, the days when the military could automatically be assured of receiving "all it needed to defend the homeland" (the standard formulation during the Brezhnev years) are over.

Yet while the role and influence of the civilian officials in the formulation of defense and security policy have increased, they do not as yet constitute the type of institutionalized defense and arms control "counter-elite" that exists in the United States. Their involvement is to a large extent ad hoc and often depends more on personal relationships than on formal channels. Moreover, while highly knowledgeable about Western defense policies, many of these officials lack detailed knowledge of the Soviet force deployments. To be truly effective and influential players they need greater access to military information, and their role needs to be more deeply institutionalized in the policy process.

As part of Gorbachev's overall approach to security, arms control has also received greater attention. In the past, especially under Brezhnev, a buildup of the U.S.S.R.'s military power was seen as the main guarantee of Soviet security; arms control was of secondary importance. Under Gorbachev, arms control is seen as a major instrument for enhancing Soviet security, and especially for reducing the economic burden of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the arms race. Indeed, Gorbachev appears to see a direct connection between a reduction of the military burden and his ability to revitalize the Soviet economy. He has thus been willing to adopt a more flexible position than his predecessors on a number of key arms control issues, especially intermediate-range nuclear forces.

In general, the military has supported Gorbachev's arms control policy. However, it has had reservations about some specific aspects of his policy. Regarding the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, for instance, the Soviet military appears initially to have taken a very tough stand, demanding a total ban on SDI, including research. Gorbachev was reportedly able to win military support for an agreement that would allow some SDI research—a change signaled in the Soviet proposal put forward in the START talks—only by agreeing to press for a higher ceiling on missile warheads.[10] The military now appears to have modified its attitude toward SDI. While it still remains strongly opposed to U.S. deployment of SDI, the top military leadership sees the program much more as a long-term challenge than an immediate one. There is a growing sense that U.S. domestic pressures, above all budgetary constraints and growing reservations in Congress, may force a cutback in the program. In addition, the Soviets recognize that Reagan's successor is unlikely to have the same high degree of personal commitment to the program. These considerations have contributed to a modification of the Soviet attitude toward SDI that could eventually pave the way for conclusion of a START agreement once other, technical issues are resolved.

The military appears to have had some reservations about the wisdom of the Soviet extension of its moratorium on nuclear testing and the impact this could have on the U.S.S.R.'s military position.[11] There are also clear differences over conventional arms control between some of the civilian analysts and the military. While some civilian advisers have advocated unilateral cuts,[12] pointing to Khrushchev's unilateral reductions in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a precedent, several

[10] Michael Gordon, "Star Wars Debate," *The New York Times*, July 3, 1986.

[11] At a press conference in August 1986 Akhromeyev noted that Gorbachev's decision to extend the test ban moratorium a second time "had given the United States certain purely military advantages" and caused "a certain damage" to Soviet interests. See Gary Lee, "Soviets Successfully Use Nuclear Test Ban for International Campaign," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 31, 1986.

[12] Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov and Andrei Kortunov, "Reasonable Sufficiency—or How to Break the Vicious Circle," *New Times*, Oct. 12, 1987, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

top military leaders have rejected such cuts, arguing that Khrushchev's reductions were ill conceived and caused serious damage to Moscow's security.[13] At present there appears to be no clear consensus on this issue, but it would not be surprising if Gorbachev did eventually make some unilateral reductions in Soviet conventional forces in central Europe in order to give the talks on conventional arms control new impetus.

Marshal Akhromeyev is likely to play a critical role in brokering the Soviet negotiating position on conventional arms control as well as in working out the Soviet approach to strategic arms. Akhromeyev has emerged as a key player and spokesman for the military on arms control issues. He was included in the Soviet delegation to the Reykjavik and Washington summits. His designation as head of the working group on arms control in both instances may have been designed to reassure the military that their interests would be protected, as well as to dissipate any military criticism of the final outcome.

Another source of controversy has been the issue of intrusive inspection measures in arms control. The Soviet military has traditionally opposed such measures, fearing that they would be used for intelligence purposes by the West.[14] Since Gorbachev's assumption of power, however, Moscow has significantly moderated its opposition to intrusive inspection. Important provisions for on-site inspection are contained in the agreement on confidence-building measures concluded at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe in September 1986 and in the INF treaty. The Soviets also agreed to Western proposals for on-site inspection of declared chemical weapons sites on Soviet territory. In line with this shift, in October 1987 a group of Western specialists was allowed to visit the Soviet chemical weapons installation at Shikhany in the Lower Volga region.

In the negotiations in Stockholm, moreover, Gorbachev appears to have directly overridden the military, which had

[13] See in particular the interview with General Ivan Tretiak, commander in chief of the Soviet Air Defense Forces, *Moscow News*, Feb. 21, 1988, in which he warned against being "lured by apparent benefits" and specifically pointed to the "sorry experiences" of the late 1950s when the Soviet Union reduced its forces unilaterally by 1.2 million men.

[14] In a statement on October 18, 1985, for instance, Akhromeyev emphasized the importance of verification by "national technical means" (in contrast to on-site inspection). Similarly, in a press conference on January 18 he explicitly warned that monitoring of any conventional agreement "must not turn into intelligence activity." See his articles, "Vtorzheniia Vashingtona i deistvitelnie fakty," *Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1985, and "Osvobodit mir ot yadernogo oruzhiia," *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

opposed Western provisions for intrusive verification measures. His decision to accept on-site inspection, apparently taken at a Politburo meeting in late June 1986, paved the way for the signing of the final accord on September 19. In order to underscore the Soviet military's acceptance of the principle, the Soviet leadership took the unusual step of sending Marshal Akhromeyev to Stockholm in early September to announce the shift in the Soviet position.

Perhaps the most telling sign of the shift in Soviet policy, however, was Gorbachev's willingness in September 1987 to allow a group of American congressmen to inspect the controversial radar site under construction near Krasnoyarsk, which the Reagan Administration claims is a violation of SALT II. The congressmen were allowed to roam freely within the facility and take nearly 1,000 photographs. In permitting them to visit and photograph the site, Gorbachev appears to have concluded that the political benefits of defusing the controversy on the eve of a possible summit outweighed the military's concerns about possible U.S. intelligence gains.

A greater degree of *glasnost* has also been reflected in the more candid coverage of military issues in the Soviet press. Some Soviet writers have even gone as far as to question the morality of deterrence itself. The more open discussion, particularly the criticism of the military by some writers, has made the military uncomfortable, and lately military leaders have begun to complain openly about the increased dangers of pacifism.[15] For instance, Lieutenant General V. Serebriannikov, a well-known military publicist, accused "certain writers and publicists" of expressing "decadent and cowardly thoughts which sow the seeds of pacifism."[16] Under the guise of *glasnost*, he charged, these writers "virtually compete with one another to put forward the most sensational and venomous 'revelations'." In January 1988 Defense Minister Yazov himself joined the fray. In a rare television interview he accused the Soviet press, especially the magazine *Ogonyok*, of undermining respect for the Soviet army. Such comments reflect growing concern on the part of the military that Gorbachev's "new thinking,"

[15] See Thomas Nichols, "Intellectual Pacifists Criticized by Military Officer," *Radio Liberty Research* 308/87, July 28, 1987.

[16] V. Serebriannikov, "Sootnosheniie politicheskykh i voennykh sredstv v zashchite sotsializma," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, September 1987, pp. 15–16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

especially the greater degree of *glasnost*, could undermine popular support for military programs and values.

VI

Another key bone of contention has been defense spending. While the disagreements that plagued Brezhnev's last years have been more muted since Ogarkov's ouster, they have by no means disappeared. In July 1985, four months after becoming general secretary, Gorbachev flew to Minsk for an unusual meeting behind closed doors with the top military leadership. Exactly what went on at the meeting is still not known, but Gorbachev reportedly warned the military not to expect large increases in the defense budget.

The party program adopted at the 27th Party Congress also contains a new formulation which appears to give the party greater flexibility in determining defense appropriations. Under Brezhnev the standard formulation was that the military would be provided with "whatever it needed reliably to defend the homeland." The new formulation states that the CPSU will make every effort to ensure that the Soviet armed forces "remain at a level that rules out the strategic superiority of the forces of imperialism." The change is subtle but important. In effect, it suggests that the armed forces do not need to match every Western increase but simply to maintain a defense level capable of deterring "Western aggression."

Recently, Soviet officials have also begun to make a distinction between "parity" (which requires forces equal to those of an opponent) and "sufficiency" (which requires enough force to deter an attack). In a speech in Prague in April 1987, for instance, Gorbachev noted that Soviet defense expenditures would be based on "reasonable sufficiency" (*razymnaia dostatochnost*), a term that has increasingly found expression in speeches and statements by Soviet officials and leaders, including the military.

While the exact operational significance of the term for Soviet force planning is not clear, as used by Gorbachev and other proponents of the "new thinking" the term seems to be part of a general effort to develop explicit criteria for force planning, putting greater emphasis on maintaining "sufficient" forces for defense. According to the proponents of the new theory, an effort to match every U.S. force development or new weapons system one for one is not only unnecessary but plays directly into the hands of the United States, which in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

past has deliberately sought to exhaust the Soviet Union economically through major arms buildups.[17]

Other proponents have argued that "copying various armaments developed and deployed by the aggressor frequently results in lagging behind in the arms race."[18] As military technology becomes more sophisticated, and more time is needed to develop, test and deploy weapons, this lag could even increase, they warn. In this view, a symmetrical response means that the initiator of the arms race (i.e., the United States) can make more effective use of its technological, geostrategic and other advantages, thereby compelling the other side "to conduct the contest on the 'opponent's field' and according to his 'rules of the game'."

Significantly, the strongest proponents of the concept of reasonable sufficiency are civilian analysts located in several key institutes in Moscow. The attitude of the military toward these new concepts is much more ambiguous. While military representatives appear to accept the idea of reasonable sufficiency in principle, they rarely spell out the concept's concrete meaning beyond saying it means having "sufficient" forces to repel an aggressor. Moreover, the military continues to insist that the achievement of parity remains the "decisive factor" in reducing the risk of war, suggesting that it is much less enthusiastic about the idea of asymmetrical reductions than are its civilian counterparts. Indeed, military spokesmen often equate parity and reasonable sufficiency.

This does not mean, however, that the military opposes Gorbachev's economic program. While undoubtedly uneasy about the apparent constraints on defense spending, the military recognizes that a strong economy is a prerequisite for the maintenance of the Soviet Union's status as a first-class power. The crucial issue is not gross output but technological change and innovation, particularly the acceleration of progress in high-technology areas such as computers, microprocessors and electronics. These areas are also considered critical in ensuring that the U.S.S.R. will be able to compete with the United States militarily, particularly in new "cutting edge" military technologies such as precision-guided munitions, sensors and electronic guidance systems, which Soviet military leaders believe will increasingly shape and dominate the military environment.

[17] Evgenii Primakov, "Novaia filosofiia vneshnei politiki," *Pravda*, July 10, 1987.
[18] Zhurkin, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In effect, the Soviet Union faces a dual challenge: (1) to constrain U.S. progress in the development of sophisticated weapons technologies; and (2) to modernize its own industrial infrastructure in order to compete more effectively in key areas of military competition, especially those dominated by high technology. The military appears to recognize that technological innovation cannot occur without a modernization of the civilian sector of the economy, since many of the key technologies are "dual use" technologies, which must be introduced in a balanced way across the board. Hence the military has generally supported Gorbachev's program to revitalize the Soviet economy, particularly his calls for "accelerated scientific-technical progress."

Over the last three years Gorbachev has introduced a number of organizational changes which have a direct relevance to the military and appear designed to improve scientific-technical progress and facilitate a better integration of the civilian and military sectors of the Soviet economy. The most important of these include: (1) the establishment in October 1985 of a new Machine Building Bureau of the Council of Ministers responsible for a unified technology policy, headed by I. S. Silaev, a close associate of former Defense Minister Ustinov; (2) the creation of a new State Committee for Computer Technology and Information Services, headed by N. V. Gorshkov, who comes from the defense-related Ministry of Radio Industry; (3) the creation of a new department within the Academy of Sciences oriented toward machine-building and computer technologies, which is intended to achieve better integration of fundamental research in military-related areas; and (4) the establishment of Multi-Branch Scientific-Technical Complexes, which are supposed to integrate efforts at all stages of innovation from fundamental research to industrial production.

In addition, a large number of officials recently appointed by Gorbachev to high economic management posts have previously held important posts in the defense-industrial sector. This includes Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, who was in charge of the armaments sector of the State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN) in the late 1970s; Silaev, who previously headed the Ministry of Aviation Industry; and Nikolai Talyzin, the former head of GOSPLAN. Talyzin's replacement as GOSPLAN chief, Yuri Maslyukov, served as deputy minister of the Defense Industry, later as first deputy chairman of GOSPLAN in charge of armaments, and as chairman of the Military Industrial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. Maslyukov was promoted to candidate membership in the Politburo at the February 1988 Central Committee plenum. Also promoted at this plenum was another member of the military-industrial complex, former Minister of General Machine Building Oleg Baklanov, who was made a Central Committee secretary.

The trend toward putting capable managers who have distinguished themselves in the military-industrial sector into key managerial posts in the civilian economy appears designed to increase the performance of the civilian sector and achieve a better integration of military and civilian economies. At the same time Gorbachev has also recently introduced into the civilian sector a number of practices used in the military sector, such as the state acceptance system (*gospriemka*) and program-oriented planning in an effort to break bureaucratic resistance to innovation and ensure a higher standard of goods. It remains to be seen, however, whether such organizational and personnel changes will be sufficient to achieve the increased technological innovation needed for the Soviet Union to reduce the growing technological gap with the United States in critical defense-related areas.

Moreover, there are built-in tensions within Gorbachev's modernization program, which could become more acute over the long run. The program requires large investments in precisely those sectors—machine-building and metal—which are the primary source of both military hardware and consumer durables. Thus his modernization plan is likely to result in greater competition between the civilian and the defense sectors for many resources. Disputes over resource allocation could sharpen, exacerbating tensions with the military.

In the near term, however, this problem is likely to be manageable. Recent Western analyses suggest that the Soviet defense establishment should be able to accommodate the shifts in machinery demand implied by the new industrial program, due to the expansion of the defense industry that occurred in the 1970s.[19] The crunch will come after 1990 when the defense industries have to prepare to produce new generations of weapons. If the modernization program falters or the U.S.S.R. is confronted with a major strategic challenge like SDI, Gor-

[19] *Soviet Economy Under a New Leader*, a joint CIA/DIA report published by the Defense Intelligence Agency in DDB-1900-122-86, July 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bachev could face increased pressure from the military for more investment in defense-related industries.

VII

Under Gorbachev, Soviet military doctrine has also undergone a number of important modifications. To be fully appreciated, these changes need to be seen against the background of the general evolution of Soviet military thinking in the last several decades. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Soviet military writings reflected a view that nuclear war was a rational instrument of policy, that victory in a nuclear war was possible, and that strategic superiority was obtainable, and desirable.[20] Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, Brezhnev openly began to oppose these views. In a speech in Tula in January 1977 he publicly rejected the idea that there could be any winner in a nuclear war and categorically denied that the Soviet Union was seeking strategic superiority.[21] He also announced his willingness to sign a mutual pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, a commitment that was extended unilaterally in his 1982 message to the U.N. General Assembly.

Brezhnev's Tula speech was designed to allay growing Western concerns about the goals and implications of Moscow's military buildup. But it also appears to have reflected a basic political assessment of the reality of mutual assured destruction and the impossibility of preventing a devastating retaliatory strike by the other side. Thereafter Brezhnev, Ustinov and Chernenko increasingly stressed the impossibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war, and categorically rejected the idea that Moscow was striving for strategic superiority. The "Tula line," as it came to be known, coincided with the downturn in the Soviet economy.

Not all Soviet military theorists, however, agreed with Brezhnev. One important holdout was Marshal Ogarkov, then chief of the General Staff, who until the early 1980s continued to maintain that nuclear war could be "won." By 1983, however, he had been brought to heel. Thereafter he became one of the strongest supporters of the view that a nuclear war was unwinnable.

After 1983 Ogarkov explicitly downplayed the role of nu-

[20] See James M. McConnell, "Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Developments," *World Politics*, April 1985, pp. 317–343.

[21] "Rech tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," *Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

clear weapons, arguing that a further buildup of nuclear weapons was "senseless." As he put it in an interview in the army publication *Krasnaia zvezda* (*Red Star*) in May 1984:

> The point is that with the quantity and diversity of strategic nuclear forces which have already been achieved, it becomes impossible to destroy the enemy's systems with a single strike. A crushing retaliatory strike against the aggressor, a strike inflicting unacceptable damage—even with the defender's remaining limited number of nuclear weapons—becomes inevitable in present conditions.[22]

Ogarkov also rejected the idea of limited nuclear war, terming it "pure fantasy" and "without foundation." He repeated essentially the same message in his 1985 book, *History Teaches Vigilance*.

The main thrust of Ogarkov's position was to downplay the importance of nuclear weapons and put greater emphasis on conventional weapons, especially those based on new technologies. During his tenure as chief of the General Staff (1977–1984) he tried to force a reorientation of Soviet strategy and adapt it to this new "revolution in military affairs." There is increasing evidence that coincident with his selection as chief of the General Staff, the Soviet Union adopted a conventional option as a long-term force development goal. This conclusion is reinforced not only by Soviet military writings, which in recent years have increasingly focused on the conduct of a theater war with conventional means, but also by the pattern of Soviet military exercises.

The Soviets no longer, in contrast to the 1960s, expect any future war to be decided in the early phase with the massive use of nuclear weapons, as espoused by Marshal Vasili Sokolovskii in his classic *Military Strategy*.[23] Rather, they anticipate a long war conducted primarily with conventional weapons.

The Soviets do not exclude the use of nuclear weapons by NATO, but they do not expect such use to be massive. In their view the stalemate at the strategic level makes the unrestricted use of nuclear weapons increasingly unlikely. In a war with NATO the Soviets would try to achieve their military objectives

[22] N. Ogarkov, "Zashchita sotsializma: opyt istorii i sovremennosti," *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 9, 1984.

[23] This has been indirectly confirmed by Soviet writers. In a recent book M. A. Gareyev, a deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, has asserted that certain parts of Sokolovskii's book have become obsolete. See M. A. Gareyev, *M. V. Frunze—voyennyi teoretik*, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985, especially pp. 239–241.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without the massive use of nuclear weapons, and ideally without the use of nuclear weapons at all. Their willingness to adopt a no-first-use pledge reflects confidence in their ability to implement this strategy. At the same time, the Soviets remain concerned that the development of new concepts by NATO such as Follow-On Forces Attack, Deep Strike and the Rogers Plan, which rely heavily on new, high-tech conventional weapons, could offset or negate many of the force improvements they have made over the past decade and give NATO important advantages in the critical early period of any conflict. It is no accident, therefore, that these concepts have been strongly attacked in Soviet propaganda and analysis in recent years.

VIII

Gorbachev's arms control policy should be seen against the background of these changes in doctrine, as well as changes in force posture to make forces more survivable by (1) putting more emphasis on bombers and cruise missiles, and (2) reducing reliance on large heavy missiles in favor of mobile missiles. Viewed in this light, Gorbachev's willingness to sign the INF treaty makes eminent political and strategic sense. It eliminates an important nuclear threat to the U.S.S.R. posed by the cruise missiles and Pershing 2s, making Soviet territory once again a "sanctuary" from missiles launched from European soil. It also reduces NATO's capability for nuclear escalation—the main Soviet concern should war in Europe break out—and erodes the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. Furthermore, Soviet advantages in conventional manpower and equipment, not to mention the geographic advantages for rapid conventional reinforcement, remain unaffected. While the U.S.S.R. must dismantle some 400 SS-20s and SS-5s, the targets covered by these weapons can be covered by other strategic systems, particularly the new SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are more accurate and mobile, and hence more survivable. Indeed, this is probably one of the reasons the Soviet military was willing to go along with the deal.

At the same time, recent Soviet statements, including those by the military, have increasingly stressed the "defensive nature" of Soviet military doctrine.[24] The main task of the Soviet armed forces is now said to be the "prevention of war."

[24] See in particular D. T. Yazov, "Voennaia doktrina Varshavskogo Dogovora—doktrina zashchity mira i sotsializma," *Pravda*, July 27, 1987.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To accomplish this task the Soviet forces will be kept at a level of "reasonable sufficiency," which is defined as a level which "rules out superiority by the forces of imperialism."

These points were officially incorporated into the new party program adopted at the 27th Party Congress. They were also endorsed by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization at its meeting in Berlin at the end of May 1987. The communiqué stresses that the military potential of both sides should be reduced to levels of "sufficiency," that is, to a level "necessary solely for defensive purposes." The accompanying statement on military doctrine, moreover, calls upon both sides to develop force postures and doctrines to eliminate the capacity for surprise attack—long a prime concern of the West.

To date the changes have largely been declaratory and related to the political aspects of doctrine; they have not altered the military-technical aspects, i.e., operational strategy and tactics (what the Soviets call "military art") which are still geared toward maintaining the capacity to launch a conventional attack against Europe. However, within several Soviet think tanks efforts are being made to try to flesh out some of these ideas. Recently, for instance, a group of Soviet analysts argued that the idea of "reasonable sufficiency" must be applied "at the regional level," i.e., the conventional level, with the goal of preventing either side from carrying out a "local blitzkrieg" or escalating such a conflict with impunity.[25] Others, drawing on lessons from the battle of Kursk, have pointed to the possibility of skillfully resisting a determined aggressor through the use of well-organized antitank defenses. Perhaps most significant, they stress the need to reconsider several widely held tenets of military theory and practice, particularly the idea that "a decisive offensive is the key to victory."[26]

There has been little sign, however, that this new thinking is acceptable to the Soviet military. The military has been reluctant to make major changes in the Soviet force posture and has insisted that the Warsaw Pact must have the capability to conduct "counteroffensive" actions.[27] Such a capability is clearly at odds with a truly defensive posture in which both

[25] Zhurkin *et al.*, *op. cit*, p. 15.

[26] A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, "Kurskaia bitva v svete sovremennoi oboronitelnoi doktriny," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyie otnosheniia*, August 1987, pp. 32–40.

[27] See the interview with General A. I. Gribkov, deputy chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces, "Doktrina sokhraneniia mira," *Krasnaia zvezda*, Sept. 25, 1987, pp. 2–3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sides are incapable of launching a surprise attack or conducting large-scale offensive actions.

Nevertheless, if the ideas currently under discussion begin to be applied at the operational level, they could have significant implications for Moscow's force posture in central Europe and its approach to conventional arms control. If the political leadership really decides that this is the direction in which it wants to move, the military will, however reluctantly, have to adapt. As the INF, START and chemical weapons negotiations have shown, Gorbachev is willing to make decisions that go against narrow military interests when he believes these serve larger Soviet objectives.

Several factors could increase Gorbachev's willingness to make the kind of asymmetrical reductions that would be necessary to achieve greater stability in Europe. First, the INF treaty eliminating all medium- and shorter-range missiles forces the conventional issue to the forefront and makes the current disparities all the more glaring. As a result, the Soviets will be compelled to address them more seriously than in the past. Second, Western advances in high-tech conventional weapons, such as precision-guided missiles, may eventually erode many of the current Soviet advantages in manpower and equipment, especially if Gorbachev's reforms do not succeed in reducing the current technological lag with the West. Third, economic factors may push Gorbachev toward reductions, as they did Khrushchev in the late 1950s; it is in the conventional, not nuclear, areas where the savings will be the greatest over the long run. Finally, demographic factors may create incentives for reductions. Given the declining birth rate among the Russian, Ukrainian and Baltic populations, the Soviets may find it increasingly difficult to maintain the current 5.7 million men under arms.

There are some tentative signs, moreover, that Moscow may be beginning to apply some of the general principles currently under debate. The Soviets have recently begun to reconfigure some of their forces in central Europe (emphasizing brigades rather than divisions), as well as change the pattern of some of their exercises. The key question is whether these signs of restructuring represent a natural outgrowth of the Ogarkov reforms, which emphasized greater mobility and firepower, or are the first steps toward a more radical restructuring. In other words, are the changes signs of an effort to make Soviet forces "leaner," or instead "leaner and meaner" by taking out some

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

support structure but retaining a capacity for rapid offensive action?

The answer to this question is not yet clear. What is evident is that there is a debate going on in Moscow over how best to address the issue of conventional arms control. At this point the Soviet position is far from solidified, and it may be some time before it is. However, the West can influence the outcome of the debate by putting forward serious proposals of its own and engaging the Soviets in a broad-ranging discussion on force postures and military doctrine. Discussions such as those between Soviet Defense Minister Yazov and his American counterpart Frank Carlucci, held in Bern in February, are a useful first step. They need to be followed up and complemented by others designed to probe and flesh out some of the concepts like "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive restructuring."

IX

The foregoing review highlights the evolution in Soviet party-military relations under Gorbachev. How successful Gorbachev will be in maintaining or even shifting further the current balance depends on several factors. The first is Gorbachev's ability to continue to put his own men in place and gradually extend the personnel changes he has initiated. In order to push through his domestic and foreign policy agenda, Gorbachev will have to conduct a far-reaching purge of the top ranks of the military bureaucracy similar to that which has taken place in the top echelons of the Foreign Ministry and Central Committee Secretariat. One way of doing this would be to lower the age limit for retirement. This would allow him to eliminate a large number of "old war horses" and promote new, younger officers more attuned to his ideas and more willing to carry them out.

A second key factor will be the success of Gorbachev's economic reform. At present, the military supports Gorbachev's effort to strengthen the economy, which it sees as a prerequisite for maintaining Soviet military strength, and is willing to accept constraints on defense spending. This could change if Gorbachev's economic reform falters or there is a major downturn in the international climate. In either case Gorbachev could come under growing pressure from an increasingly restless and disenchanted military, which might, as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Khrushchev's time, ally itself with other disaffected elements to form a powerful brake on Gorbachev's policies.

Developments in Eastern Europe could also play an important role. Gorbachev has allowed his East European allies somewhat greater room for maneuvering, both internally and externally, as long as their initiatives do not conflict with basic Soviet policy aims. However, an upheaval in Eastern Europe would significantly reduce Gorbachev's willingness and/or ability to make any major troop withdrawals from the area. Indeed, many in the Soviet military probably worry that troop reductions could accentuate instability in the region, fueling a new crisis.

Perhaps the most important factor, however, will be the success of Gorbachev's arms control policy. If Gorbachev can succeed in following up the INF agreement with an agreement on strategic arms and achieve some meaningful constraints on SDI, he will probably be able to keep the military at bay and have a freer hand to pursue his domestic agenda. If, however, he does not achieve some negotiated stabilization of the strategic relationship, he is likely to face growing pressure from the military to devote more resources to defense. Thus, the next several years are likely to be critical, not only for Gorbachev's political position but also for East-West relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sidney D. Drell
Thomas H. Johnson

MANAGING STRATEGIC WEAPONS

At the Washington summit in December 1987, the United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and instructed their negotiators in Geneva to work toward a reduction of strategic offensive nuclear arms by approximately 50 percent. The two countries also agreed to sweeping new cooperative procedures for verifying treaty compliance. At the same time, however, charges and countercharges of treaty violations have been exchanged, efforts to resolve current issues of compliance at the Standing Consultative Commission have broken down, and the United States has formally abandoned all Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and SALT II) limits on strategic offensive forces. The present period is thus characterized both by high hopes for new compromises and by antagonism on a variety of major issues.

No one can say what will emerge from this turbulent atmosphere in the long run. But no matter what happens in the continuing negotiations, it is clear that if lasting improvement in the superpowers' strategic relations is to be achieved during the next two decades, it must arise from a realistic assessment of contemporary U.S.-Soviet relations and of likely military and political developments.

One necessary element in charting a path toward a more stable relationship is a pragmatic judgment of technological trends and their military implications. These technological realities constitute the constraints or boundary conditions that

---

Sidney D. Drell is Professor and Deputy Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University. Thomas H. Johnson is Professor of Applied Physics and Director of the Science Research Laboratory, U.S. Military Academy, West Point. He is a member of the Center for International Security and Arms Control. This article is adapted from a more detailed study forthcoming from the Center for International Security and Arms Control, *Technical Trends and Strategic Policy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States and the Soviet Union will almost certainly have to cope with in setting defense priorities and in negotiating arms control agreements during the next twenty years.

We begin by summarizing those technical realities and trends that can reasonably be foreseen over the coming two decades. These provide the basis for formulating an approach to increasing both the security of the United States and the stability of the nuclear arms balance with the Soviet Union. This approach incorporates both very specific bilateral agreements and de facto arms control through judicious unilateral decisions about weapons development and deployment. Above all it is designed to point out a pragmatic path for the near-term future.

II

The land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are each capable enough to cause apprehension as to their potential for a devastating first-strike counterforce attack against the other superpower's fixed, land-based targets. A 50-percent reduction, such as may be negotiated in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), will not change this situation appreciably. In response to this threat, both nations will continue to develop, test and deploy mobile ICBMs, unless limited by strict treaty provisions. As long as mobile missiles are allowed, their total number is not likely to be accurately verifiable. However, if a treaty were to allow only small mobile missiles armed with single warheads, the overall uncertainty about the number of warheads deployed and their leverage in threatening counterforce attacks would be correspondingly reduced.

Both countries will also continue to develop, test and deploy in large numbers submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads with very high accuracy, comparable to that of the best ICBM warheads, which will be capable of delivering a prompt counterforce attack against hard targets such as missile silos, command posts and communications centers. Unless otherwise constrained, the numbers and accuracy of the U.S. SLBM force, and possibly of the Soviet SLBM force, will come to cause the same apprehension that ICBMs now do. However, operational difficulties (such as launch coordination) rather than technical considerations will continue to make a devastating counterforce attack from SLBMs less credible than one from ICBMs.

Both technological and operational considerations will pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vent gains in acoustical detection capabilities from threatening the security of deployed strategic submarine forces. Research in nonacoustic means of detection is very unlikely to alter this situation. With increasingly effective communications, strategic submarines will thus become more secure and more reliable. These same factors, plus a new generation of submarine-launched cruise missiles, will make attack submarines more effective, and will render the protection of surface battle groups and convoys more difficult, expensive and problematic.

Furthermore, both the United States and the Soviet Union will develop and deploy very accurate cruise missiles, using "stealth" technology to attain very low radar cross sections. The Soviet Union will in all likelihood continue to expand and modernize its large air defense system. However, our judgment is that the ability of cruise missiles to penetrate defenses will continue to outstrip the capabilities of defenses against them. The United States will retain confidence in the ability of its air-breathing force of modern, long-range cruise missiles to deliver massively destructive ordnance.

Both countries will extend and vary their passive military use of space for intelligence, communications, navigation, early warning and threat assessment; and they will enhance the effectiveness of their conventional forces with improved surveillance and target identification.

Despite any expanded deployment of strategic defenses, societies will remain vulnerable to nuclear destruction. Technology capable of providing a limited but fairly effective defense of hardened military targets against light attacks will be developed and tested, but it is impossible to say now whether strategic defense will eventually provide an effective or preferred means to enhance the survivability of retaliatory forces. The progress of arms control negotiations in achieving limits on offensive forces, together with further advances in technology, will be central to answering this question.

Assuming these to be the most significant strategic arms trends over the next two decades, the task for the United States is to determine what force design and what arms control measures are best suited to the attainment of a survivable deterrent force and stability in the overall balance of forces. This entails evaluating the contributions to strategic stability of the major weapons systems.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

One of the principal engines of instability in the nuclear arms race is the preoccupation with strategic counterforce targeting. "Counterforce" refers in general to one's ability to attack and destroy the military strength of an opponent, thereby limiting the damage one will suffer if attacked. It is frequently argued that such a war-fighting capability strengthens deterrence, and that it would be needed in the event deterrence failed; in some quarters counterforce targeting has also been presented as a "moral alternative" to targeting cities and many millions of innocent civilians. But counterforce weapons pose a dilemma: if deployed in large numbers, they threaten the destruction of a significant part of an opponent's strategic deterrent forces, namely, his command-and-control system, his fixed land-based ICBMs, his bomber force and his submarines in port. This threat is sufficiently ominous as to have a tendency to undermine the basis of deterrence, especially when the counterforce weapons are high-technology ballistic missiles with short flight time, high reliability and great accuracy. Over the past two decades this threat has generated a preoccupation with securing strategic offensive forces against such massive first strikes.

In evaluating the counterforce threat, one must ask the question: Can a significant fraction of one's deterrent forces be placed at risk of effective elimination by the attacker at some cost he will find reasonable? One must ask this question about the components of one's strategic forces and their associated command-and-control facilities. The latter have been the object of much recent concern since, if they can be eliminated swiftly by direct attack, the effectiveness of one's entire deterrent force can be degraded. But because effective attacks against specific command-and-control targets can be executed by small numbers of strategic weapon systems this problem cannot be solved by setting numerical limits on offensive forces alone.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union take extensive and various precautions to guarantee their ability to control their deterrent forces, even under attack. Coordinated attacks on missile-launching submarines are now, and will probably remain, impossible to execute because of limits to the capacity for antisubmarine warfare. Bombers, on the other hand, can be attacked with missile warheads that are individually very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cost-effective (that is, a single ballistic reentry vehicle can eliminate one or more loaded bombers). But operational considerations of alert and warning, as well as of aircraft dispersal, make it difficult for an attacker to rely with great confidence on an ability to destroy preemptively a large fraction of the opponent's bombers. On the other hand, protection of the bombers against the threat of preemptive attack is expensive; the United States has so far sought to balance economy and security. In essence, the United States can resolve this dilemma unilaterally—for example, by providing more dispersal bases.

In sum, there are unilateral remedies to most of the threats of counterforce attack, although the remedies require extensive planning and are expensive. Broad efforts to secure command and control must continue, and modernization of airborne strategic forces must emphasize their survivability. This still leaves the peculiar fixation on the "window of vulnerability" imperiling land-based ICBMs, a case that epitomizes the logical dilemma of counterforce targeting.

ICBM vulnerability has arisen from two developments: multiple warheads (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs) and the high accuracy of counterforce weapons. Of these two, MIRVs are the critical factor. Without them an attacker could not hope to do better than break even; the destruction of a single missile would require the expenditure of at least one attacking missile. In a world with only single-warhead ICBMs, and with a comparable number of launchers on both sides, even a high level of missile accuracy would not be very threatening; one would not then need to consider the difficult job of trying to constrain the evolution of technology.[1]

Thus the objective of arms control agreements seeking to enhance stability should be to provide incentives to both sides to shift toward single-warhead ICBMs, within an overall limit on the total number of warheads (ICBM plus SLBM) that each side could use for prompt first strikes. This should be a major objective of force development for both nations; neither side can do it alone. We believe this goal should have a higher

[1] There are no practical means of preventing the continuing improvement in ballistic missile accuracy. However, if a small annual quota of ICBM and SLBM test firings were negotiated, both countries would have lower confidence in both the reliability and accuracy of their missiles to execute counterforce strikes against hard targets. This lower confidence would be caused primarily by operational, rather than purely technological, considerations. The overall deterrence value of the forces would, nevertheless, remain strong.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

priority than that of merely reducing the number of such vehicles.

To summarize, the desiderata arising from considerations of the problems of counterforce are: first, continued guaranteeing of the security of airborne and seaborne deterrents and of strategic command, control, communications and intelligence; and second, elimination of the risks inherent in counterforce targeting of ICBMs. The first requires judicious force development that secures deterrent forces against threats from new technologies and reduces the threat posed by short-warning attacks. There are three approaches to achieving the second objective: reducing the threatening nature of attacks, protecting the missiles themselves against possible attacks (including making them less attractive targets), or removing the ICBMs entirely.

We address the first approach by investigating force developments that reduce the threat to ICBMs, and we explore the terms of the second approach, which hinges on the problem of ICBM basing, a controversial problem of long standing. The third approach—removing ICBMs—we do not view as a practical objective during the next twenty-year period.

IV

The excellent command-and-control characteristics of ICBMs, their large throw-weights (particularly useful for carrying penetration aids, such as decoys and jammers, to be used against defenses), their high reentry velocities, and their relatively low operating costs (below those of SLBMs on a cost-per-warhead basis) all continue to make ICBMs attractive as offensive weapons, even as their monopoly on high accuracy disappears. The costs of protecting them against counterforce attack will likely remove their operating-cost advantage during the next twenty years. But they will always retain advantages by virtue of their distributed deployment and their command-and-control properties. Militarily, they are the weapons of first choice to provide a credible capability for implementing limited nuclear options; that is, their ability to respond in measure to provocation at any level, which we consider a necessary component of deterrence. (This is both less than and distinct from "nuclear warfighting.") Such ability, plus the obligation they impose on an offense to be complex enough to coordinate attacks against both ICBMs and alert bombers, makes the maintenance of at least some ICBMs advisable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The questions are: How large should the ICBM force be, and how should it be based? These questions are not independent, and the question of basing does not yet have a clear answer.

The total number of high-velocity warheads (on both ICBMs and SLBMs) should be fixed by U.S.-Soviet agreement. With such an agreement, and with ICBMs based in a highly secure mode, only a small number of ICBM warheads—several hundred—would be needed. If, as at present, the United States relies on an uncertain survivability of its ICBMs in a massive counterforce attack, a thousand or more reentry vehicles on ICBMs would seem to be necessary to provide sufficient survivable warheads. Deploying ICBMs as single-warhead missiles reduces the probability of success of a counterforce attack by requiring the attacker to target and destroy more missiles.

But questions of numbers and of basing become coupled if the eventual choice for basing is mobile missiles. The possibility of either side's cheating in deployment of mobile missiles would place a high premium on guaranteeing that such ICBMs do not have multiple warheads, a guarantee that should be a high-priority goal of future arms control efforts.

Confident delivery of a massive and simultaneous strike against a missile force based in hardened underground silos and numbering between many hundreds and more than a thousand would present awesome difficulties. Nevertheless, the possibility of such an attack cannot be dismissed. One must ask: How vulnerable is the U.S. ICBM force to actual execution of a disarming first strike? The most that can be said is that, whatever the chances of success of such a strike, those chances will increase during the next two decades in the absence of new constraints. It is therefore inevitable that resources will be devoted to the search for a more suitable ICBM basing mode, one that meets favorable cost-effectiveness criteria as well as force-structure, political and strategic requirements.

There are five classes of options for secure land basing of ICBMs: deceptive basing, deep underground basing, mobile basing, deployment of an active defense, and hardened silos. We regard only the latter three as still being competitive options.

Mobile missiles would be preferable in the single-warhead mode, so that the numerical uncertainty arising from verification difficulties would not be a major concern. Detailed analyses on various mobile-basing schemes for the single-warhead Midgetman currently estimate system costs to be significantly greater

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than for fixed basing in silos. However, the United States continues to consider the mobile Midgetman deployment, in part because it is argued to be the most economical when costs are calculated in terms of the desired level of *surviving* warheads against the currently postulated Soviet threat. This conclusion, however, is sensitive to three considerations: a continued high level of ICBM warhead deployment by the Soviets, the availability of a sufficient land area in the United States for basing mobiles, and the hardness of the missile-launcher-transporter system. The inferred cost advantages may no longer be valid, however, if the reductions in strategic missile warheads discussed by Washington and Moscow are successfully negotiated.

Active defense (e.g., defense by antiballistic missile, or ABM, systems) of land-based missiles is another option. It has three major problems. First, on the basis of technology available in the immediately foreseeable future, active defense of ICBMs will have to use interceptors carrying nuclear weapons, which would require a fundamental change from current U.S. insistence on non-nuclear strategic defense systems. Second, before deploying an active defense, the United States would have to develop and test an entirely new system and show it to be cost-effective and capable against potential countermeasures. (Of course, success in developing such a system would mean that the United States could retain its current ICBMs and basing, with perhaps the addition of some new silos; and the system's cost would very likely be less than that of a new force of mobile ICBMs.) Third, fielding an active defense for silo-based ICBMs would certainly entail abrogating or, at a minimum, extensively revising, the ABM treaty. Even though radar and interceptor technologies are allowed by the treaty, provisions on numbers and basing would have to be changed.

Justification of active defense of silos requires a complex cost-effectiveness analysis: comparing proliferation of the offense and countermeasures with further improvements in the defense. One would have to develop a detailed engineering design of a system before one could determine if a criterion of cost-effectiveness might be satisfactorily met. Our judgment is that, so far, no option that would meet such a criterion has been clearly shown to exist. The difficulty of producing an active defense option is sensitive to the total number of threatening ballistic missile warheads and to advances in technology, such as the development of warheads that can maneuver inde-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendently and maintain accuracy. The problem would be easier if the United States and the Soviet Union were successfully to negotiate reductions in the number of threatening warheads.

The final option is to deploy either MIRVed or small, single-warhead ICBMs in very hard silos. Existing Minuteman silos could be rendered substantially harder if they were refitted with smaller missiles. Deployment of single-warhead missiles in hard silos would be consistent with an arms control regime that restricted the United States and Soviet Union to equal numbers of strategic missile warheads. In a circumstance of symmetrical deployment of single-warhead ICBMs, individual missiles would not be sufficiently valuable to be lucrative targets; an attack would cost more warheads than could be destroyed. If only the attacking side retained MIRVs, after a first strike against single-warhead missiles the total expenditure of warheads in an attack would still be greater, but the financial cost could easily be less, depending on the relative cost of the boosters for MIRVs and single warheads. Thus, silo basing also benefits strongly from well-verified limits on total deployments, to prevent the achievement of an advantage in cost-effectiveness through increased numbers of warheads. This option is the least expensive of the three considered. Its strategic attraction is that a greater vulnerability can be accepted for individual targets of lower value, particularly for ICBMs, which would become, by virtue of smaller relative numbers, a strategically less critical component of the deterrent force.

V

Reductions in the ICBM fraction of the deterrent force would make the sea-based forces, both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, relatively more important to deterrence. The trends discussed above suggest that this will be an effective strategy.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union should be free to allocate warheads between ICBMs and SLBMs within an agreed total as they choose, according to their own technological, geographic and bureaucratic priorities. Subsequently, this total could be lowered gradually without either side losing confidence in its deterrent. Strategic arms agreements should permit continued modernization of allowed SLBM forces in the interim. Providing these missiles with penetration aids and extending their range to include a larger fraction of the oceans in their operating areas will increase confidence in their survivability.

Modernizing SLBMs would also lead to their improved accu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

racy, and could cause concern about them as an emerging hard-target counterforce threat. If, however, the number of deployed SLBMs were limited, their modernization would not add significantly to the destabilizing nature of the perceived threat. Such deployments could increase the incentive to move away from a heavy reliance on highly MIRVed, fixed, land-based ICBMs toward a more stabilizing force mix. Once ICBMs were reduced to more stable sizes and types, SLBMs could be traded off for cruise missiles, through gradual lowering of the agreed total number of ballistic missile warheads; the threat of counterforce attacks would thereby be further reduced.

VI

Cruise missiles occupy a unique place in strategic weapons planning. First, quantitative limits on sea-launched cruise missiles cannot be accurately verified. Second, cruise missiles have very little, if any, potential for large-scale, prompt counterforce targeting because of their technical characteristics: their low velocity and their vulnerability as targets for various kinds of interceptors. Their low velocity means long flight times through variable atmospheric conditions that cannot be predicted well at the low altitude at which cruise missiles fly. Massive, highly coordinated strikes by cruise missiles against large, geographically diverse targets, such as ICBM fields, would be impractical because of the long warning times the missiles would afford were any of them detected. The likelihood is high (from the attacker's conservative point of view) that more than a few of the large number of cruise missiles in such an attack would be detected relatively early. Furthermore, if nuclear weapons were to start exploding in a target vicinity, cruise missiles arriving later might not survive; because they are not hardened against various nuclear weapon effects nearly as well as are ICBM reentry vehicles, attack coordination presents an even more worrisome problem for cruise missiles than it does for ICBMs. Finally, the slowness of cruise missiles precludes their use against targets that can reasonably be expected to move—for example, military units, mobile ICBMs or command posts.

Individual hard targets can probably be protected against limited cruise missile attack, because the flight time of cruise missiles allows significant opportunity for detection by airborne early warning and control systems (AWACS) on station near the targets, or by large arrays of tower-mounted radars. Moreover, once located and identified, cruise missiles are relatively easy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to destroy. However, such a defense against cruise missiles could prove very expensive; the large number of airborne or tower-mounted sensors and extensive associated systems required for protection of each target preclude this defense from being practical for very large or soft targets and, in particular, for very numerous targets.

Three classes of appropriate targets for cruise missiles remain: cities, industrial facilities and certain high-value military targets—such as submarine bases, airfields, large fuel depots and proposed ground-based laser facilities; all are too large and soft to protect with high confidence against attack by large numbers of cruise missiles.

In sum, although cruise missiles can inflict massive damage, they are far less threatening against an opponent's deterrent force than are accurate, reliable and highly MIRVed ICBMs. Since any cruise missile attack might be detected with significant warning time, the attack planner cannot rely on a doctrine that depends on minimal or no warning. The realistic prospect that there will be a long warning time of a large cruise missile attack is an essential element in increasing the stability of deterrence, since it reduces the odds that decisions will be made impulsively on the basis of incomplete information; it also enhances the perceived survivability of most strategic military forces and support elements.

One can argue that cruise missile forces have an important and undesirable defect: the fact that their precise numbers are not accurately verifiable rules out prospects for negotiating tight numerical limits on the levels of deployment, particularly for sea-launched cruise missiles. However, because nuclear-armed cruise missiles are inappropriate for executing large-scale prompt counterforce attacks, there is no strong incentive to enlarge a cruise missile-centered force to anything like the extent of the currently deployed strategic ballistic missile force.

By accepting the evident defect of an inability to count cruise missiles precisely, one could take advantage of these missiles' stabilizing characteristics, making it possible to accept an arms control regime that would prescribe no limits on certain classes of cruise missiles and shift the emphasis of deterrence to a force structure with far fewer ballistic warheads. Within such an approach, one could continue to implement numerical limits, with satisfactory standards of verification, on air-launched cruise missiles and their carriers. The threats posed by ALCMs are relatively symmetric, assuming that long-range ALCMs will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retain their ability to penetrate existing and prospective Soviet air defenses.

Sea-launched cruise missile deployments can be diversified by basing them on surface ships as well as submarines, a process that has already begun. Frequently expressed opposition to extending deployments of nuclear-armed SLCMs to surface ships has generally arisen from three sources: fear of further expanding the size of the nuclear arsenal in unverifiable ways; concern that major surface ships bearing nuclear-tipped SLCMs would be tempting and vulnerable targets; and concern for the physical security and control of the surface-deployed weapons themselves.

The first concern is largely moot, since some SLCMs have already been deployed. Removing them is an unrealistic solution within the near future, since the essentially unverifiable nature of the SLCMs will not be changed by wishing the situation were different. A total ban on SLCMs of all kinds, conventional as well as nuclear, on surface ships might change this reality, but such a ban seems a highly unlikely prospect. Furthermore, the importance of diversification of SLCM carriers will increase as SLCMs become a larger fraction of the deterrent forces.

With regard to the second concern, about the relative risks of SLCMs on ships, there is no reason to believe that, in general, they should be more attractive as targets than other classes of seagoing nuclear forces, particularly aircraft carriers. Concerning the third point, the physical security and control of the weapons can and should be greatly improved with permissive action links (safety devices that prevent the firing of a nuclear weapon without presidentially delegated authorization) like the ones currently employed in the U.S. bomber force.

One aspect of SLCM deployments tends to favor the Soviet Union: a large fraction of the American urban and industrial base, in contrast to that of the Soviets, lies relatively close to the seacoasts, and thus to potential launch areas for SLCMs. The significance of this asymmetry can be reduced, though not altogether removed, by developing longer-range SLCMs.

Once the total number of ballistic missile warheads has been reduced to a mutually acceptable minimum, thus removing concern about a disarming counterforce attack, future reductions in nuclear weapons could proceed by eliminating the right for certain classes of ships to carry nuclear-armed SLCMs. The progress of such restrictions can be adjusted to guarantee a stable regime as verification capabilities evolve and as num-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bers of weapons decrease. Finally, if adequate SLCM-counting methods are developed, restrictions can accommodate U.S.-Soviet geopolitical asymmetries by providing freedom to allocate between ALCMs and SLCMs under an agreed total.

VII

The critical practical issue surrounding strategic bombers continues to be the perceived necessity for the ability to penetrate all the way to the target. This is a problem for efficient force modernization, but one that bears little direct relation to strategic stability. We fail to see the necessity to carry pilots and large, expensive vehicles all the way to strategic targets.

The continued case for high-performance penetrating bombers seems to hinge on four major arguments: (1) the combination of bombers and ALCMs puts a great stress on air defenses, thus providing maximum penetration for both (and causing continued heavy Soviet investment in air defenses); (2) bombers can find mobile targets or be redirected to secondary targets, whereas ALCMs cannot; (3) bombers continue to be needed for other missions (as, for example, B-52s were used in Vietnam); and (4) because of the insufficient range of ALCMs, bombers must penetrate Soviet air defenses even to launch cruise missiles. In our view, none of these arguments makes a compelling case for continuing the development of new penetrating bombers. Extending the range of ALCMs beyond 2,000 miles, a feasible option, would entirely dispose of the fourth argument.

The third argument—conventional use—is indeed a valid reason to keep some bombers in the force. But the requirements are different from those for a bomber force capable of penetrating the world's heaviest air defenses during a nuclear conflict. The military requirements of the United States for a new, highly versatile, large-payload bomber for combat support and long-range naval attacks do not appear to have been carefully analyzed apart from the assumption that the bomber must penetrate the airspace of the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, to locate a mobile target, a bomber pilot would have to be quite close indeed, about an order of magnitude closer than the distance at which radar can currently acquire airborne targets. Although a bomber may penetrate toward a target at high speed and low altitude, at a speed of several hundred miles an hour the ground close by is a complete blur for a pilot, who would have to slow down to see anything and gain altitude to increase his field of view. Both of these actions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would vastly decrease the bomber's survivability, even if it were a stealth aircraft.

Arguments for the importance of placing stress on Soviet air defenses are highly sensitive to what one assumes to be the relative potential for successful penetration by bombers as compared to ALCMs, and to the additional costs the Soviets must bear to be able to intercept both. To support the argument quantitatively, one must assume either that bombers penetrate very much better than ALCMs do, or that Soviet expenditures to cope with the dual threat would be significantly larger. Neither has been shown to be true.

As is the case with SLCMs, expansion of the role of ALCMs as the airborne leg of the strategic triad will not come without cost. Airplanes designed or adapted for use as ALCM carriers would have attendant costs, although the costs certainly will not equal those necessary for a new generation of penetrating bombers. The savings from eliminating the penetration requirement for bombers could more appropriately be spent in increasing the survivability of ALCM carriers—for example, with more dispersal bases. The air-breathing leg of the triad is the most expensive per warhead, but its unique capability to be recalled, plus its excellent survivability and reliability, will continue to be valuable.

VIII

The scope and pace of strategic defense activities will depend on the future of the 1972 ABM treaty. If the treaty is modified or abandoned in order to allow the full, unrestrained development of new technologies, competition in defensive programs will increase and create new pressures for expanding offensive missile forces and for improving their ability to penetrate any initial deployments of defenses. Advanced interceptors, such as the Soviet SA-12, might provide a partial defense against SLBMs, depending on their deployment mode (including extensive internetting with other systems, especially an expanded deployment of acquisition radars) and on their performance against offensive countermeasures (including radar suppression and trajectory changes). In this light, actual deployment of these weapons will have to be monitored carefully if the current ABM treaty regime is to be maintained.

The one strategic defense technology with tested military capability—nuclear-armed interceptors—is not capable of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

significantly more ambitious role than to defend hard points, preferably of dispersed target sets such as ICBMs. The United States must solve two problems in order to consider any significantly more capable defensive system: it must develop means of discrimination in midcourse between attacking reentry vehicles and their accompanying decoys; and, for a full nationwide defense, it must develop a reliable, survivable means of intercepting missiles in their boost phases. Even though other major issues will remain, if these two problems can be solved in the next decade or so it will be possible to evaluate realistically the full military capability of various classes of ballistic missile defense systems.

Meanwhile the primary question remains the size and direction of research and technology development for strategic defense, including testing of functional prototypes.[2] Maximizing the eventual utility of defenses will require negotiating simultaneously to reduce offensive forces and to extend and strengthen cooperation in arms control with the Soviet Union. Such cooperation would play a critical role in determining any future deployment plans. For the coming decade, a research and development program consistent with the ABM treaty is sufficient to fill this need.

Strategic warning, photoreconnaissance and communications satellites are among the most valuable of U.S. military assets. Guaranteeing their security and strengthening their capabilities by vigorously exploiting advancing technology should therefore be among the highest of U.S. defense priorities. The principal means for providing such protection are moving the satellites (except for photoreconnaissance satellites) to higher orbits, applying various kinds of stealth technology, using hardening measures (which would be particularly effective against directed-energy weapons and other forms of electromagnetic attack), providing redundance of means for performing tasks, and maintaining ready spares (and attendant expendable launch vehicles) to replace lost assets. We remain skeptical about the real value of keep-out zones and shoot-back defensive satellites, but further thought and research in all areas of satellite protection will be valuable.

[2] See the report of a workshop at the Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control: "Strategic Missile Defense: Necessities, Prospects, and Dangers in the Near Term," April 1985.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IX

If nothing is done to change the present course, we foresee a continued evolution of existing strategic nuclear systems toward higher capabilities and larger numbers that, taken as a whole and unconstrained, will pose a greater threat to the security of the superpowers and thus a greater threat to peace.

As for remedies, we are suspicious of proposals that attempt to transform or eliminate the source of insecurity with bans on single types of weapons or on new technology. Adaptations and constraints on the applications of a variety of technologies are likely to be more possible to achieve; their ramifications can be more confidently understood.

Therefore, we propose a conservative and evolutionary response to an evolving threat: specific bilateral agreements and judicious unilateral choices in force modernization. We recommend bilateral agreements to reduce drastically the total number of warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs; to limit mobile ICBMs to single-warhead missiles; to permit modernization of SLBM forces, with a primary emphasis on improved operational security and survivability; and to increase bomber survivability by providing more dispersal bases. We also favor expanding cooperative means of verification, particularly on-site inspection and presence; strengthening survivability and multiplicity of command-and-control systems; and protecting space assets by a variety of means, principally redundancy, ready spares and higher altitudes.

Cruise missiles play a prominent role, in our view. We advocate reducing the role of both ICBMs and SLBMs, with the result that the bulk of the U.S. deterrent force should comprise two categories of cruise missiles, ALCMs and SLCMs. In addition, the air-breathing deterrent should move from a penetrating bomber force toward an advanced ALCM force.

Our approach is not to be interpreted as recommending an unlimited increase in numbers of SLCMs and their carriers. We believe that, in fact, the numbers will remain within reasonable limits and that the operational aspects of deployment can be made and kept strategically stable.

Unilateral actions by the United States to ensure a high survivability of the independent components of the American deterrent force are more important than seeking to negotiate rigorous equality in the numbers of warheads. We anticipate a political evolution toward deeper numerical reductions as both

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sides develop operational confidence in cooperative measures of verification, including such measures as challenge rights and on-site inspection.

None of our suggestions would stand in the way of the various current proposals for significant reductions in total deployed nuclear forces. Evolution toward force structures that simultaneously are inherently secure and give long warning time in the event of a massive attack will not only be stabilizing, but also will remain a source of stability as total numbers of weapons decrease. We believe that the limited proposals we make here for managing the strategic balance in the near term can provide a practical basis for subsequent steps toward smaller and more stable strategic forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stephanie G. Neuman

ARMS, AID AND THE SUPERPOWERS

The frequency and intensity of armed conflict in the Third World have provoked a new theory of great-power impotence, the perceived inability of the superpowers to prevent an outbreak of violence or limit its intensity. Recent trends in the global arms trade seem to reinforce this view: the rising number of weapons suppliers, particularly among the Third World countries whose capabilities to produce and transfer arms have grown; the increasing diversity of procurement programs; and the decline of monopolistic military assistance relationships. According to this argument, fewer Third World countries depend on the United States or the Soviet Union for arms supplies; thus superpower leverage is reduced and the political and military independence of the Third World is increased, especially during periods of regional conflict.

Indeed, the relative decline in U.S. and Soviet military deliveries is clear from the statistics. From a high point in the 1960s of 85 percent of market share in world military equipment and services, the superpower share is now about 68 percent.

Economic factors are clearly changing procurement practices. The rising cost of weapons designed and manufactured in the industrialized world is inhibiting the purchases by the poorer countries. Many are opting merely to upgrade present inventories, or are buying older equipment that has been modernized by suppliers in industrial countries or in the Third World itself.

More states are now producing military consumables, such as ammunition and spare parts, to suit a wide variety of weapons systems, not just those in their own inventories. North Korea, for instance, supplies Iran with ammunition compatible with Iran's U.S.-origin system; Bulgaria is reported to have supplied NATO-standard ammunition to Nicaragua. Converting produc-

---

Stephanie G. Neuman teaches Third World security issues at Columbia University and is Senior Research Scholar and Director of its Comparative Defense Studies Program. This article is adapted from the author's book, *Military Assistance in Recent Wars.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion lines to manufacture small arms and artillery ammunition of varying caliber is not very difficult or expensive, and can be accomplished within a few weeks. As demand for military consumables has risen, so too have the facilities that produce them. Curiously, this trend suggests that the arms trade is becoming more, rather than less, homogenized even as it grows more diversified.

A careful examination of all the evidence, however, suggests that, despite the diversity in sources of supply and the clear relative decline in the dollar value of the superpowers' military exports, the United States and the Soviet Union still dominate the international arms transfer system. Indeed, the dependence of less-industrialized states upon the superpowers appears to be on the rise. The evidence shows that various constraints on recipients, as well as on smaller suppliers, serve to reduce the options of states engaged in conflict. These constraints allow the superpowers to retain a significant measure of control over the patterns of military assistance and the conduct of recent wars.

II

External and internal factors alike work to create dependencies among the developing countries. For this analysis, I have singled out five:

Superpower restraint and arms transfer restrictions. Contrary to popular wisdom, neither superpower has been an eager arms "pusher" once war breaks out. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have proven to be inconstant resuppliers—slow to respond to combatants' pleas for arms and reluctant to become involved—at least during the early stages of the conflict. In general their initial response to these requests has been limited to shipments of ammunition and less-advanced systems. The superpowers tend to wait until they are able to assess more clearly the impact a war will have on their competition with each other and better evaluate the political gains or losses associated with resupply. Soviet resupply of Syria after the 1982 Lebanon war, for example, provided the Soviets with the opportunity to place in Syria 3,000–5,000 military advisers and technicians, which they had previously been denied. In Vietnam, the Soviet Union gained access to strategically significant military bases, particularly the former U.S. naval and air base at Cam Ranh Bay, in return for furnishing approximately $2 billion per year in military aid after the Sino-Vietnamese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1979 border war. The increase in U.S. military assistance to Morocco in 1980 was exchanged for U.S. access to Morocco's ports; similarly, U.S. aid to Somalia in 1982 brought with it permission to use Somali air fields and port facilities.

Even when a superpower decides to support a belligerent, it tends to exercise relative economy and caution in the quantity and quality of its military assistance. The dollar value of military support to the combatants in eight recent conflicts reflects this caution.[1] The proportion of superpower security assistance drops sharply, from a prewar level of 77 percent to only 38 percent. The U.S. share of assistance in all eight conflicts fell from 32 percent before the outbreak of war to only three percent. Similarly, the U.S.S.R. provided 45 percent of the total prewar military assistance, and 35 percent after the onset of the conflict.

This self-imposed restraint on resupply has had important implications. First, it has determined the kind of weapons combatants use during conflict and has forced them to accept what is available rather than what they prefer to buy. Second, superpower arms transfer restrictions have limited from whom Third World countries can buy during periods of armed conflict. As a result many combatants have been forced to buy their weapons on the black (illegal) and gray (covert) markets, which can supply quantities of smaller, older, less-advanced military items, but not the large, modern, major systems many combatants seek.

In effect, superpower restraint and restrictions on arms transfers to warring parties have limited the sophistication of weapons available to combatants, and therefore the technological level at which wars have been fought. They have circumscribed not only the Third World combatants' choice of weapons but ultimately their offensive capabilities as well.

Human factors. When more advanced systems have been available, human factors have often increased the dependency of the recipient upon the supplier. As some Third World combatants have learned in recent wars, high-technology items are not easily integrated into force structures, nor are they

[1] The eight conflicts are Ethiopia-Somalia, Vietnam-China, Iran-Iraq, Argentina-Britain, Israel-Syria (in Lebanon), Morocco-POLISARIO, El Salvador-Honduras-Nicaragua-contras, and Afghanistan. "Military" and "security assistance" refer to transfers (exports) of military equipment and/or training and other related services, whether in the form of sale, offset arrangement or grant. Military assistance percentages for the ongoing wars were calculated through 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

easily maintained in operational condition. Many found that the transfer of advanced weapons not only reduced their military capability, but also increased their dependence on foreign suppliers—usually a superpower—for training, help in building infrastructure, and assistance in tactics, logistics, operations, management and maintenance.

The Syrian experience with its air defense system during the Lebanon war is only one example of how a country dependent on advanced equipment but lacking adequately trained operators can see its war-fighting capability decreased. The Syrians did not learn to refrain from turning on their radars until *under direct attack. They apparently operated them unnecessarily* before and during the conflict, enabling the Israelis to identify, locate and destroy their antiaircraft emplacements. They also did not take advantage of the mobility of their SA-6 missile launchers, leaving them vulnerable to attack by keeping them stationary for long periods of time.

In some instances, even the transfer of relatively simple military equipment has required substantial support from one of the superpowers. The Afghan rebels experienced operational difficulties in handling Stinger missiles, which began arriving in the spring of 1986. The United States had to provide extensive and intensive training support in Pakistan before the rebels could use them effectively. Apparently the skill is now so highly prized by the trainees that those who have mastered it are reluctant to train others.

Economic constraints. Recent wars also demonstrate the extent to which economics can mold the capabilities of Third World countries—determining what and how much they can buy, and inevitably reinforcing their dependence upon the superpowers. Wars have become so expensive that few combatants can afford them. Although many countries have arms to sell, most Third World combatants are unable to pay for them, and small suppliers cannot afford to offer the generous long-term grant-aid or easy credit terms the combatants require.

In the past, some noncombatant Muslim countries have been able to assist their friends and neighbors. But they themselves are dependent upon one or the other superpower for military equipment and support and are, therefore, susceptible to pressures from them to initiate or reduce arms supplies to belligerents. It is unlikely that any of these countries would supply equipment against the wishes of its own major supplier.

Furthermore, as oil revenues have dwindled, the financial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resources available to the Persian Gulf states and Libya for disbursement to combatants have declined. In Saudi Arabia alone, annual income from oil exports fell from more than $100 billion before 1982 to less than $20 billion in 1987. By 1987 Saudi foreign assets (estimated at $50–60 billion) were being drawn down by $1 billion a month to meet government spending, and many development projects were being canceled. The cost to the Saudis of aiding the Iraqi war effort alone (about $3–5 billion a year) had helped to create a serious budget deficit (which reached $17.4 billion in 1986) and forced the Saudis to reduce aid to Iraq and others.

Oil-producing combatants like Iran and Iraq have faced similar economic constraints. Initially both Iran and Iraq were able to finance their defense efforts. But as the war progressed this became more difficult. At the beginning of the Gulf war, for example, Iraq had approximately $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves. By 1986, the drop in oil revenues and the rising expense of conducting a war of attrition (for Iraq, approximately $15 billion per year in foreign exchange alone) were taking their toll, presenting Iraq with a yearly foreign exchange shortfall of $4–5 billion. That year its foreign debt reached $50 billion, $10 billion of which was owed to France, and $10 billion to the Soviet Union, for military transfers. Although Moscow and Paris have agreed to reschedule Iraq's massive debt payments, they have reduced their deliveries of advanced aircraft to Iraq, and they are generally reluctant to offer more credit. The war is reportedly costing Iran $11 billion per year, and it too is now experiencing a yearly shortfall of about $4 billion in revenues.

Third World combatants without oil resources have felt the impact of war even more keenly than the oil rich. Faced not only with the expense of military preparedness and combat, but also with reduced credit and assistance from others and an overwhelming debt problem, resource-poor combatants have found themselves particularly dependent on the superpowers for the subsidization of their wars.

Nicaragua, for example, is heavily dependent upon the Soviet Union and its allies for military equipment and aid. In 1987 Soviet arms deliveries to Nicaragua alone totaled about $500 million, and some sources claimed that this figure was as high as $1 billion. The contras were equally dependent upon the United States. In 1986–87 they were allocated $100 million by the United States—not including the millions of dollars do-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nated by Saudi Arabia, Brunei and private U.S. organizations, or the $3.5 million of profits from the secret sale of weapons to Iran.

The stakes have been even higher in the Middle East. The short war in Lebanon, for example, is said to have cost Israel $1 billion in direct expenses—a figure which does not include the indirect costs of calling up the reserves from the civilian economy. For Israel, the price of serial warfare has been its economic dependence on the United States.

For Syria, the economic consequences of war have not been different. Its debt to the Soviet bloc is said to be $15–19 billion. Syria's annual government budget amounts to only $10 billion, half of which is already marked for defense and internal security. With Saudi economic support declining, Syria's dependence upon the Soviet Union for military assistance is almost complete. And this when the Soviets are demanding that Syria pay hard cash for weapons.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States (with help from other countries) have absorbed the costs of war in Afghanistan. In 1987 it was reported that the Soviet Union had been spending an average of $3 billion per year. On the other hand, foreign military assistance to the Afghan rebels from 1979 to 1986 is said to have amounted to $3 billion, half of which came from Saudi Arabia. In 1986 alone, the CIA delivered at least $480-million worth of weapons, with a comparable supply donated by China and Saudi Arabia; by 1987 the United States had increased its allocation to $630 million.

In Africa economic factors have affected both the pace and conduct of war. U.S. financial and logistical support, along with French equipment, have helped the Chadians in their conflict with Libya. And in the Western Sahara, Morocco received $2.5 billion in military assistance from the United States, France, West Germany and Italy between 1979 and 1986 to help defray at least part of the estimated $1.7-billion annual cost of its ongoing war. Saudi Arabia and South Africa reportedly have also contributed to the Moroccan effort.

Among nonbelligerent Third World countries, dependency upon a superpower for military equipment is also the norm. Indian-Soviet relations provide a good example, demonstrating not only the degree to which the recipient's choices are circumscribed by financial considerations, but also the concessions a superpower is ready to make when it believes there are political gains to be had. India, despite its preference for Western

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

equipment, has been practically forced to buy from the Soviets. The concessional rates the Soviets offer, their willingness to accept payment in rupees, and their agreement to barter and offset arrangements to reduce procurement costs have left the Indian government little choice. Facing chronic hard-currency shortages and competing demands from its civilian sector, India has ordered some Western equipment, but remains heavily reliant upon the Soviet Union as a main source of supply.

These examples illustrate how dependent the Third World is upon the superpowers for affordable arms and services. What they can buy is circumscribed by who is willing to subsidize the purchase. Without the financial support of the United States or the Soviet Union or one of their allies, opportunities to procure advanced military technology are severely limited. As their debts continue to accumulate, more and more developing countries, particularly those fighting expensive wars, will be forced to turn to the superpowers for their military equipment and services. Given the Third World's current economic straits, the reliance of developing countries, particularly those at war, on the superpowers for military equipment and financial assistance is not likely to diminish.

The demand for fast, large deliveries. Third World combatants often need fast, large deliveries of equipment in order to stave off defeat. But although there are many potential suppliers available, few other than the superpowers are able to produce enough surplus items or remove them from their stores in large enough numbers to satisfy the urgent request of a combatant without dangerously drawing down their own inventories.

Fewer still have the capability to transport rapidly major weapons over long distances, along with the men and equipment to support them. This is true for European as well as Third World suppliers, none of whom have sufficient long-range air transports in inventory to carry heavy, outsize cargo to the theater of conflict (such as the U.S. C-5A, C-141 and C-130, or the Soviet An-22, or the An-400 currently in production). France, for example, has frequently used U.S. transports in times of crisis in Zaïre and Chad. It is also claimed that France transports its daily airlift of military supplies to Iraq on Soviet-built An-22 cargo planes.

Much the same is true for communist-bloc states. It has been the U.S.S.R., for example, that has provided transport for the larger movements of Cuban troops and supplies. And during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, Soviet assistance to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vietnam included transportation of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and southern Vietnam to the northern front and an airlift of military supplies.

In addition to these comparative advantages, few suppliers other than the superpowers have the global influence to request and receive permission for refueling or territorial overflight from countries on the route of access. The problems even the United States and U.S.S.R. have encountered in this regard suggest how difficult it would be for other, less-powerful states to get such permission. One need only recall how the United States was denied overflight permission by France for its British-based F-111 planes during the U.S. air attack on Libya in 1986. The Soviet Union experienced similar difficulties during the Ethiopian-Somalian war, when its airlift of supplies to Ethiopia had to be halted because of protests from Greece and Turkey regarding overflight of their territories. Curiously, this need among Third World countries for rapid resupply and the corresponding superpower capabilities are rarely mentioned in the literature as factors promoting dependency.

Demand for intelligence and satellite information. Finally, intelligence and satellite information that provides real-time knowledge about enemy movements and expands command and control capabilities has become increasingly important in recent years. Although the superpowers maintain a near monopoly on sophisticated information gathering systems (e.g., reconnaissance planes and satellites,[2] radar installations, signal intelligence), analysts have paid as little attention to this type of Third World dependency as they have to that associated with transport services. The demand for intelligence support is now coming from all regions of the world, and at least one side in all recent wars has received it. Information about assistance of this kind is difficult to find (much of it is classified), but enough is available from open sources to document its character and frequency.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have given diverse forms of intelligence assistance to their allies and friends, particularly in the Middle East. Israel, for example, is said to have used U.S. satellite pictures in order to bomb more accurately the French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981—in exchange for help to the contras. And eight days

[2] Current-generation quasi-commercial satellites, such as Landsat and Spot, are not militarily very useful because of their limited resolution and down-linking capabilities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980, the United States sent the Saudis four E-3A Sentry airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, at Saudi request, to help them deal with a possible Iranian attack on their oil fields. The following year Saudi Arabia purchased five AWACS of their own, the last of which was delivered in April 1987, bringing to nine the number based in Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi crews were supposed to fly the five AWACS, reportedly only enough Saudis to crew one or two of the planes have been trained, so that U.S. crews are expected to fly all nine for the foreseeable future.

The U.S. AWACS have seen continual service in the region. The intelligence they collect has been relayed to ground facilities in Saudi Arabia—built and operated by the United States—where it has been analyzed and transmitted to U.S., Saudi and Kuwaiti commands. In 1986 the Gulf Cooperation Council asked the United States to extend AWACS coverage to all of its members.

In spite of its public neutrality the United States apparently has also supplied some intelligence to both sides of the Iran-Iraq War. Since 1984 the AWACS (supplemented since 1986 by U.S. satellite photographs) have provided Iraq with data about Iranian troop movements. Information from these sources may have helped the Iraqis defend Basra during the 1986 Iranian offensive. In addition, since 1985 the CIA has been providing data before and after Iraqi bombing raids on Iran's oil terminals and power plants, to help the Iraqis hit their targets more accurately and better assess the damage afterward. On the other hand, according to the American press, Iran received information from the United States (some claim "disinformation") in 1986 regarding Soviet troop movements on its border.

Egypt has been another frequent beneficiary of U.S. intelligence assistance. After the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981, the United States sent an AWACS to help the Egyptians cope with internal unrest, which both the United States and Egypt feared might occur after Sadat's death. In early 1983, when Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi was threatening Egypt and other states in the region, three AWACS were deployed to provide Egypt with information about Libyan troops dispersements. The aircraft were also ordered to help direct Egyptian fighters to Libyan planes should the need arise. By 1985 the command and control capabilities of E-2C Hawkeye planes stationed aboard U.S. aircraft carriers were provid-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing "technical support" to Egyptian commandos who rescued a hijacked Boeing 737 in Malta; since 1986 these planes have been ordered to stand by should the Egyptian government require their help.

The Soviet Union has also given intelligence support to its friends in the Middle East. Soviet intelligence gathering for its Mideast allies goes back at least to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when the U.S.S.R. launched a reconnaissance satellite every day to inform the Egyptians about Israeli troop dispositions. Soviet personnel are also reported to have provided various types of command and control assistance to Syria during that war. More recently, Soviet reconnaissance planes apparently took photos to aid Iraqi bombing raids, and Soviet satellites are known to have lingered over Tehran during November 1987—a time of increasing tension in the war—collecting intelligence presumably to be passed on to Iraq.

A similar pattern can be found in other regions of the world. In South America during the Falkland Islands war, Britain received extensive intelligence assistance from the United States. In Central America, the United States was able to provide the contras with the locations of the Sandinistas' fleet of Hind helicopters—information gathered by U.S. tracking installations in Honduras and ground operators in the region—which has been credited with saving many contra lives.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is rumored to have passed on some intelligence data to Argentina during the Falkland Islands war, although exactly how much and what is not publicly known. And in Nicaragua, a Soviet spy plane apparently provided the Sandinistas with information about contra movements, although the Sandinistas claimed the aircraft was being used for mapping purposes.

Similar efforts have been expended by the Soviets in recent conflicts in Asia. In South Asia during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the Soviets loaned a "Moss" AWACS to India which demonstrated its effectiveness in defensive and offensive operations. The plane repeatedly assisted Indian strike aircraft flying at night to locate and attack targets 160 kilometers into Pakistani airspace, while providing at the same time detection of enemy aircraft entering Indian airspace. During the Sino-Vietnamese border dispute the Soviets supported Vietnam with maritime reconnaissance and signals intelligence, although the impact of the latter was minimal because of tight Chinese communication security.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Africa, intelligence support also has contributed significantly to the capabilities of the various combatants. For example, intelligence information was provided by the United States and France to the Chadian army to assist its defense against Libya. Information derived from satellite pictures of the battlefield and signals intelligence, which Chad used to intercept Libyan radio messages, helped Chad realize its stunning victories around Libya's Wadi Doum stronghold in March 1987.

The Soviets, on the other hand, assisted the Libyans at a time of high tension between Libya and the United States in 1985 with information about the U.S. Sixth Fleet's movements. But in March 1986, when Libyan forces and the U.S. Sixth Fleet actually clashed in the Gulf of Sidra, Libya was forced to operate without potentially helpful satellite material or other intelligence, because the Soviet ships in the Mediterranean declined to provide it to them. In this case, and undoubtedly in others not made public, the decision of a superpower to withhold information was as important a contribution to the outcome of hostilities as the decision to provide it.

From the perspective of the United States and Soviet Union, the services discussed above not only augment the military capabilities of their clients, but help them to maintain influence over regional political/military balances. From the clients' perspective, their continuing need for these services, and the limited number of available sources for them, reemphasizes their dependency upon the superpowers, particularly during periods of crisis.

III

A subtle blend of Third World needs and the limited capabilities of other suppliers has enabled the United States and the Soviet Union to regulate the flow of major weapons and services to developing countries, particularly those fighting wars. As noted, some observers claim that a rise in the number of suppliers has reduced the ability of the superpowers to dominate the arms trade, particularly during periods of crisis. But what may have been overlooked in this assumption is the source of initiative for resupply during recent wars. Have the various suppliers responded independently to the combatants' demand for resupply, or have they acted with the tacit approval or at the prompting of either the United States or the U.S.S.R.? During combat, is diversified procurement a product of market demand or superpower manipulation? Does the denial of a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resupply request reflect the supplier's or the superpower's preference?

Although the evidence is circumstantial, it points to substantial superpower influence over major military transfers, regardless of source. It suggests that much of the assistance received by belligerents from small and medium-sized donors is "surrogate transfers"—that is, military assistance given with the implicit or explicit approval of a superpower. In other words, through a maze of indirect connections, the diversified patterns of military assistance observed during recent wars may be more a reflection of superpower political interests and influence than the independent political or commercial decisions of other states and their Third World customers. The same may be true for military transfers to the Third World in general.

A litmus test of superpower manipulation can be found in the patterns of military assistance associated with the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. State Department's "Operation Staunch"—a diplomatic effort under way since 1983 to impose a worldwide embargo on the sale of U.S. and other-origin war matériel to Iran—has been relatively successful in part because of the tacit cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both have successfully pressured their allies and friends to restrict their deliveries to weapons that will not tilt the war in Iran's favor, and they have cooperated to limit the war's effect on the regional balance of power.

Even the black market has not supplied Iran with the items it needs to change the military balance. Black market sales generally are limited to the so-called low end of the arms trade—articles that can be easily concealed and disguised as nonmilitary items. Generally, the size of these deliveries is limited by what can be conveniently shipped via commercial air freight companies or fit in the cargo bay of a light plane. What Iran has been able to buy is older, less-sophisticated ground forces equipment and ammunition, quartermaster goods and limited spare parts, for which it is forced to pay an enormous markup. Even at that price, equipment has been difficult to come by—as the secret negotiations between Iran and its avowed enemies, the United States and Israel, suggest.

Although the embargo on Iran has not been able to halt the flow of these articles through the black or gray markets, it has raised the economic cost to Iran and maintained a lid on the technological sophistication of what Iran can buy. As Vernon Walters, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, observed:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"We may not prevent the sale of all weapons to Iran, but we may stop enough weapons to make a difference."[3] The Soviets have followed the U.S. example, apparently calibrating the communist bloc's military transfers with those of the West, but not exceeding them.

The result has been that Iran, despite its effort to do so, has not been able to acquire tanks, ships or any single modern, major Western military system, nor has it been able to purchase fighter aircraft or an effective air defense system with which to challenge Iraq's control of the skies. The Iran-Iraq War, then, stands as a good example of the superpowers' ability to manipulate other actors in the international system and of their influence over the progress of war in the Third World when they choose to exercise restraint and tacitly cooperate.

IV

Why have the superpowers' arms restrictions been honored by other arms suppliers? Why have they responded positively to U.S. and Soviet pressure even when it has been against their financial interests to do so? Since 1980, the Iran-Iraq War has been the most lucrative arms market in the Third World. It generates a large demand, and both combatants have oil with which to pay. Despite their declining fortunes, both Iran and Iraq are better able to pay for their military expenditures than other combatants, and most arms suppliers—in Europe as well as the Third World—badly need the revenues to keep their own arms industries going. And yet American and Soviet efforts to restrict sales to one side of that lucrative market have been relatively successful.

The hypothesis advanced here and implied above is that not just Third World combatants, but noncombatants in Europe and the developing world as well, all depend on the United States and the Soviet Union for a variety of transfers and services. These dependencies make it difficult to ignore the superpowers' policy preferences. In some recent wars this has meant serving in the role of surrogate supplier, in others limiting military exports. The United States and the Soviet Union, because of their relative weight and wealth, can address many different kinds of needs, four of which appear to create particularly strong dependencies and yield a high level of influence for the superpowers.

[3] *Jane's Defence Weekly,* Nov. 28, 1987, p. 1276.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The need for modern, major military systems. Most Third World and European suppliers purchase their own advanced aircraft from the superpowers, as well as other major items such as tanks, radar systems, advanced missiles, and a variety of components and subsystems. The retransfer of these items is strictly controlled, so that even if a country wishes to send them to third parties it is constrained from doing so without permission.

The transfer of military technology from Warsaw Pact countries and other Soviet friends and allies is highly coordinated and restricted by the U.S.S.R. through a system of third-country transfer prohibitions and surrogate deliveries. When the Soviet Union provides direct military assistance, for example, most East European sales become appendages to the larger Soviet program. In recent wars there appear to have been no known cases of East Europeans flouting Soviet transfer strictures.

Soviet restraints on the distribution of its advanced equipment are maintained through various mechanisms, the most potent of which is the Soviet disinclination to permit licensed production of its modern major systems. Nowhere is this more evident than in their relations with their East European neighbors, who might, the Soviets fear, point their weapons in the wrong direction or prove to be competitors in the arms market. Since 1961 no East European country has received new production licenses for any major Soviet weapons system, with the exception of tanks already in Soviet inventory for a number of years. The result has been an erosion of the East European countries' military-industrial capabilities, an increase in their dependence upon the Soviet Union for their own major systems, a decline in the competitiveness of their products in the world market, and relatively tight Soviet control over the reexport of their most advanced offensive technologies.

Soviet policy has been equally restrictive regarding new coproduction and licensing agreements in the Third World. Only India has been allowed to produce modern Soviet systems under license. But India has not been in a position to thwart Soviet political interests in this area, even if it so desired. A combination of production problems and a high demand from India's own military for defense and industrial products has kept Indian arms exports very low.

The relationships between the Soviet Union and North Korea and Libya, major purveyors of Soviet technologies, are less clear, although there is evidence that the Soviets exert

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerable control here also. There have been reports that the size of North Korea's exports to Iran concerned the Soviet Union and that in 1984 Moscow successfully pressured Pyongyang to moderate them. Some analysts contend that because of its economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, North Korea enjoys little autonomy in these matters. The Soviets are thought to drive a hard bargain for even second-rate, outdated military equipment, and they have delayed and temporarily embargoed exports of contracted equipment, cutting off economic aid on occasion to express their displeasure with North Korean policies—with apparent success.

Similar methods have dissuaded Libya from sending major items to Iran. Reportedly the Libyan transfer of surface-to-surface missiles to Iran in 1985 during the "campaign against the cities" caused considerable friction between Qaddafi and the Soviets. The delay of Libya's then pending military aid package may not have been related to this issue, but the Libyans apparently did bow to Soviet pressure.

Although the connections in the West are less clear, and U.S. friends are extremely sensitive to the charge of "surrogate" or "proxy," a similar hierarchical pattern of supply has emerged. Third-party transfer prohibitions have proved to be an equally effective weapon in the hands of the United States. The Carter Administration halted Israel's military sales to Guatemala, and during the final stages of the Nicaraguan civil war it stopped Israel from arming the Somoza government. The Israeli sale of six Super Mystère fighter bombers with U.S. engines to Honduras was also stalled, and until recently the Israeli-manufactured Kfir fighter bomber could not be exported because it contained an American-built engine. Even after the armed hostilities over the Falkland Islands had ended, the United States blocked Israel's sale of aging A-4 Skyhawk aircraft to Argentina based on its rights as original seller. The Swedes have experienced similar restraints. In 1978 the United States was able to veto the sale to India of Swedish Viggen jet fighters because of their American engines and other components.

The need for continued access to technical innovations. Another powerful lever for the superpowers is their dominance in military-related research and development. The high R&D costs associated with the production of advanced military systems and components—expenses only the United States and the Soviet Union have been willing and able to bear—have exacerbated the rest of the world's dependency upon the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superpowers for access to the latest military technologies. Although estimates of Soviet R&D expenditures are not readily available, one source suggests a range within one-third and two-fifths of the world total. In 1983, of the estimated $60-billion world expenditure on military R&D, the superpowers share was thought to be about four-fifths, or $45 billion.[4]

The United States reportedly spends three to four times more than Western Europe on conventional military R&D. This has meant that individual West European countries have had to rely on U.S. R&D efforts not only for the advanced major systems they buy but also for the new technological innovations and advanced concepts they incorporate into the military items they produce. Soviet allies find themselves in a similar position.

The consequences for the rest of the world are that most of the major military systems they buy or make are either derived from the superpowers' research and design efforts or are embedded with U.S.- or Soviet-origin subsystems such as engines and electronic and avionics packages. In the West, for example, 20–30 percent of each Tornado plane produced jointly by the United Kingdom, West Germany and Italy is said to consist of imported U.S. equipment. As a State Department official on the European desk told me: "The U.S. has controlling interest in the Tornado and the Leopard. Major radar systems on the Tornado are U.S., so that the U.S. has a say in third-party transfers." Israel, too, is very dependent on the United States for access to advanced technologies. No single modern major system manufactured in Israel is without some U.S. input, in the form of either design or subsystem. East European countries conduct no R&D on modern, major military items.

For most states, the desire for continued access to technological innovation has been an important incentive to comply with U.S. or Soviet policy preferences. The People's Republic of China is a case in point. After denying that it had sold Silkworm missiles to Iran, Beijing pledged to prevent future deliveries. The pledge followed a U.S. State Department announcement that further liberalization of U.S.-Chinese high technology trade could not proceed until the Silkworm transfer stopped. Thus China's need for access to American high technology

[4] Mary Acland-Hood, "Statistics on military research and development expenditure," *SIPRI Yearbook, 1984*, London: Taylor & Francis, 1984, pp. 165–66.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serves as a tacit, if not overt, constraint on what it can sell, particularly to parties at war. Even China's recent sale of CSS-2 surface-to-surface missiles to Saudi Arabia probably had the tacit consent of the Reagan Administration.[5] It is unlikely, given the current climate in the Gulf and China's military and civilian modernization efforts, that either China or Saudi Arabia would risk alienating the United States with a major sale of weapons such as the CSS-2s without presupposing its approval. If the sale was objectionable to the Reagan Administration, its public response was remarkably low key.

Brazil's desire for U.S. high technology has also proved to be an effective lever for the United States in slowing its transfer of military technology, particularly to Iran. In June 1984 the Brazilians reportedly agreed to restrict their weapons sales abroad in return for access to U.S. defense technology.

The need for financial assistance. The superpowers also have been able to use economic assistance and the promise of future military sales to obtain cooperation from other states. Indeed, the promise of financial aid is perhaps the most powerful political instrument of all for the United States and the Soviet Union. In return, many states have been willing, even eager, to perform various military services when it has been politically imprudent for the superpowers to do so themselves. Thus Washington's $3.2-billion aid package to Pakistan in 1981-86 was, in part, compensation for Pakistan's support of the Afghan insurgency. Some observers believe that the United States' enlarged economic and military assistance to Israel is related to Israeli activities in Central America.

In some instances a military sale to a third party by a U.S. ally may be used tacitly to offset its own U.S. procurements. This kind of relationship is difficult to document, and for obvious reasons is rarely discussed openly by either party. In the 1960s the British sold $266-million worth of Lightning aircraft, missiles, a radar system, and training services to Saudi Arabia, in spite of Saudi Arabia's declared preference for a U.S. plane. They did so with the direct encouragement of the Kennedy Administration, "which understood that Britain would use the money from the sale to purchase U.S.-manufac-

[5] This is not to suggest that all relevant agencies were aware of the sale. Many apparently were taken by surprise. More likely, a few key officials knew and/or conveyed to the Chinese and Saudis the impression that the Reagan Administration did not object.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tured fighter aircraft."[6] At issue were the British balance of payments problem and their prospective purchase of U.S. F-111 aircraft. According to one source, the Saudis "had been persuaded to buy British planes that they did not want, to allow Britain to pay for American planes it could not afford."[7]

In a different context, Britain may again have served as a substitute supplier for the United States when it sold $4-billion worth of fighter planes (72 Tornado jet fighters, 30 Swiss PC-9 trainers that British Aerospace is modifying to Saudi requirements, and 30 Hawk trainers) to Saudi Arabia in lieu of two squadrons of U.S. F-15 aircraft. Unwilling or unable to pay the political price necessary to get the F-15 package through Congress, in mid-1985 the Reagan Administration sent a letter to the Saudis "that raised no objections to purchases of planes elsewhere."[8] As one British informant observed, "We couldn't say that Reagan steered the Saudis in Britain's direction. We like to think, and Mrs. Thatcher likes to think, that we all have a close relationship. Certainly in a political sense, this government, Reagan and the Saudis are all very close."[9]

Although no public documentation exists that establishes a direct connection between the political and military services provided by the superpowers' allies and friends and offsets or kickbacks for their procurements, based on the few cases that have surfaced, and inferring from the more widely publicized relationship between increased economic aid and surrogate activities, it is not illogical to assume a linkage in the military sector as well.

The need for military and political support. In addition to financial assistance, many countries depend upon the weight and prestige of the superpowers to protect them from various political or military humiliations in international forums and on the battlefield. The promise of this type of support has also won for the superpowers the gratitude of many states which in return cooperate and willingly undertake various diplomatic and military tasks for them. Again, no public document affirms a relationship between U.S. and Soviet political or military

[6] Karen DeYoung, "Saudis Set to Buy British Jets," *The Washington Post,* Sept. 15, 1985.
[7] Anthony Sampson, *The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed,* New York: Viking Press, 1977, p. 164.
[8] Bernard Gwertzman, "Saudis Say Reagan Cleared Purchase of British Planes," *The New York Times,* Sept. 16, 1985.
[9] *The Washington Post, op. cit.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

support and the cooperation of recipients, but there is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest it.

In Central America, for example, it may not be coincidence that the list of contributors to both sides of the war effort includes states which have had remarkably little political or commercial interest in the area but are dependent upon the Soviet Union or the United States for political, military, technological or economic support, and sometimes all four. In fact, this link was made explicit by the Reagan Administration, which publicly discussed the role of substitute suppliers in the region. In the face of Congress' reluctance to support the Nicaraguan insurgents and as a tactic to persuade it to do so, the Administration announced in March 1985 its intention to request that friendly Asian countries help channel aid to the contras. In August 1985 the Nicaraguan government claimed that South Korean military experts were advising the contras, and it was reported elsewhere that Taiwan was providing assistance.

Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brunei, Britain and Israel (all of which have little political concern for Central America and with the exception of Israel few ties there), are also said to have aided the contras. According to published reports, Saudi Arabia has been secretly financing the contras as part of an informal arrangement for buying arms. Aid to the contras was tied to Saudi Arabia's 1981 AWACS purchase from the United States, which intelligence sources termed a "kickback by the Saudis to get the AWACS."[10] They claim it has been a common, long-standing practice to generate cash from foreign military sales for politically sensitive U.S. programs. The precedent had already been set in 1980 with the Saudi financial channel to the Afghan rebels. The 1981 AWACS agreement included Saudi aid to other anticommunist forces as well; by 1987 it was reported that Saudi Arabia had also provided aid to insurgents in Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and Angola.

Since 1986 the U.S. Seventh Fleet has offered protection to Saudi and Kuwaiti oil vessels against Iranian attack, and in 1987 the United States increased its political commitment to permit 11 Kuwaiti tankers to fly the American flag. Again, the connections have never been directly established, but for the

[10] "Saudis Secretly Funding Contras, U.S. Sources Say," *San Francisco Examiner*, July 27, 1986, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Saudis and Kuwaitis, helping the United States support the contras may have seemed a small price to pay in return.

During the Falkland Islands war, Britain depended upon the United States for substantial military support. The United States provided not only intelligence facilities and information, but Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and a variety of ordnance for its planes. It may not have been mere happenstance that Britain later was reported to have offered military training to the contras. Israel's role in Central America, on the other hand, has been referred to unambiguously as that of a "surrogate supplier." As one Israeli analyst observed about U.S.-Israeli relations: "It's like Israel has become another federal agency, one that's convenient to use when you want something done quietly."[11] Honduras too, with more immediate regional interests, agreed to assist the contras but not without U.S. compensation. It successfully lobbied for more military and economic funding in exchange for allowing U.S. contra aid to pass through its territory.

El Salvador has received similar support from an assortment of U.S. friends and allies. Britain, Belgium and Israel have each volunteered to train members of the Salvadoran army in their own country, and West Germany lifted a five-year ban on aid to El Salvador in 1984 by providing technical and financial assistance. Even Japan has expanded its economic aid program to help a number of U.S. friends, particularly in Central America.

U.S. efforts to limit Nicaragua's access to Western equipment also have been quite effective, despite the disinclination of U.S. friends to honor them. France, however reluctantly, acquiesced in the Reagan Administration's request that it "slow down" delivery of an arms package it had sold to the Sandinista regime. The French also agreed to "delay" delivery of the two Alouette III helicopters the United States found most objectionable. U.S. officials later said they thought any new French arms deals with Nicaragua "most unlikely." Other European and Latin American countries have followed suit, so that Nicaragua, once the recipient of military assistance from multiple Western suppliers, now finds itself almost completely dependent on the communist bloc for its military aid.

The Soviet aid program to Nicaragua has followed a similar

[11] "Israeli Reportedly Set Up First U.S.-Iran Arms Deal," *The Washington Post,* Nov. 19, 1986.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pattern. Although the Soviet Union now provides 90 percent of Nicaragua's oil, in addition to other economic and military assistance, Soviet allies and friends have also pitched in. East Europeans serve in a variety of support roles alongside Cubans, and Libya reportedly has given a $100-million loan to the Sandinistas.

V

Surrogate support activities have characterized most recent wars, at least those that have lasted long enough for the superpowers to organize supplementary channels of assistance. Afghanistan, the Western Sahara, Angola, Iran-Iraq: each of these wars features different actors, but the relationships between those supplying and servicing them and the superpowers is the same. The dependence of most states, European as well as Third World, upon one or the other of the superpowers for sophisticated military technologies, subsystems, advanced R&D, and other forms of economic, political and military support have been powerful incentives for cooperation and compliance. Hence, through a delicate system of tacit rewards for restraint and punishment for infractions, both superpowers have been able to staunch or raise the flow of aid and regulate the level of armed hostilities in various regions of the world.

This does not suggest that superpower control has been or can be total. Power is a relative concept. Clearly the participating countries have reasons of their own for cooperating and often pursue their own political and economic interests even when they promote those of one of the superpowers. And when the vital interests of a superpower's allies or friends are at stake, they may not be compliant. Still, the United States and the Soviet Union retain the option of withdrawing support and wreaking economic punishment if sufficiently displeased—a price most smaller or less-affluent states are frequently unwilling to bear.

In sum, a constellation of factors has served to foster the dependency of most of the world's states on the economic and technological capabilities of the superpowers. As a result, the intensity of combat in the Third World has been determined not only by the regional interests of the combatants, but by the national interests of the United States and the U.S.S.R. as well.

Judging from recent conflicts in the Third World, neither warfare nor the rising number of weapon suppliers has destabilized the international system or reduced the influence of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the United States and U.S.S.R. in it. To date, the superpowers have not clashed with each other on the battlefield, and their military competition has been relegated to direct and indirect support of combatants in local wars. Both have continued to dominate the arms trade, using military assistance to enhance their position in the world and to limit each other's expansion.

Although diversification and indirect sources of supply have permitted Third World combatants to continue fighting, often at tremendous cost in lives, the type of weapons and training available to them has remained limited. In effect, the superpowers have retained control over the quality if not the quantity of the arms trade, and ultimately, therefore, over the level of technological sophistication at which wars have been fought in the Third World.

VI

If the above analysis is correct, the implication for U.S. policy toward the Third World is not insignificant. It suggests that the United States, because of its economic and technological strength, enjoys a comparative advantage in relation to other suppliers of military aid—including the Soviet Union. It also suggests that despite the conventional wisdom that such instruments have little utility, security assistance programs have served the interests of the United States well.

If the outcomes of recent wars in which American troops have actively participated have been disappointing (U.S. marines in Beirut and the Vietnam experience), the outcomes of recent wars in which the United States has delivered security assistance, or denied it, have been less so. By providing U.S. policymakers with alternative options, military aid has enabled the United States to demonstrate resolve on the one hand and restraint on the other.

In an era when mutual assured destruction in an all-out nuclear war remains a reality, such policy tools are few in number but are critical to the task of defending perceived U.S. strategic interests while avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S.S.R. In this respect, U.S. security assistance has proven to be a potent foreign policy instrument during recent wars. Used in conjunction with a coherent set of foreign policy goals and creative diplomatic initiatives, it will continue to serve as an important alternative to military intervention and as a moderating influence on the level, if not the frequency, of conventional conflict.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, the data presented here suggest that the conventional wisdom regarding the decline of U.S. influence and the dispersal of power in the world cannot be unquestioningly accepted. If power rests with the state whose resources dwarf those of other states, then the United States possesses the greatest reservoir of potential influence in the international system.

In this respect, even the Soviet Union is at a relative disadvantage. Economic slowdowns beginning in the late 1970s, combined with low oil prices, declining production beginning in 1984, and a trade deficit beginning in 1985 have compounded the Soviet Union's difficulties. In response to these problems the U.S.S.R. has come to rely more heavily on its arms export earnings and to demand hard-currency payment for its weapon transfers. Whereas its 1950s agreements with developing countries were concessional, with discounts ranging from 40–50 percent and easy financing terms, by 1981 an estimated 85 percent of the Soviet Union's arms sales were paid for in hard currency, and these sales were contributing about 20 percent to the U.S.S.R.'s hard-currency export earnings.[12] However, in recent years depressed world economic conditions have adversely affected Soviet foreign exchange earnings. As the ability of Third World countries to buy weapons with hard currency declines in tandem with the Soviet Union's decreasing ability to provide extensive economic and military support to them, the relative influence of the Soviet Union over its Third World friends and allies can be expected to fall.

From the perspective of the arms trade, U.S. influence remains paramount. If this is so then it is important for American leaders to recognize and constructively use it. Myths of declining power, if repeated often enough, become the accepted truth, depriving decision-makers of their confidence and will to lead. In that event, the self-fulfilling prophecy of increasing impotence will become true, and U.S. foreign policy will become less an exercise in influence over events than an attempt to block their most negative effects.

[12] *Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects, Vol. 2,* Joint Economic Committee, 97th Congress, 2nd session, Dec. 31, 1982, Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1983, pp. 502–504.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Michael Clough

SOUTHERN AFRICA: CHALLENGES AND CHOICES

When a new president takes office in January 1989, one of the major challenges he will face is to craft a coherent and sustainable policy toward southern Africa. His ability to meet this challenge will be affected greatly by developments over the next six months. Current congressional efforts to pass new sanctions against South Africa could further politicize the apartheid issue and result in actions that would restrict the next administration's ability to deal resolutely and effectively with Pretoria.

Moreover, the outcome of U.S.-sponsored talks currently under way between Angola, Cuba and South Africa to bring about the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola will greatly influence the opportunities for a new relationship with the Angolan government, as well as the possibilities for removing this conflict as a source of tension in U.S. relations with Moscow and Havana. Unfortunately, the potential impact of developments in the final months of the Reagan era on the options available to the next president has not been widely recognized.

The process of building a broad bipartisan consensus that will enable the next president to grapple with southern African issues quickly and confidently should begin immediately. Building such a consensus requires a balanced understanding of the sources of recent policy failures, a clear recognition of the deep-seated nature of conflict in southern Africa, and a willingness to reexamine U.S. policy objectives.

II

Southern Africa has always been difficult terrain for U.S. policymakers. The several failures involved in the collapse of

---

Michael Clough is Senior Fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was Study Director of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa in 1986–87. This article is adapted from the author's "Beyond Sanctions," a paper published in the *Critical Issues* series of the Council on Foreign Relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" are only the latest in a long series of frustrated initiatives. Over the past three decades, Republican and Democratic officials alike have repeatedly miscalculated the stability of white rule, the strength of black resistance and the significance of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the region, with equally damaging consequences.

In their efforts to promote political change in southern Africa some administrations have relied on strategies emphasizing "quiet diplomacy" and "positive measures," others on strategies emphasizing pressure and isolation. Both approaches have been tried several times, and each time they have failed to produce quick results. As one approach has fallen into disfavor, the other has been revived, and the cycle has started anew.

Never before, however, has U.S. policy toward southern Africa been in such disarray as it is today. The conflict between the Reagan Administration and Congress over sanctions against South Africa has been widely publicized. But equally important, albeit less understood, differences exist both within and between the Administration and Congress on most other important issues on the regional agenda.

Within the Reagan Administration, there are at least three areas of disagreement concerning southern Africa. These reflect broader differences between Administration moderates and Administration conservatives.

President Reagan's remarks on South Africa have often contributed to a perception that his views differ from those of his advisers on a number of questions, including the significance of South African reforms, the causes of black unrest and the right of the South African military to attack facilities in neighboring states alleged to belong to the African National Congress. For example, in a July 22, 1986, speech on South Africa (his only comprehensive statement on the subject during his two terms in office), the president cited acts of "calculated terror" by ANC elements and said that "the South African government is under no obligation to negotiate the future of the country with any organization that proclaims a goal of creating a communist state and uses terrorist tactics to achieve it." In congressional testimony the very next day, however, Secretary of State George Shultz, while expressing "serious questions about the ultimate objectives of the ANC," urged the South African government "to communicate with all parties,"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and suggested that the United States should and would do the same.

Differences also exist within the Administration over policy toward Angola. The decision in late 1985 to aid UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), which has waged a 13-year military struggle against the MPLA (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola) government in Luanda, represented a significant change from the more neutral posture assumed by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker in his effort to broker a settlement in Namibia and facilitate the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This shift was a victory for proponents of the so-called Reagan Doctrine, who see the war in Angola as part of a global struggle for freedom. In the aftermath of the Iran-contra scandal on one hand, and the apparent beginning of a new chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations on the other, those who favor diplomatic efforts to encourage regional accommodations may have regained their earlier bureaucratic ascendancy. But the underlying tension remains.

A more subtle conflict exists over policy toward Mozambique. Since early 1984, when Mozambique signed the so-called Nkomati agreement with South Africa, the United States has been committed to providing support for the government of Mozambique. In fact, many officials in the State Department regard rapprochement with FRELIMO—the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front—as constructive engagement's most important achievement. Within the Defense Department and other agencies, however, there have always been doubts about FRELIMO's ability to survive. These differences have manifested themselves in a sometimes bitter dispute over intelligence assessments of the nature, strength and future prospects of RENAMO (the Mozambique National Resistance), a band of insurgents supported by South Africa. There does not appear to be any significant support within the Administration for providing aid to RENAMO. But some officials favor pressuring FRELIMO to negotiate with RENAMO, and others would prefer that the United States steer clear of the issue entirely.

III

Conflicts between the Reagan Administration and Congress over southern Africa have been more obvious than those within the Administration, but the lines of contention have not been consistent. The most dramatic instance of executive-legislative

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disagreement was the overwhelming vote of Congress to override the president's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Although the act contained a wide range of different and conflicting provisions, the vote was basically a referendum on apartheid, constructive engagement and sanctions. Since passage of the act, policy has been in a schizophrenic state, with the Administration legally obliged to pursue an approach that it openly opposes.

In a required report submitted to Congress on September 30, 1987, the president declared that "there has not been significant progress toward ending apartheid since October 1986. . . . Moreover, the South African government's response to the act over the past year gives little ground for hope that this trend will soon be reversed or that additional measures will produce better results." Congressional proponents of sanctions share the president's negative assessment of the current South African situation, but have a different view of the implications for policy. They advocate stronger sanctions and an international campaign of economic and diplomatic pressure directed against South Africa. The gap between these two views is unlikely to be bridged before the end of President Reagan's term.

The Reagan Administration and Congress have also been at odds over the question of aid to Mozambique. In this case, however, Congress has adopted the more conservative position. A conflict first developed in 1985 when the Administration proposed a package of economic assistance including very limited nonlethal military supplies for the Mozambican government. By a substantial margin (247 to 177) the House of Representatives imposed conditions effectively prohibiting all but food assistance. Since then, restrictions on economic assistance have been somewhat loosened, but not those on military assistance. In 1987 Senate conservatives delayed the confirmation of Melissa Wells as ambassador to Mozambique for over 11 months in an effort to pressure the Administration to establish contacts with RENAMO.

On other regional issues majorities in Congress have also been less supportive of the so-called Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) than the Administration. For example, in May 1987 the Senate passed an amendment by Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) denying aid to countries in southern Africa that had not renounced "necklacing," a brutal tactic for executing suspected

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

collaborators, despite the fact that there was no evidence suggesting that any government in the region had ever supported that practice. In the case of Angola, it is often forgotten that the real impetus for aid to UNITA came from Congress in mid-1985, at a time when most officials in the State Department thought such aid would be ill advised. Similarly, it is conservatives in Congress who have been actively seeking restrictions on U.S. economic relations with Luanda.

Over the past three decades congressional majorities have generally been more conservative on southern Africa than the president. For example, in the early 1970s Congress placed the United States in violation of a U.N. embargo of Rhodesia, and then in the later 1970s nearly derailed the Carter Administration's attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement in that country. The only major exceptions have been 1975–76 legislation preventing the Ford Administration from intervening in the Angolan civil war and the recent sanctions measures.

Divisions within Congress over southern Africa policy are just as significant as those between Congress and the president. Despite passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 by landslide votes, a congressional consensus does not exist on policy toward South Africa, much less other regional issues. The coalition supporting the act was composed of at least four groups, each with a different set of motives.

—Leadership and core support for anti-apartheid legislation is provided by members of the Congressional Black Caucus, liberal Democrats and a handful of moderate Republicans. This vocal group has a long-standing interest in southern Africa. Although it comprises about 25–30 percent of the membership, this bloc will never be the swing factor in congressional votes on southern Africa.

—A smaller group of young Republican conservatives in the House of Representatives centered around Jack Kemp (N.Y.), Newt Gingrich (Ga.), Vin Weber (Minn.) and Robert Walker (Pa.) provided unexpected support for sanctions. They believed that their opposition to right-wing oppression in South Africa would enhance their ability to win support for "freedom fighters" waging wars against Marxist regimes in other countries. They also saw opposition to apartheid as a way to attract black support for the Republican Party. Support from this group gave the sanctions movement in Congress a substantial boost.

—The most passive, but nonetheless essential, bloc in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sanctions coalition was comprised of moderate and conservative Democrats with little ongoing interest in southern Africa. They were primarily concerned with domestic politics. At a time when the public and the media were seized with the issue of apartheid, it seemed unwise to cast a vote that might be construed as support for white rule.

—Moderate Republicans provided the final, and most decisive, source of support for the Anti-Apartheid Act. Included in this group were Senators Richard Lugar (Ind.) and Nancy Kassebaum (Kan.), both of whom had initially been strong supporters of constructive engagement. In 1986, as it became apparent that President Reagan was either unwilling or unable to demonstrate U.S. opposition to apartheid, Lugar and Kassebaum assumed leading roles in shaping a congressional alternative.

Given the diverse interests and objectives of this coalition, it is not surprising that the 1986 act is a jumble of provisions. It contains some 18 different types of sanctions, including investment and loan bans, trade restrictions and the termination of commercial air travel between the United States and South Africa. It calls on the president to develop with other countries a multilateral program to end apartheid, and to recommend additional unilateral sanctions if progress toward ending apartheid is not made. The act also authorizes a broad range of assistance to the victims of apartheid. In addition, it requires a number of reports, including ones on the role and activities of the South African Communist Party, health conditions in the South African "homelands" and measures to reduce U.S. dependence on strategic minerals. In short, it contains something for just about everyone. Unfortunately, however, it does not provide a basis for an effective long-term strategy.

A major problem is the gap that exists between the strategic assumptions and intentions of proponents of sanctions and the political realities that determine outcomes in Congress. None but the most naïve advocates of sanctions expected the 1986 act to cause the South African government to dismantle apartheid and enter into genuine negotiations with black leaders. Instead, the sanctions contained in the act were seen by anti-apartheid strategists in and out of Congress as the first in a series of escalating pressures. That view was not shared by most members of Congress. For some, the most important consideration was the need for a symbolic statement of U.S. opposition to apartheid. For example, Senator Kassebaum com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mented: "We aren't fooled that sanctions work very well or will cause the South African government to buckle under. . . . But if we want to be perceived by South Africa and all sub-Saharan Africa as a player in the future we have to show whose side we are on." Many other members of Congress, probably a majority, saw the issue in even more limited terms. For them, the act was a political quick fix to get apartheid off the domestic agenda. In the absence of highly publicized violence in South Africa and renewed domestic protests over apartheid such as occurred in 1984–86, it is doubtful that Congress can be counted on to pass measures that will steadily tighten the screws on South Africa.

A second problem with the Anti-Apartheid Act derives from provisions within it concerning the ANC. Although urging the release of imprisoned ANC Life President Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of opposition political parties including the ANC, the language of the act suggests an underlying congressional ambivalence. For example, the act required the Administration to submit a report on the role of the South African Communist Party in the ANC, and prohibits assistance to any organization that supports or encourages "necklacing," which some ascribe to the ANC and its supporters. The act urges the Administration to encourage the ANC to (1) suspend terrorist activities, (2) make known its commitment to a free and democratic post-apartheid South Africa, (3) agree to enter into negotiations and (4) reexamine its ties to the South African Communist Party. Viewed in isolation these provisions are unobjectionable, but they portend a potentially bitter American debate over policy toward black leaders and organizations in South Africa; such a debate could quickly shatter the sanctions coalition in Congress.

In this regard, it is important to remember the Carter Administration's experience with Congress over sanctions against Rhodesia. In April 1977 President Carter managed to get Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment, which had placed the United States in violation of a U.N. embargo on Rhodesia, by substantial majorities. Fourteen months later, Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) narrowly failed to win Senate support for a bill that would have lifted all U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia. What accounted for this sudden reversal? In the spring of 1977, the sanctions vote was widely regarded as a referendum on white rule. In mid-1978 the terms of the debate were different. By drawing Bishop Abel Muzorewa and several other black leaders

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into a coalition government, Ian Smith allowed his supporters in the United States to present the issue as a choice between "pro-Western" black "moderates" and "radical" black "terrorists" aligned with the Soviet Union. By failing to anticipate and respond to this change, the Carter Administration came very close to having its Rhodesian policy sabotaged by Congress. If the South African government were to succeed in drawing Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi or other prominent black "moderates" into a multiracial national structure, congressional debate over South Africa could shift along the same lines it did in the Rhodesian case.

The final problem with the Anti-Apartheid Act is that it does not adequately take into account the regional context. The issue is not whether the Frontline States would suffer from the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. The governments in these states all support Western economic sanctions against South Africa, but, as their leaders readily acknowledge, they are themselves in no position to impose such sanctions. The South African government understands this fact; it will occasionally retaliate against them to remind the international community of its ability to do so. But Pretoria's primary response to sanctions that are not comprehensive will most likely be to expand its economic links with most of the surrounding states in order to compensate for lost markets elsewhere and facilitate sanctions-busting, while intensifying its military efforts to establish itself as a regional superpower.

As long as South Africa's regional economic and military predominance are unchallenged, the effectiveness of sanctions in eroding Pretoria's self-confidence will be limited. To change this situation would require a substantial and sustained commitment of resources to the Frontline States; providing economic aid without security assistance would be futile. This issue was not seriously addressed in the 1986 act.

The leaders of the liberal bloc of the sanctions coalition see such aid as a logical next step in the struggle against apartheid. But their view does not appear to be shared by the rest of the coalition. The domestic politics of economic and military aid to the Frontline States are very different from the domestic politics of apartheid and sanctions, especially at a time of huge U.S. budget deficits. Moreover, it is difficult to consider seriously challenging South Africa's regional policy when the United States is engaged in a tacit alliance with it to support

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNITA in Angola, and Congress is busy imposing restrictions on U.S. aid to Mozambique.

At the time it was passed, the Anti-Apartheid Act was both necessary and useful. The collapse of constructive engagement and the president's refusal to develop a serious alternative left congressional leaders with no choice but to act. Not to have passed sanctions would have sent the wrong message to white South Africans. Just as important, without sanctions it would have been impossible for the United States to begin to reestablish lines of communication with the black opposition in South Africa. But it would be a mistake to ignore the act's limitations and attempt to use it as a building block for future policy.

Legislation that would impose additional sanctions on South Africa is currently under consideration in Congress. There is a possibility that a new bill will be approved by the House of Representatives. It is less likely that it would win approval in the Senate. Moreover, any significant sanctions measure that was approved by Congress would almost certainly be vetoed by the president. In the final months of the Reagan era, it makes no sense to force a replay of the battles surrounding passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986.

A much more productive approach would be to lay the groundwork for executive-legislative cooperation in developing a new and more coherent approach. For example, congressional hearings on the problems of creating an effective multilateral sanctions program, ways to protect the Frontline States from retaliation, and South African military and technological vulnerabilities could provide a new administration with the knowledge base that will be necessary for sustained confrontation with Pretoria.

Strong sanctions will and must be a part of any new policy. Before further steps are taken on sanctions and other tactical issues, however, it is necessary to go back to basics and reassess the objectives of U.S. policy.

IV

The first prerequisite for an effective policy toward South Africa and southern Africa in general is the establishment of a set of realistic objectives. Realistic in the sense, first, that there is some chance they can be achieved in a reasonable period of time, and second, that they are generally in accord with U.S. public values and expectations.

The highly political nature of the American foreign policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

making process places a premium on results. When policies fail to produce visible successes, the clamor for an alternative usually grows quickly. By establishing goals that are unlikely to be achieved in a timely manner, an administration creates an easy opening for its critics. A better approach is to underpromise and overdeliver; as Assistant Secretary Crocker has learned, however, such advice is easier to give than to heed.[1] Practical considerations aside, policy objectives must be defined in terms that are broadly acceptable to the American public. Policies that appear to be "soft" on racism or terrorism—no matter how expedient—will never win lasting political support.

In April 1976 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the first comprehensive statement on U.S. policy toward southern Africa by a high-ranking American official. In his speech Kissinger identified three goals for U.S. policy:

—a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia that would ensure a majority rule while protecting minority rights,
—a U.N.-supervised transition to independence in Namibia,
—a peaceful end to "institutional inequality" in South Africa.

The first two goals were realistic both pragmatically and politically. There was at that time a reasonable prospect that they could be achieved, and they met the test of public acceptability. From 1976 to the present, however, American policymakers have had great difficulty defining workable objectives vis-à-vis South Africa.

Kissinger's goal of ending "institutionalized inequality" was realistic in the sense that it was possible to envision an "enlightened" South African government embarking on a program of domestic reform that would eliminate the more egregious features of apartheid and begin to eliminate discrimination in the workplace. By the mid-1970s, however, such limited reforms were already insufficient to satisfy the minimum demands of black South Africans. Luckily for Kissinger and the Ford Administration, they left office before they were put to the test on this issue.

The Carter Administration erred in the opposite direction. By allowing himself to be trapped into calling for "one man, one vote" following a meeting with Prime Minister John Vorster in July 1977, Vice President Walter Mondale contrib-

[1] Mr. Crocker gave such advice in his article outlining the policy of constructive engagement, "South Africa: Strategy for Change," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1980/81, p. 351.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uted to the perception that this was the Administration's objective. That objective was appealing in domestic political terms, but it was never practical in the sense that the policies being pursued could bring it about before the end of President Carter's term.

In his exposition of constructive engagement in *Foreign Affairs*, Crocker criticized the Carter Administration for failing to recognize the strength and resolve of South Africa's white rulers. This failing, he argued, caused that Administration to adopt an unattainable set of objectives. Unfortunately, the Reagan Administration went to the other extreme in overestimating the commitment of the South African government to "reform" and underestimating the ability of the opposition in South Africa to mount a serious challenge to white control. As a result, it pursued policies that have proved just as impractical, if not more so, than those pursued by the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration's difficulties have been exacerbated by its further failure to understand the need for goals that could be defended in domestic political terms.

The Reagan Administration's initial objective for South Africa was the beginning of an evolutionary process of reform that "was open-ended and consistent with a nonracial order." To promote that objective, Crocker believed the United States should be willing to indicate support for positive steps taken by Pretoria, even if those steps fell short of what the United States believed would ultimately be necessary. This proved to be a serious miscalculation.

One of the complaints about U.S. policy most frequently made by South Africans is that Americans are constantly moving the goal posts. In their view, the reforms instituted by the Botha government went a considerable way toward satisfying earlier U.S. demands, but instead of approval South Africa received new demands. The "shifting goal posts" debate is a direct result of constructive engagement's focus on near- and medium-term reforms rather than ultimate goals.

Reforms, no matter how substantial, that fail to win substantial black support in South Africa will never be politically acceptable to a majority in the United States. In implicitly suggesting that they might, Crocker misled the South African government. The only reason that this did not become clear earlier in Reagan's term was that the apartheid issue was not yet on the public agenda.

As long as the promise of an early settlement in Namibia

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seemed credible and the political situation in South Africa was relatively calm, the Reagan Administration was able to avoid putting its definition of progress in ending apartheid to a political test. By mid-1983, however, Congress was beginning to grow impatient with constructive engagement. It was at this point that Administration officials began to cite reforms, especially the unveiling of a new tricameral constitutional structure that would grant limited political rights to Coloureds and Asians, as evidence of positive change in South Africa. In the fall of 1984 the credibility of these claims was shattered by the widespread unrest that accompanied the inauguration of South Africa's new constitution and the attempt to put in place new structures of black local government.

Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment it is now clearly understood that merely encouraging "reform" is not sufficient. In January 1987, for example, the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa recommended "against U.S. endorsement of 'reforms' that fail to address the fundamental concerns of black South Africans." There is in this, however, a danger that Americans may be adopting a new set of objectives that are equally unrealistic, i.e., not achievable.

In his September 1987 report on the Anti-Apartheid Act, President Reagan declared the goal of U.S. policy toward South Africa to be "doing all that is possible to bring the peoples of South Africa together for meaningful negotiations leading to the creation of a democratic society." The act's stated goal is "an end to apartheid" and "the establishment of a nonracial democracy." It is difficult to quarrel with the ultimate desirability of these objectives. But they are not practical in the near to medium term, and giving them operational priority might prove counterproductive. Sooner or later, negotiations will bring about an end to white rule in South Africa as we now know it. That is a certainty. When that will occur, who will sit at the table and what will result are all open questions.

Obviously, it would be best if negotiations occurred before the current violence escalates into a bitter and bloody civil war; if they included representatives of all important groups; and if they resulted in the establishment of a democratic, nonracial political system committed to protecting human rights and promoting economic opportunity. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that such an outcome will occur before the end of the next president's first term in office. Establishing this as a goal to be achieved by that date would, therefore, almost certainly ensure

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

failure from the start. Moreover, by focusing on negotiations to end apartheid, policymakers may forfeit an opportunity to pursue other, more attainable objectives and, paradoxically, delay rather than hasten achievement of that ultimate objective.

Most conflicts eventually end in negotiations, but embattled regimes almost invariably agree to negotiate with their principal opposition only after they have tried to negotiate with everyone else and have concluded that they cannot defeat their principal opponents by force. South African whites are far from reaching this point.

Although shaken by the events of 1984–86, the South African government is still in a strong position. Since the state of emergency was imposed in mid-1986 the government has pursued a ruthless strategy designed to eliminate organized political opposition inside the country, curtail foreign assistance to opposition forces and redress some of the underlying socioeconomic grievances that fueled township unrest. This strategy has succeeded in eroding the revolutionary optimism that had begun to develop in the black community. But the struggle is still far from over.

President Botha's recent announcement of his intention to offer new formulas for inclusion of blacks in the national government is evidence that Pretoria recognizes that a strategy based solely on repression and socioeconomic co-optation cannot succeed over the long term. Before seriously considering negotiations with its main political opponents, however, the Botha government will attempt to entice "moderates," including most prominently Chief Buthelezi, to accept a role in the government. Moreover, once they do decide to talk to the real opposition, especially the ANC, they are likely to spend considerable time trying to identify and hive off "moderates" with whom they might be able to cut a better deal than the one demanded by "radicals."

In the face of these realities it would be quixotic for U.S. policymakers to launch grand initiatives "to bring the parties closer together." U.S. interests—and the ultimate interests of South Africans—would be served best by honestly pointing out how far away a solution appears to be in South Africa, while emphasizing the potentially catastrophic costs of continued stalemate.

A related problem with putting emphasis on negotiations is the current effort to establish a set of preconditions or interim

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

steps that can be defined as significant progress toward a settlement. The most widely accepted such step is the call for the release of Nelson Mandela. The Commonwealth's "Eminent Persons Group" report, the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act and the report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee have all suggested different lists of steps that should be taken. These lists risk starting a new "shifting goalposts" debate. The problem with them is that a politically adept South African government could fulfill—or at least create the impression that it had fulfilled—a number of these preconditions without being prepared to negotiate an end to white dominance. In fact, U.S. policymakers should be prepared for the day when South Africa decides to satisfy many of these demands, *not* to clear the way for genuine negotiations involving the ANC, but rather as part of an effort to avoid them. This risk is particularly high with regard to the release of political prisoners. Such a development would almost certainly further polarize the policy debate in the United States and, as a result, reduce the ability of a new administration to restore U.S. credibility and influence in southern Africa.

What is the alternative? A simple statement is required to the effect that U.S. officials are in agreement that resolution of the South African conflict will ultimately necessitate a settlement that is broadly acceptable to South Africans of all races. The South African government needs to recognize, once and for all, that the United States is not responsible for defining what constitutes sufficient or desirable change for South Africa. That is something that can only be done by the South African people. If a broadly acceptable settlement is reached it will be fairly easy to tell, and the specifics will not much matter. U.S. officials ought to do what they can to foster conditions that will make negotiations possible eventually, and be prepared to play a useful role once they begin. But, at least for now, promoting negotiations should not be the immediate objective of U.S. policy.

V

Emphasizing the objective of ending apartheid through reform and/or negotiations has concentrated American attention on the white factor in the South African equation. Despite dramatic developments in black politics over the past four years, this situation has changed only marginally. Crocker defended his emphasis on white politics in the following terms:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The importance of internal white politics derives from the fact that, on the one hand, whites continue to hold effective power and cannot be *forced* to share or transfer it; on the other hand, the way white leadership plays its cards will help to shape the question of who sits at future bargaining tables and under what circumstances.[2]

Critics have attacked the Reagan Administration for paying too little attention to black politics, but their alternative strategy—escalating pressure—operates on very similiar assumptions about the political centrality of whites. Both strategies—constructive engagement and escalating pressure—assume that the most urgent policy objective is getting whites to the bargaining table. What they differ on is how that can be achieved. Both sides largely discount the importance of black politics; when Americans do discuss it, all too often the talk centers on black attitudes toward sanctions.

Some analysts have suggested shifting the focus of policy from whites to blacks, but little effort has been made to think this through in strategic terms. Recommendations usually involve urging greater dialogue with representative black leaders and providing assistance to "the victims of apartheid." Over the past four years, this advice has been increasingly acted on, but efforts have been largely ad hoc, lacking any clear focus or larger objective.

One effective black-oriented strategy would be to concentrate on enhancing the black opposition's ability to create autonomous organizations and independent economic and social support networks, thereby reducing black dependence on white-controlled agencies and structures and enabling blacks to challenge the state more effectively. Such an idea is implicit in the phrase "black empowerment," which is being used increasingly by officials in the Reagan Administration.

In July 1986 Alan Keyes, then assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, gave a speech in which he said, "the question for Americans and others in the international community is not with what well-intentioned gestures can we show our hatred of apartheid and our sympathy with the suffering of its black victims but rather how, with concrete acts, we can support the expansion and use of their positive power." In practice, however, the Reagan Administration has used the concept of black empowerment in an extremely nar-

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 344.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

row and self-serving way to argue against disinvestment and sanctions. This limited formulation should not deter others from exploring the strategic potential inherent in the concept.

Focusing on black empowerment would highlight the fact that the primary battleground in the struggle against apartheid is not in the halls of Congress or the meeting rooms of the U.N. Security Council, but inside South Africa. The most that any U.S. actions can achieve is to reinforce internal pressures for change. In this regard, it is useful to remember Nelson Mandela's words to the Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa in January 1962. While calling for strong international action against apartheid, he warned that "it would be fatal to create the illusion that external pressures render it unnecessary for us to tackle the enemy from within. The centre and cornerstone of the struggle for freedom and democracy in South Africa lies inside South Africa itself."

It is the nature and pace of black empowerment, not white predispositions or maneuvering, that is the most critical determinant of the prospects for genuine negotiations. Until there is a decisive shift in the balance of power in South Africa there is little prospect that whites will agree to negotiate. Black empowerment is precisely the process of shifting that balance. Similarly, it is the political, social and economic character of black empowerment, not the largely white-dominated discussions of possible constitutional formulas, that will ultimately be most important in shaping a post-apartheid South Africa.

The expansion of black power has been under way in South Africa for several decades. Economic forces such as the emergence of a powerful independent trade union movement are only one factor. Equally important is the growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s of a diverse array of politically conscious organizations at the local, regional and national level, and the emergence of the church as an active political force.

Over the past three years the South African government has taken a series of wide-ranging actions to reverse this process of black empowerment and crush internal political opposition. It has arrested and detained thousands of individuals, including most of the national leadership of the United Democratic Front. The political activities of most organizations have been severely restricted. The news media's ability to report on developments in the country has been tightly circumscribed. New regulations are being put in place to block the flow of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foreign funds to progressive organizations inside the country. These developments have caused many people to conclude that efforts to assist internal organizations are foolhardy, but this conclusion is short-sighted.

Despite the government's actions, the vast majority of the progressive organizations that emerged inside South Africa over the past decade continue to function, albeit in different guises. Rent strikes and stayaways continue in much of the country. The independent trade union movement has grown stronger and more unified. Church leaders have assumed a greater role in articulating opposition to government policy. The alternative media has found ways to report on events. Universities such as the University of the Western Cape and others are still working to lay the groundwork for a nonracial South Africa. Most important, a climate of determined resistance to white rule continues to exist throughout the country. In short, the government has succeeded in suppressing political opposition, but it has not been able to establish its authority and legitimacy in the black community. As one South African analyst has observed, the most the government can hope to achieve is compliance, and over the long run compliance without consent and cooperation is not enough.

One of the main current tasks of a strategy of black empowerment should be to find ways to help progressive organizations inside the country survive. Many private and public efforts to do this have already been undertaken. As the South African story has received less attention in the media and as U.S. firms have withdrawn from the country, however, resources for these efforts have begun to dry up.

Creating a wide range of personal and institutional ties between black South Africans and individuals and organizations in the United States can greatly complicate Pretoria's efforts to isolate and demoralize its domestic opponents. Trade unions and churches in the United States and Western Europe are already playing a major role in assisting their South African counterparts. Other groups, e.g., professional associations, service organizations and student groups, should be encouraged to do so as well. Increased financial support should also be provided to independent organizations working in South Africa on community development, health projects, child care programs, legal assistance clinics and black education.

Many Americans most sympathetic with the black opposition have opposed efforts to provide assistance to blacks inside

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

South Africa on the ground that such aid might indirectly bolster the existing system and relieve the financial burden on the South African government, or that it could be used as a substitute for sanctions. These arguments are far off the mark. As strategists for Solidarity in Poland and other opposition organizations in Eastern Europe have long recognized, efforts to reduce dependence on the state and encourage the emergence of a self-sufficient society are an important means of diminishing the power and authority of a repressive regime. The South African government would find it quite difficult politically to block foreign support for such "nonpolitical" work.

The cornerstone of a black empowerment strategy should be the development of an ongoing dialogue with the black leadership in South Africa. Such a dialogue could provide the informed understanding of the situation on the ground and black priorities in the struggle against apartheid that a serious effort to promote black empowerment would require. Moreover, by clearly acknowledging the legitimacy and authority of those black leaders operating outside of government structures, dialogue would foster black empowerment. Such a dialogue should include representatives from the exile movements, especially the ANC.

A black empowerment strategy is not an alternative to revolution in South Africa; there are no such easy choices left. As the Rockefeller-supported Study Commission of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa foresaw in 1981: "The choice is not between 'slow peaceful change' and 'quick violent change' but between a slow, uneven, sporadically violent evolutionary process and a slow but much more violent descent into civil war." Support for black empowerment will ultimately increase the opposition's ability to wage a serious revolutionary struggle in the event that white authorities continue to block all channels for peaceful change. For that reason, a serious Western commitment to support black empowerment would send the strongest possible signal to whites that continued intransigence will threaten their interests in the long run.

A policy of black empowerment would require the U.S. government to adopt a much more determined and active strategy for responding to South African efforts to block contact and communication between Americans and progressive organizations in South Africa. Sanctions, especially in the area of travel, should be specifically linked to South African policies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on passports and visas. South African media restrictions should set in motion programs to use official U.S. intelligence and communication capabilities to get information in and out of South Africa. Restrictions on the flow of funds to organizations inside South Africa should be met with commitments to provide U.S. funds to exile organizations.

Emphasizing black empowerment would not mean ignoring the white factor. Obviously, white politics are important; Americans can and should try to influence white thinking and government policy in South Africa. But this should take place in the context of an overall emphasis on black empowerment. In fact, committing the United States to black empowerment and following through in a serious and sustained manner would reinforce the position of those political leaders in the National Party who are beginning to perceive the long-run futility of the government's current policies.

VI

Over the past eight years an important shift has occurred in the way the United States defines its objectives in southern Africa. From 1976 through 1982–83 U.S. policy focused on the achievement of a number of discrete objectives: negotiated settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and progress toward ending apartheid in South Africa. In the Reagan Administration's first year emphasis was placed on a Namibian settlement and Cuban troop withdrawal, and to a lesser extent, positive ties with Zimbabwe.

In 1982 this approach began to change. U.S. objectives began to be defined in broad regional rather than national/bilateral terms. In July 1983 Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger spelled out a U.S. vision of "a framework for regional security" in southern Africa based on respect for international boundaries, renunciation of violence and political coexistence. "A structure of regional stability," he declared, "is unlikely to take root in the absence of basic movement away from a system of legally entrenched rule by the white minority in South Africa."

This shift was dictated in large part by South Africa's adoption of a strategy of regional destabilization designed to compel neighboring countries to accept a regional order supportive of South African interests—or, if this proved impossible, to so destabilize those countries that they could not threaten South African regional hegemony. Destabilization led to a series of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cross-border raids by the South African Defense Forces (SADF) on neighboring states, especially Lesotho and Mozambique, support for antigovernment insurgents in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and restrictions on regional transport. As these actions began to engulf the entire region in a widening spiral of violence, officials in the Reagan Administration became increasingly concerned. They were forced to reexamine their initial premise that the United States and South Africa had a common set of regional interests and that the main task was to clear away the two issues—Namibia and apartheid—that made open cooperation politically impossible.

The reorientation of U.S. regional strategy had several effects, one of the most important of which was to cause the Reagan Administration to rethink its relationship with Mozambique. Disappointed with the support it was receiving from the Soviet Union, the Mozambique government first began to make overtures to Washington in 1982. Most Administration officials did not immediately perceive the importance of a rapprochement with Maputo. For example, one official commented wryly, "the problem is they haven't got any Cubans to send home." Once the issue was conceived in broader regional terms, however, the Administration's view of Mozambique's importance changed; Mozambique became the centerpiece of the effort to stabilize the region and demonstrate the United States' unique abilities to serve as a regional power broker.

Initially, U.S. officials sought to use their access to Pretoria to encourage South African policymakers to abandon destabilization in favor of a policy of regional accommodation. They played a significant role in bringing about the Nkomati accord of April 1984, wherein Mozambique and South Africa agreed to cease all support for antigovernment guerrillas. This accord—and the Lusaka accord involving South Africa and Angola—briefly renewed Washington's belief that cooperation with Pretoria on regional issues was possible. As evidence began to mount, however, that South African support for insurgents in Mozambique was continuing, in clear violation of the Nkomati accord, and as the SADF launched new attacks on targets in the surrounding states, U.S. officials began to see the conflict between South African and Western interests and objectives in the region as fundamentally irreconcilable. By mid-1986 it was clear that the United States and other Western countries were on a collision course with South Africa.

In his July 1986 congressional testimony Secretary Shultz

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commented that "South African strikes against Lesotho, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, and Pretoria's continued relationship with the Mozambican rebel movement, have shattered the emerging climate of regional moderation." After detailing the extent and gravity of regional conflict, he continued: "The fundamental cause of all this damage is the system of apartheid and the mounting and inevitable reaction to it."

In the maelstrom of controversy surrounding constructive engagement, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that considerable progress has been made in defining regional objectives that are practical and significant. The basic elements of a policy of regional restabilization are: (1) opposition to cross-border military raids and assistance to antigovernment insurgents; (2) cooperation with the United Kingdom and other Western allies to assist the members of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)[3] to rebuild their economies and reopen railways and roads through Angola and Mozambique; (3) support, including military training and supplies, to enable these states to protect their legitimate security interests; (4) promotion of internal accommodation and reconciliation (such as occurred in December 1987 when the Zimbabwean government signed a unity pact with its opposition); and (5) dialogue with the Soviet Union and Cuba to minimize the risk that regional conflicts will escalate into international confrontations.

Implementing an effective restabilization strategy would require, first and foremost, that Congress and the executive branch resolve the inconsistency between general U.S. support for regional stability and its actions toward Angola and Mozambique. It would also require rethinking how sanctions and the threat of sanctions can be used most effectively. For example, the threat of sanctions to deter South African regional aggression or promote a settlement in Namibia might be more successful than sanctions to promote the end of apartheid; the same sanctions cannot be applied simultaneously to both ends.

It would be a serious mistake to adopt the position, as some have urged, that the order of political priorities in southern Africa has changed and that regional initiatives should now be given lower priority than bringing the situation in South Africa to a head. If negotiations to end apartheid are not in the offing,

[3] The member countries of SADCC are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then it is wrong to send the message to South Africa's neighbors that their problems must be put on the back burner until there is a breakthrough in South Africa. It makes more sense to shift away from a single-minded focus on a goal—bringing about negotiations to end apartheid—that is not likely to be achieved in the near or possibly even medium term, in order better to promote goals such as black empowerment and regional restabilization that can be realized.

A critical first step in developing a more effective policy toward southern Africa would be to resolve at long last the tangle of issues that have blocked establishment of a normal relationship between the United States and Angola. U.S. policy toward Angola is currently proceeding on two contradictory tracks. One track—the effort to achieve a diplomatic settlement leading to Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops—is consistent with the Reagan Administration's commitment to regional stability. The other track—aid to UNITA—is not.

The decision to provide aid to UNITA was based on ideological and domestic political considerations that had little to do with the situation in southern Africa. In fact, at the time the decision was taken, considerable progress had been made in developing a workable basis for negotiations with the Angolan government. U.S. support for UNITA temporarily disrupted the negotiation process, but over the past six months new and important ground has been broken. It is still doubtful that a settlement will be reached before the end of President Reagan's term in office, but it is now possible to envision developments, especially in U.S. relations with Angola and Cuba, that could significantly change the nature of the problem a new president will inherit.

Despite their initial protests over the Reagan Administration's decision to link resolution of the Namibian conflict to the withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola, both Luanda and Havana have now accepted linkage as a reality. Recent discussions, including an early May meeting where U.S., Angolan, Cuban and South African officials sat down together for the first time, have centered around this issue. While Angola and Cuba have not yet tabled a proposal that fully satisfies U.S. officials, they are far closer to doing so than most analysts previously believed possible.

Several factors account for the willingness of the Angolans and Cubans to be forthcoming in the negotiations. Both of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MPLA's main military supporters—Cuba and the Soviet Union—appear to have concluded that the Angolan conflict cannot be won militarily, that a continued stalemate is a costly drain on scarce resources and, most important, that a politically acceptable settlement is possible. In particular, there appears to be a growing consensus among supporters of the MPLA, including African, Cuban and Soviet officials, that a formula must be found to end the struggle between the MPLA and UNITA. Also important is the belief that officials in the Reagan Administration are acting in good faith.

Even if the Angolans and Cubans do offer a troop withdrawal timetable that satisfies U.S. expectations, however, a settlement is not probable because the South Africans are unlikely to live up to their part of the bargain—i.e., implementing U.N. Resolution 435 to bring about Namibian independence. Because of the bases and facilities the SADF has established in the territory, especially in the Caprivi strip along the Angolan border, Namibia is far more important militarily to Pretoria now than it was in 1980–81. Moreover, given the recent successes of the right-wing opposition in South Africa, National Party leaders have reason to fear the possible political repercussions of appearing to "sell out" the white cause in Namibia. Two considerations, however, might cause the Botha government to agree to a settlement: a credible threat of concerted U.S., British and West German support for sanctions if it refuses; and the possibility of significant military losses on the ground in Angola.

Twice previously, promising negotiations in southern Africa have been impeded by the U.S. electoral calendar. In 1976–77 the election of Jimmy Carter complicated efforts to bring about a settlement in Rhodesia, and in 1980–81 the election of Ronald Reagan destroyed any hope of an immediate settlement in Namibia. This scenario need not be repeated a third time.

VII

The prospects for a resolution of the Namibian and Angolan conflicts and, just as important, the next administration's opportunities to shape a serious strategy to restabilize southern Africa could be enhanced greatly by a determined bipartisan effort to support the initiative currently under way. What would be most helpful would be a clear signal of American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resolve to push the current negotiations to their logical conclusion regardless of the results of the November elections.

Such a signal could take the form of a sense of Congress resolution, endorsed by both major presidential candidates. It should spell out steps that the United States would take if the Angolans and Cubans table proposals for a withdrawal of Cuban forces within two years of the beginning of implementation of U.N. Resolution 435, and the South Africans do not then agree to withdraw from Angola, end military assistance to UNITA and grant Namibian independence. Specific steps the United States should be prepared to take are: supporting imposition of a selective but mandatory package of sanctions by the U.N. Security Council, ceasing all contacts between the American and South African intelligence communities, ending all covert military assistance to UNITA, and undertaking not to become involved if Cuban forces were to attack South African forces in response to continued SADF incursions into southern Angola.

For such a proposal to be politically feasible there would have to be a further understanding between the United States and the Angolan government that if external assistance to UNITA were cut off and UNITA ceased offensive operations in Angola, Luanda would not attempt to defeat UNITA militarily. Such a de facto cease-fire would allow Angolans time to begin to figure out a way to resolve politically rather than militarily the tragic civil war that has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars over the past 13 years.

In sum, it is not too late for the Reagan Administration to achieve the major goal it set for its southern Africa policy in 1981—a Namibian settlement and progress toward the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola—nor is it too early to begin laying the groundwork for a credible and coherent regional policy by a new administration. What is required is that Administration officials, congressmen and presidential candidates recognize the critical importance of their actions and rhetoric over the next six months, and act in a way to enhance rather than diminish the chances of a breakthrough in the Namibian negotiations and expand rather than limit the options that will be open to a new president.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Michael Vlahos

THE END OF AMERICA'S POSTWAR ETHOS

National security policies reflect the culture of the society creating them. Each society's forms of war and politics express its unique culture. The United States has taken this truth as its own. From the beginning this nation imposed upon itself a self-conscious identity distinct from the European world. It was a New World torn from the Old. Americans continue to seek to strengthen our self-described uniqueness, and our national security policy has always been asked to reinforce our identity.

More than other modern societies, America relies, even depends, on myth to cement its confidence in current policies. Americans are profoundly ahistorical; we do not share a coherent sense of our own history in formal, academic terms. Popular culture, not an educational system, shapes our common sense of identity.

Our national myths are not tall tales, nor are they untruths, but they are both representations of identity and the actual instrument of acculturation. Myths give each of us our sense of belonging, our actual membership as Americans. This process of acculturation through myth, moreover, is achieved through what many believe is simply entertainment: television and movies. Even the way in which we choose to represent ourselves is uniquely American, however chaotic and random in appearance.

It is nonetheless extremely effective. The American ethos is no less entrenched for its lack of a formalized historical-literary tradition sternly taught in state schools. The imagery of American myth, one might argue, is actually more passionate and more powerful given its screen presentation. The problem for Americans is the translation of inchoate images of self into a coherent mental concert for the development of foreign and national security policies. The culture of a society—its ethos—defines distinctive patterns of individual and group behavior. Culture shapes the way we look at the world. Whatever our

---

Michael Vlahos recently became Director of the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

immediate group membership, our final sense of identity is shaped by larger cultural patterns.

If we define ourselves according to myth, what kind of worldview has it given us?

First, at the core, Americans share an essentially religious value system. The primal myth of our origin is that of the "Pilgrim's Progress," with the Plymouth Colony completely overshadowing Virginia and its lineal transplanting of British class and caste. We believe that the source and inspiration of America is bound up in religion: religious freedom, but also the moral vantage of Calvin. The impact of Protestant thought is felt in the ways we talk about mission, service, sacrifice, restraint. It underlies the sense that Americans share of serving a higher calling. This underpinning remains dominant today even though it is highly secularized, and transmuted into legal, constitutional language.

Second, Americans still hew, if unconsciously, to the symbolism of a New World. This symbolism has given rise to a set of specific myths about the United States. One of these is that America is the source of human progress and can achieve perfection as a society. The sense that we strive to create "a more perfect union" is embedded in our policymaking.

Americans believe that there has never been a society quite like our own. This American "exceptionalism" suggests that we are a people graced with unusual natural endowments. We think of ourselves literally as a "people of plenty." But our mythology also reminds us that this land was a great "untamed wilderness," a "land of savagery." It was the exceptional will, unity and vision of the American people and their beliefs that transformed the landscape. The twin icons of national bounty and national achievement have inspired two senses of an American national purpose: a conviction that the United States should serve as an example to the world, that America and its people are the model for all human development; and an impulse to change the world for good, to become the active agency of human progress. Tyranny and resistance to change are so entrenched in the world that only direct American intercession can shift the direction of history. America's gifts demand that it assume a missionary role.

But there are two tendencies. Does this nation exist as a model to a corrupted world, where existence is contingent on separation? Or does our existence demand engagement, so that a corrupted world ultimately may be reformed? Engagement

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

risks mirroring that from which we fled. The hazard is that in reforming evil we will inevitably, naturally incline toward its forms of subjugation—war and tyranny—even if pursued for good. But aloofness implies its own corruption, encouraging evil by celebrating detachment from the very fledgling movements America's existence hopes to inspire.

Our national irony is that both strands must coexist and even be woven together politically for this nation to remain uncorrupted. There is an American mission, and it is composed of two apparently contradictory parts. It must preserve itself from the world at the same time it proselytizes to that world. Even the earliest American immigrants knew that there was no escape, that by leaving Europe they must eventually return, that there could be no reconciliation between good and evil belief systems. After two world wars, Americans remain united around this recognition.

In functional terms there are only two identifiable American political groups. One seeks to preserve the purity of the American ethos, to keep our society unsullied, a more perfect model. At the other extreme is a broad group committed to the progress of world reform. Between the two is the political center, always shifting in emphasis, attempting to balance both interpretations of national purpose as they are translated into policy.

The most important thing to understand is that this basic split in American politics is not linked to party affiliation. Both major parties historically have had to balance "purifiers" and "progressives."

II

Purifiers and progressives, however, share a set of assumptions about the outside world that binds them together as Americans. These assumptions—a set of cultural theses—emerged from core national myths and were shaped at the beginning, as America struggled to free itself from Europe. Even today, many of the images we paste onto the wider world were cut in the eighteenth century.

A basic thesis was the rejection of the European concept of "grand strategy." Grand strategy was the agenda of monarchs, serving their needs at the expense of their people.

The very execution of a grand strategy implied an exaltation of the power of the state: it required centralized if not absolute state control over society in order to mobilize national energy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The monarch was thus the arbiter of an entire people's energy; he personally calibrated the limits of their capacity for sacrifice. Grand strategy required domestic political servitude.

If the monarch's personal goal was simply the pursuit of power, then it was the merest cynicism to say, for example, that "France aspired to greatness," if such greatness was simply the whim of a single man, and purchased with the blood, treasure and freedom of twenty million Frenchmen. It is understandable that Americans today mistrust the word "realism" in the conduct of foreign policy, where realism is seen as no more than the cynicism of equating state interests to national interests.

The objective of grand strategy itself was also intrinsically corrupting: at home through the enslavement of popular will to the state, and abroad through the enslavement of others in imperial wars. Even if called forth by the collective will of an entire people, the quest for great power status as a norm, an acceptable end in itself, was wrong. It must be remembered that throughout the eighteenth century North America was the imperial battleground par excellence for endless wars in which Indian nations served as the "Third World surrogates" of European kings.

If imperial wars were the rituals of grand strategy, then the professional military castes of Europe were its instruments. This led to an American rejection of the European norm of "professional" or state-controlled military institutions. Professional armies were at best an unaccountable mechanism of royal power over society, encouraging legal absolutism. At worst, they could create the eighteenth-century equivalent of the totalitarian state. The European officer corps was seen as a pylon of an unjust class system. War was also a king's domestic political safety valve, used to channel the energies of the aristocracy while encouraging patriotic allegiance to the commander-in-chief: the state.

Completing the American antipathy to standing armies was the nineteenth-century emergence of the iconography of the Prussian General Staff. A general staff existed to prepare for war, to present the state with the most encouraging and attractive motivation for initiating war.

Taken together, these cultural theses mean that any American engagement must be a "just war" with moral aims. In our history, the Civil War serves as the grand prototype of the "good war." Our twentieth-century world wars were deliber-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ately given the mythic trappings of 1861–65. Each became a just war the moment each became explicitly a war for human freedom. The power of this moral aim was redoubled in the Civil War by the need for full national mobilization in the North to defeat the Confederacy. The aim was elevated and enshrined by the sense that all citizens were fully committed to its attainment.

The totality of war also made the enormous sacrifices required easier to bear. In fact, sacrifice became a positive force after war, the "honored dead" giving inspiration and moral force to those who would shape America's future course. Finally, war was made to remake a world. "Reconstruction" was a necessary part of the process.

War demands cathartic action to justify it. War must celebrate American values and materially advance the American mission. Limited wars do not easily satisfy these needs, especially limited wars on foreign soil. Where America has intervened abroad, such actions have been politically satisfying only to the extent that they perpetuated national myth. In the postwar era, Korea just barely passed popular muster, and Vietnam failed altogether. Our failure in the latter conflict was in many ways a judgment on a leadership that ignored the centrality of the Civil War in national myth.

Both progressives and purifiers accept the legitimacy of the just war, and both interpretive strands have been intertwined through American enlistment in the war-as-moral-crusade, in 1861, 1917 and 1941. Since 1945, however, nuclear arms have negated the only kind of war that could be considered positive in our national ethos: one that is capable of unifying our national identity. Limited war is almost always unacceptable to purifiers, and an uncomfortable choice for progressives.

If military force is to be used it demands a unanimous definition of the national interest. But what are our vital interests? An attack on American citizens abroad has always been one of the few provocations for which military intervention was considered necessary. But purifiers at times have taken exception even to this: the Barbary outrages and today's terrorist assaults are two examples. But when American interests are linked to economic investments or geopolitical "stakes," support for the use of force in their defense is readily likened by critics to the European imperial prototype: American boys are dying to protect a depraved potentate or a banker's profits.

Finally, the whole issue of force and interest returns to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primal question of national purpose. If we must be committed to the world for our own values to survive, then its defense is a necessary risk. If commitment to an imperfect world, however, ends only in the defense of the morally indefensible, then the use of force must sap those values. We do not reform the world; the world succeeds in corrupting us.

Today, the stress between the two visions of American national purpose is greater than at any time since 1939. From the unity forged by world war, we have come to doubt ourselves. A national mission accepted as orthodoxy for a generation—from the late 1940s to the late 1960s—is now in shards. The world has changed, but so have we. It is important to show, in contrast to national myth and historical tradition, how Americans came to construct an essentially progressive mission, how purifiers came to be excluded from that mission, and how, ultimately, the mission foundered. Only then can we discern the state of the American ethos today.

III

The breathtaking experience of global war, where war with unconditional aims seemed to succeed completely, gave us enormous national self-confidence. Not only had the war justified our sacrifice, the completeness of the success made an ambitious national vision seem within reach: true world reform. It was the ultimate progressive mandate, and yet purifiers could embrace it. The Old World was so prostrate that, without the scheming Clemenceaus and Lloyd Georges of 1919, it could pose no threat of corruption. The world was ours, to remake in our image.

Several historical recognitions only reinforced this new tableau of American mission. One was a revision of historical myth. Pearl Harbor seemed a judgment on the isolationist legislation of Congress during the 1930s. After 1945, this assessment was extended. America was not attacked simply because it failed to respond to a threatening world; the very progress of evil, going from strength to strength, was a function of American withdrawal from the world. The United States actually encouraged the path of the dictators by its willful abstention.

America as a model to the world during the 1930s, moreover, now appeared vain, self-serving and farcical. Shackled by Congress, Franklin D. Roosevelt, with his gestures and pleas for peace, looked absurd in retrospect. From the vantage of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1945 our behavior appeared doubly pernicious: it did nothing to preserve world peace, and it made American foreign policy seem a posturing, useful only to stroke our national sense of self-righteousness.

In contrast to the lamentable moral aversion of the 1930s, World War II created a satisfying symbiosis: American moral imperative was indissolubly linked to absolute evil (i.e., Nazi tyranny). In this sense, American involvement was necessary to evil's abolition.

The depth of national emotional commitment was presented as equivalent in moral content to the fight against slavery. And just as the Emancipation Proclamation transformed a war of rebellion into a revolutionary struggle, so the Atlantic Charter, the "Four Freedoms" and the United Nations created for global war the same constitutional imperative. They elevated our passion to one of national crusade.

Our national sacrifice made sense only within the moral embrace of a natural extension of war into peace. World War II existed not merely to end a threat, but to remove the very source of threat. Before America's entry into the war, the pieces had already been put into place: a transformation of the world system was made the ultimate goal. Going into battle, Americans understood that the peace settlement would not hew to Old World tradition. This time, unlike the squabbling at Versailles in 1919, there was to be no balance-of-power solution. The world was not to be remade in favor of great power aggrandizement among the victors. The model of 1815 was to be forever left behind.

This charge ensured that the primary task of the postwar era would be to create a true liberal world order, to do what had been left undone in 1919. In American expectations, this new order was to be evenhanded: the Soviet Union must accept international standards and restraints on its behavior, while the colonial powers, especially Britain and France, must accept decolonization as their post-imperial fate.

IV

Between 1945 and 1950 Americans yielded to the charge of global mission. It began with a gathering sense of failure in transforming victory into peace. The Yalta agreement began to seem a little like appeasement, certainly an arrangement more at ease in the world of 1815 than the new world of 1945. How could the Soviet Union be coopted into a universe of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liberal values if we began by bartering for its good behavior with the freedom of whole peoples? The vision of future world stability anchored in U.S.-Soviet cooperation vanished in the confrontation over Germany. The American effort to resolve the new German question was blocked by a Soviet cement-brick wall. Beyond this "diplo-deadlock," the rapacity with which Stalin seized his war spoils shocked even the practitioners of accommodation. His ruthless subversion of Eastern Europe at once evoked the imagery of the late 1930s. Appeasement again had led to aggression and enslavement, but this time the United States was acquiescing to evil directly. How easy it was for us to recreate the masque of the prewar world. Stalin became Hitler: threatening, fomenting, saber-rattling.

It is only understandable that the Munich metaphor returned to those who had held junior positions in 1938. It is also understandable that their response should be "never again." All of the new myths of recent war informed Americans: the fruits of appeasement were war; it was better to stand up for our values earlier than later; evil understood only force; with a broken Europe before us nothing could stop the march of evil but the United States.

The myths were already there, and Stalin was foolish to give them renewed life. He unwittingly forced a fusion of "truths" from the recent past to expectations of the future. History would repeat itself—unless America intervened.

The shock of the Soviet atomic bomb, however, twisted the context of national mission. America's commitment to a liberal world order was unchanged, but the form of mission-as-crusade changed subtly. Nuclear weapons forced an abandonment of the just war as an instrument of reform. If the Soviet Union became the focus of contemporary evil, then it could not be tackled directly. Communist Eurasia could at best be "contained" while the rest of the world, the "free world," together held the line until a true and complete liberal world order could be reestablished. The free world rubric reflected a return to the language of 1942, when F.D.R. used the term "United Nations" to identify not merely the allied coalition, but the legitimacy of a universal world order to come.

Nuclear weapons also changed the style of American strategy and diplomacy, as well as its objectives. Partly in response to nuclear ambiguity, Americans tentatively accepted a partly European approach to great power diplomacy. The early 1950s marked the emergence of a guiding guild of pragmatists who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tried to manage America's global commitment in a classical manner, while publicly genuflecting to the rhetoric of a progressive mission. They tended to see the United States as a mature great power, inheriting the mantle of Britain. America indeed took responsibility for the stability of the world system, but it could do so only by tempering its impulse toward moral absolutism.

At first the pragmatists believed that Americans might also be forced to live under a permanent war-mobilization. The West would have to mirror evil's power to contain it successfully. The world of containment and NSC-68 was a dark one, almost Orwellian, where we would live on the edge of apocalypse for a generation, waiting out the Soviets. In this sense the neo-British metaphor hearkened to the 1930s, not the sunny climes of Victoria's stewardship.

Eisenhower tried to leash the trend toward an American mission that would abridge ultimately the very values it sought to defend. Ike sought a "middle way": moderating defense expenditure while promoting a strategic doctrine that would skirt the tar pits of limited war. He recognized the danger that active containment would come to be seen as corrupting our national ethos. But his instrument of cultural moderation appeared immoderate. The "New Look" (NSC-162/2) quickly became "massive retaliation," an apparent prescription for atomic war. It was in any event evanescent, for it could survive politically only as long as it was not tested. As Americans became aware of their vulnerability to atomic attack, their acceptance of the threat of nuclear first use in support of crisis diplomacy became a political taboo.

V

The great postwar consensus was always more fragile than it appeared. It was finally riven over Vietnam. And Vietnam was the centerpiece of the Kennedy Administration, a buoyant reenactment of NSC-68 after eight years of Republican timidity. What Eisenhower had feared, Kennedy embraced. Everything seemed in place in 1961 for a testing of American mission: a resurgent economy, dominance in the nuclear balance and a fine-tuned, conscripted army. In contrast to 1950, the vantage of the new decade was infused with traditional American optimism. A permanent war-economy was unnecessary to contain communism. Americans could have both "guns and butter," and social reform at home would mirror our missionary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

energies abroad. An unsullied, supremely confident American ethos could go on a progressive offensive.

Vietnam can be seen as a flamboyant failure by the postwar pragmatists to apply their own historical vision. As an elite, they envisaged themselves as latter-day Foreign Office archons, guiding America's way in the world. They were like Palmerston or Grey, modulating world affairs for good, but with realism and restraint. When they came into office they found an emotional allegiance among Americans to a progressive interpretation of national mission. It was this popular support that could be exploited in the pursuit of their strategic theories. The majority of Americans appeared to believe in a rigorous, "symmetrical" application of containment. So be it.

But their war went awry.

Intended as a kind of Yankee affirmation of the British imperial model, Vietnam soon was leashed by deeper native values. At first, the foreign and defense elite prosecuted a "brushfire war" as would Garnet Wolseley or Kitchener, but they did so with a draft army of civilians. The war could not, as in British experience, continue as long as was necessary. There was no tough, professional, all-but-impressed clutch of battle-hardened veteran regiments to battle the Ashanti or Zulu. Americans do not go to war unless it is a revolutionary, liberating, all-embracing struggle for reform. A coldly calculated exercise in great power diplomacy, playing with the lives of American boys, had always been taboo.

Worse, the war trampled upon the old myths of America itself. In Vietnam we were fighting like a corrupted European monarchy, insensitive to the squandered blood of our young men, pursuing objectives defined by a pseudoaristocratic elite. That this war was prosecuted by the party of reform and revolution (in recent mythic terms) and that its members developed the callous theories of "graduated response" and "signaling" only heightened the perception of corruption. The military was fighting the war, but a sinister band of academic and political sorcerers was pulling the strings.

It was the beginning of the end of the postwar world. In the process of defending the free world, the very values cherished by Americans (in contrast to their subjugation elsewhere) were diminished. It was inevitable tragedy to watch Lyndon Johnson (painted as an archetypal American) destroyed by the vanity that he could remain untarnished while aping empire; it was inevitable that we should also await the transmission of that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

corruption to us. Having essayed an imperial mission, what we did abroad had to come home.

Watergate only seemed to complete the prefigured denouement. It became an equally emotive symbol of America's fall from grace, straight from the vision of our own ancestors. The patterns of an evil foreign policy had in fact clearly permeated the very fabric of American life, and the soul of our political institutions.

Although it was the Democratic pragmatists among the Washington elite who created Vietnam (and their indistinguishable Republican counterparts who extended the metaphor to domestic corruption), it was the progressive mission that suffered. Its calling was crippled. It had failed because Vietnam was presented as an authentic American vision—hardly as an imperial venture—and that vision had gone terribly wrong.

The mission-standard Americans had followed after 1950 was discredited. There was a resurgence of a traditional, even nativist American worldview, for the most part strongly puritanical. Its shamans sought to purge us of our sins, to bring those who had led America astray back to grace. The tide crested in 1972, when the "corrupt" within the Democratic Party were purged. Purifier values had suddenly, strongly reasserted themselves in the definition of American foreign policy.

Ultimately, nativisms of the left and right margins captured the center, and the center ceased to dominate. In foreign policy, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan—both outsiders "running against Washington"—defined an authentic, even parochial sense of American mission, much to the horror of the foreign policy "community."

The pragmatic practitioners of the cold war foundered because they did not recognize the pervasive power of American myths, because they did not understand their own national ethos. They sought to emulate models that American people have characteristically found uncomfortable; worse, they practiced their arts without reference to the will of the people. Current pragmatic practitioners would do well to remember this.

VI

Ironically, Vietnam brought us back more intently to the myth of World War II, to the restatement of the just war, or as Studs Terkel cunningly sensed, *The Good War,* that it rep-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resents. By the end of the 1970s Americans could imagine such a war fought only in the strict image of France under Nazi jackboot or Britain under Nazi blitz. But a rerun was conceptually impossible: a Soviet assault implied almost certain nuclear escalation. We would destroy ourselves to save ourselves. Deterrence might work, but there could be no just nuclear war.

The severe restriction of our conception of the just war and of the national interest during the 1970s was reinforced from without by a popular sense of major change in world conditions. This American perception of a changing world was used, however unconsciously, to underscore the traditional revision of national mythos.

First, the image of the enemy was gradually reduced to adversary, then to mere competitor. This process was in part a natural product of the selling of détente. It promised "a generation of peace," in itself a pernicious pledge. Far worse was its implicit revision of the Soviet-American confrontation. If, after an epoch standoff at the brink, old cold warriors could suddenly link arms over champagne, then why the years of nuclear strain?

Through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, détente also revived the American purifier tradition of "peace reform." The old equation of peace through arms control and disarmament could be reestablished. The postwar truth of peace through strength then could be dismantled.

Second, world conditions as a whole seemed to have changed. The world system had been transformed again. What in 1945 had been beleaguered democracies were now healthy, powerful economies. Former enemies were now buttresses of the Western alliance. The vast colonial world was now the "developing world," calling itself the "Third World" between East and West.

America was reexamining its commitments to Western Europe and Japan. The dependence of their fat economies upon our defense began to look like usury to many Americans. Why, asked the most inflammatory, should we be saddled by perpetual strategic dependents who seemed intent on making us their economic dependents? Moreover, a young "Euro-generation" vocally equated the U.S. and Soviet states as morally equivalent. Why did the United States "pick up the bill" for defending Europe, and even go so far as to accept nuclear destruction in its defense, when its thronging demonstrators screamed that this was the last thing on their minds?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Third World had once been the focus of our postwar proselytizing: we saw in the newly independent states of Africa and Asia the hope of the future. Americans were confident that they would trust us, for had we ever intentionally sought overseas colonies? Had we not been the instrument of postwar decolonization? We lavished foreign aid upon them and waited for them to become, in Jefferson's phrase, little "eaglets" of the United States.

Instead, in the 1970s they turned on the United States. In the United Nations, in the form of the Group of 77, they took over the General Assembly and many U.N. agencies, and used the liberal forum of F.D.R. to attack America. The unfinished architecture of that dream of world order became the leasehold of squatters. The stature of the United Nations gave them an opportunity to promote their own local agendas and enhance their international standing—at America's expense.

Many Americans accepted the public lashing. It was even embraced as a kind of deserved public punishment for recent crimes, a cleansing at the hands of world opinion. It did not matter that many of the regimes excoriating the United States were themselves tyrannies of the most loathsome sort. In Vietnam, America had lost the right to judge others. Indeed, taken to its extreme, liberal values ended by declaring that all value systems were equal, and that for the United States to force its beliefs on other cultures was the worst form of imperialism.

The American breast-beating of the late 1970s was less a rejection of fundamental national myths than a celebration of them in their original form. American exceptionalism, American perfection, America as a model for others—these were myths stained by a long episode of national intervention. Only by returning to traditional values could America be cleansed, and rediscover itself. Both national parties made this quest their theme in 1976 and 1980; although the Democrats couched this process in terms of universal human rights and the Republicans in terms of particular domestic values, the goal of national purification was, and is, shared.

VII

Where does the American approach to the world stand in the 1980s? The dominant sense of American foreign policy behavior in this decade has been one of limitation. These limits can be described as a set of precepts, a rough chart of the ways

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

domestic values are shaping foreign policy and national security:

—Traditional (pre-1939) attitudes about the nature of America's relationship to the world coexist uneasily with postwar norms. Officially the United States is still committed to the defense of Western Europe, Japan and South Korea. The ANZUS and Rio treaties are still on the books, barely. The United States still swears to defend its commitments with nuclear force if necessary. Both Democrats and Republicans still pay lip service to a grand strategic concept of containing Soviet power. But the visible superstructure of the postwar world is gone. No one today could certify the strength of American commitment to others, as they could not measure others' ultimate fidelity to us.

—Major nativist lobbies in both the right and left wings of the major parties reinforce the sense that domestic political support of the postwar global mission continues to erode. There is a generalized belief that alliances remain stable only in the absence of crisis; but there is an equal apprehension that the continued absence of crisis also accelerates the process of dissolution.

—A pattern of American use of force has emerged during the last decade that implies very clear domestic limits on military action. The duration and scale of the response, and the political capital expended in doing anything military at all are advertisements to our adversaries. By choosing the time and place well, and by exploiting American public opinion, a skillful adversary can almost ensure American military abstention from regional crises.

—This emerging conviction on the part of friend and foe alike that American words are seldom backed by deeds creates a special pressure on U.S. diplomacy. Forceful diplomacy must be confined to the initial period after an election (which historically is the time when an American president is least capable of foreign policy assertion), when domestic political support should be greatest. Foreign perception of an American president's strength is seen today as a function only of his electoral charisma.

—The collective "truths" that emerged from American wars are unchanged. In this sense the received truths of Vietnam do not in themselves constitute a rejection of World War II, and ultimately of the Civil War model. To the contrary, Vietnam has been incorporated into the larger body of American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

myth. Both purifiers and progressives join ranks in longing for the just war. But as World War II becomes even more mythic as its veterans pass on, its iconography seems ever more rigid and unbending. It is harder than ever for younger American generations to relate contemporary conditions to the world of the 1930s, and yet that world, threatened by Hitler and fascism, is the only setting in the picture of national myth legitimizing the just war.

Any effective use of American military force must forge a bond with World War II and its transcendental heroic imagery; but perceived world conditions today evoke no resonance. The gap between myth and its reassertion was vividly evoked in the 1984 film *Red Dawn.* The only way in which director John Milius could bridge the distance between mythic American wars and his vision of a contemporary just war was to force a situation so absurd as to negate the idea itself: a Soviet invasion of the United States from Mexico and Alaska! His artistic desperation mirrors a profound American dilemma.

VIII

These precepts describe only limits. How did these limits operate during the Reagan era?

To some, Ronald Reagan appeared an atavism, an unregenerate cold warrior (or musing hoplite) seeking to recapture a halcyon age of American dominance. Given that he was born at around the same time, one might suggest that he be painted as an aged Jack Kennedy. Certainly his campaign rhetoric in 1980 echoed J.F.K. on the stump in 1960.

But for all his talk, Reagan's policies and programs reflect an emerging American nativism. At the end of his watch, Reagan has come to the arms control altar as eager as a Nixon or a Carter. Military force has been used, as it has been without exception since Vietnam, only when there has been no danger of escalation, only when such action could be limited in advance, and only where a sure escape route existed if things went sour. Reagan's trumpeted nuclear buildup has yielded a minor cache compared to Kennedy's majestic atomic arsenal. And his Strategic Defense Initiative frames an almost frantic appeal to a changing American worldview. The vision of strategic defense hearkens to an older, cherished picture of national security.

Weapons trumpeted for a cold war arsenal in 1981 have since been pitched in tones richly appealing to the old image

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the "Shield of the Republic." Reagan has abetted an erosion of the postwar paradigm of containment at its foundation: extended deterrence. Serious strategic defenses deny the legitimacy of nuclear use, and readiness for nuclear use *is* extended deterrence. Although Reagan was yielding to a yearning among Americans to "escape the nuclear trap," the snare was laid less by the weapons themselves than by the ironclad resolve that they be used.

Ultimately, Reagan's desire to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" is less important than his intent to do so. SDI reflects more than a generalized antinuclear yearning. It signals a renewed American urge, however latent, to revise the cold war commitments symbolized by nuclear use. Revision came with the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, but the terms had been couched years earlier. Remember, the "zero option" was Reagan's; the call for weapons, Europe's. Reagan's initial zest as a progressive shows in the early bidding on strategic nuclear forces. The zest was gone by 1984.

It is quite clear that Reagan did not succeed in reasserting the postwar progressive mission. The United States undertook no offensives against tyranny; in contrast, the progressive image of America as champion of freedom was reduced to furtive arms smuggling to the mental rimlands of civilization, in Angola, Nicaragua, Afghanistan. In the places where we actually used military force, our late twentieth-century behavior began to mirror nineteenth-century antecedents: our Libyan raid evoking the Barbary Coast in 1804 and our Iranian combats the quasi war with France in 1799. In practical and popular terms, America's armed forces had come again to protect Americans abroad. Their use might even be justified as necessary to uphold ancient liberal notions like the right of free passage at sea. But there has been no hint since 1980—not even in Reagan's most expansive speeches—of another crusade.

If anything, Reagan's exertions served to exhume the mythology of the American postwar progressive mission for examination, only to have the people reject it. If a single postulate could be found, a kind of core reality underpinning American attitudes about how we should approach the world, it is that the postwar world is over. This means three things.

First, Americans see a world different from the one to which we pledged our lives and fortunes in 1950. We fought and remained ready to fight through three generations to build a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world out of our beliefs: a democratic free world. It paid off. The states of the West are rich and free, and appear to be in no danger. The so-called Third World has gone its own way. It is not necessarily a bad world, but it is not necessarily worth dying for.

Second, although many Americans would be willing to fight for values at the core of our national myth—the "American way of life"—we question whether these values are really threatened the way they were in 1941. The Soviet Union seems in serious decline. The threat has receded each year since 1981. In contrast, our allies promise to challenge the American way more than any rogue Leninist. So the need for sacrifice, too, is gone.

Third, if national values are no longer threatened at the center, as they were during the postwar era, then the danger is at the margins, in the Third World. Here in the galaxy of the American belief system are both good and bad states, people some want to help and societies some long to reform. Reagan sought to help rebels in Angola and Afghanistan and Nicaragua. His loyal opposition would do the same for dissident groups in South Africa. The impulse to intervene is the same. So are its limits. In contrast to the postwar era, the reasons for intervention now emerge from a domestic debate over the American identity and our national purpose. No longer do our allies rally to consensus calls for the defense of the free world.

What was left of the good-war-as-crusade died in Vietnam. Today, as in earlier times, the United States has its interests and the lives of its citizens to defend. We continue as well to call (according to domestic political stripe) for the nurturing of new "eaglets" in the Third World, as long as their suckling or succoring does not risk our own corruption.

The American approach to the world shifted after 1980. We simply have not yet surveyed the watershed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

POINTERS FROM THE PAST

To the Editor:

Interpreting the larger tendencies and broader patterns of world history is, by its very nature, an intellectually risky business. The mere fact of generalizing across centuries and continents disturbs the orthodox professionals, whose own focus upon a single decade or region probably represents over 99 percent of all historical studies. The necessity to synthesize and make sense of vast amounts of secondary literature irritates the narrow specialist, who holds that it is improper to comment on, for instance, the policies of Gustavus Adolphus without years of research in the Swedish archives. Above all, perhaps, an author's attempt to point to the broader patterns of world history will provoke a response from critics who have their own, and very different, interpretations. Such disagreements will be the livelier if those critics sense that a new publication may also challenge their beliefs about the present and the future. As Marxists recognized long ago, just how the past is interpreted will always be a significant part of contemporary political disputes. "Pointers from the past" are, after all, trying to point us in a particular direction.

To that extent, W. W. Rostow's lengthy assault upon *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* in the Spring 1988 issue of *Foreign Affairs* is both perfectly natural and welcome. To be sure, anyone who reads a sustained critique of one's latest book in a journal as eminent as *Foreign Affairs* is bound to have mixed feelings: a dissatisfaction at the reviewer's failure to appreciate the volume in question, and a (admittedly only compensatory) satisfaction at the fact that one's arguments are getting such an airing. Ultimately the feelings of satisfaction must prevail; for does not the present heat generated by the debate over "lessons from the past" (or more accurately, over which "lessons" should be drawn from the past) suggest that we finally may be having our revenge on Henry Ford's well-known aphorism that history is bunk? If he had been right, then why should syndicated columnists across the country now be jostling to offer their opinions on the extent to which the past can offer pointers to the future?

Perhaps the real answer to the second question is that, while demonstrating by their very actions that they do not think history is bunk, journalists, politicians, reviewers and other sorts of pundits know that it is a very useful "grab bag" out of which materials for all sorts of interpretation can be plucked. In this connection, Ernest May's 1973 publication, *"Lessons" of the Past* still merits careful reading, perhaps especially by those who continue to use the term "appeasement" as if nothing in the historiography of the 1930s has altered since Churchill's *The Gathering Storm.*

Into this historical grab bag, of course, all reviewers have the right to grope, in the hope of bringing up evidence to counter the author's own interpretation of the past. But whatever counterargument they then pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duce deserves the same scrutiny they have given the book in question, especially when they make such a point about the problems of using analogies from the past.

This seems particularly necessary in the case of Professor Rostow's critique because of the peculiar but ultimately unsatisfactory emphasis he places upon the distinction between "hegemonic" and "balance-of-power" states in the 500-year story of *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.* Laymen who have not noticed this distinction raised in any other review of my book may be bemused at such an emphasis, as well they should; professional scholars, well used to the way in which history is raided for examples and counter-examples, will be far less moved.

The idea that great-power politics since the Renaissance can be seen as a struggle between certain states that strive for continental "hegemony" and others that counter with a "balance-of-power" policy is not a new one. It is, perhaps, best described in its "pure" form in Ludwig Dehio's 1962 classic *The Precarious Balance.* In Dehio's rendition of events, Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Hitler led the five successive attempts to achieve European (and, to some degree, global) mastery, but they all were finally brought down by a coalition of "flank" powers, most notably Britain and Russia, and later the United States, which combined to oppose such hegemonic strivings. It was very much a tale of the good guys defeating the bad guys; and for a post-1945 German author fearful that the Soviet Union might become the new "hegemon," it was a useful one to lay before Anglo-American readers.

But the problem about employing such categorizations, as Mr. Rostow should well know, is that the issue is far more complex than those simple distinctions allow. After all, much of the recent interest in studying "hegemons" and "hegemonic regimes" in world politics has come from scholars in the field of international political economy, seeking to analyze the periods when the global trading and financial system appeared to center on one preeminent national economy. From this perspective, it is Great Britain itself, and later the United States, that are seen as the "hegemonic" powers, and the others that somehow have to relate to that hegemony. This is a point of more than semantic interest, since it is possible that many great-power clashes in the past were caused chiefly by one nation's fear of a rival's *economic* power. According to Mr. Rostow's fixed categorizations, one might conclude that the English should not have engaged in the three Anglo-Dutch wars of the seventeenth century (which were overwhelmingly "trade" wars), because their job was to preserve the European balance of power from the growing ambitions of France. Alas, nations often do not understand their function in world affairs in the way later interpreters do.

One might go on for a long time here, delving into the grab bag of history to show that the distinctions Mr. Rostow makes are all too often subjective rather than objective in nature; or, to put it crudely, that one nation's "balance-of-power" policy is viewed in another capital as a "hegemonic" striving. Denmark in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century so often gravitated toward a French alliance because it resented Britain's overweening, "hegemonic" policies at sea. A century later, Germans under Wilhelm II spluttered with indignation at what they considered to be the British hypocrisy of wanting a balance of power on land but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

undisputed mastery for the Royal Navy at sea. The Russian equivalent of this twin-track policy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was to preserve the power equilibrium within Europe while systematically expanding across Asia; to the peoples of Transcaucasia, the tsarist regime could hardly be viewed as a "system-stabilizing" flank power.

Yet even if we leave aside these cautionary remarks about Mr. Rostow's categorizations, the chief flaw in his critique still remains to be noted: it is the questionable relevance, in terms of a great power's capacity to remain successful and flourishing for generation after generation, of whether it sees itself (or is seen to be) as either a "hegemonic" or a "balance-of-power" nation. To be sure, an arrogant, hubristic state (like Napoleon's France or Wilhelm II's Germany) that tries to swallow more than it can chew is likely to exhaust its resources more swiftly than a power with fewer ambitions; and if that arrogance is sufficient to provoke a counter-coalition of great powers to mobilize their larger combined resources to prevail, it will meet its fate. If it fails to match its ends with its means—as hubristic powers have a greater tendency to do—it will pay the penalty.

But what Mr. Rostow apparently does not see is that this inability to match ends with means has brought down all sorts of countries, whether "hegemonic" or not, and whether they sought to revise or maintain the existing order. What ultimately counted was not their status, but their relative national strength. From the 1660s onward, for example, the Dutch found that they had increasingly to concentrate on beating back the "hegemonic" strivings of Louis XIV's France; a half-century later, that aim had been achieved (by a coalition), but the United Provinces was no longer in the ranks of the great powers. Again, from 1871 onward, and more particularly after 1919, the chief aim of French statesmen was to preserve a European balance of power in the face of Germany's massive economic and military expansion. It was a natural, and one might say worthy, sentiment—only partly aided by France's allies. But it could not gainsay the fact that the wellsprings of French power no longer sufficed to carry out its policy successfully. A "balance-of-power" strategy, like a "hegemonic" strategy, still required the power concerned to have the strength to achieve its aims.

We can now see why Mr. Rostow's singling out of Britain's historic "balance-of-power" role, and his argument that the United States since 1945 has occupied much the same position, is both less pertinent and less comforting than he would have us believe. It is less pertinent because Britain itself, all the Churchillian rhetoric and leadership notwithstanding, found it impossible to carry out an effective "balance-of-power" strategy when its own relative economic strength had ebbed. By 1945 Hitler's power had been destroyed much more comprehensively than Louis XIV's power in 1714; but Britain, like the Dutch Republic before it, was stepping out of the first ranks.

And Mr. Rostow's analogy is also much less comforting for the United States as it heads toward the 21st century—not because his proposed diplomacy of working with allies in Europe and East Asia to preserve the "balance of power" is wrong, but because he brushes aside the relative erosion of this country's manufacturing and financial strength since the 1950s. By a supreme irony, Mr. Rostow's little anecdote about President

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kennedy's 1961 remark weakens rather than strengthens his case: "We've forty percent [of the free world's power]. . . ." Are we still far ahead now? And will we still be so in 2000 or 2020 if we fail to renew the wellsprings of our national strength, produce our own engineers, and manufacture our own microchips?

There is much to be debated about how far the United States needs to go in restructuring both its external diplomatic and military policies and its internal economic policies, in order to readjust to the changing global order and to preserve its more essential national interests. But that discussion cannot be initiated in the brief space permitted here, and will have to wait for another time. It is encouraging that in some of those areas, it seems to me, Mr. Rostow and I are not too far apart in our prescriptions. But moving toward such long-term policies will not be aided by evoking dubious historical analogies, especially of the Churchill v. Chamberlain category. Nor will it be aided by reading into history's grab bag to produce bemusing distinctions of a country's status in the international system, rather than focusing on those underpinnings of power that have affected *all* nations, whatever policy they choose to pursue.

PAUL KENNEDY
Yale University

The reviewer replies:

In response to Mr. Kennedy, I shall deal with only four major points:

1. *Hegemony v. balance of power.* Kennedy first sets out to blur the distinction between a hegemonic and balance-of-power policy, but he evades an issue fundamental to his book and my review; i.e., the charge that U.S. foreign policy post-1945 sought hegemony in Europe and Asia. From his response I conclude that he has dropped that characterization and substituted a new charge: that Britain and the United States were each, in its time, hegemonic "global and financial" powers. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the pre-1914 world economic system did *not* depend on British economic hegemony (see, particularly, my *Rich Countries and Poor Countries,* 1987, Chapter 9). After all, British foreign trade fell from 25 percent to 16 percent of the world total between 1870 and 1914; its industrial production, from 32 percent to 14 percent. The system nevertheless worked because all the major players accepted rules of the game that kept the world's prices and business fluctuations roughly in step. The point is currently relevant. If the major economic states are in time to create a successor to the Bretton Woods system—as they should—they will have to focus on rules of the game acceptable to all rather than on the instructions of an economic "hegemon" that never existed except for a few post-1945 years.

2. *Resources and a balance-of-power policy.* Accepting my distinction, Kennedy next argues that even a balance-of-power nation can be "brought down" for lack of adequate "relative national strength." He cites, in particular, France after 1919 and Britain after 1945. The tragedy of interwar France was not that it commanded in 1936–38 only five percent of the world's industrial production rather than Germany's 11 percent. It was that at Versailles the United States refused to give France the security guarantees it demanded as the price for a generous treaty with Germany.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interwar Britain, as well, took its distance from France at critical moments. At that time, Britain, France and the United States commanded 46 percent of the world's industrial production. If they had stood in firm coalition in the 1930s, the Second World War could have been prevented. Similarly, the failure of Britain to seize leadership in the movement toward European unity after 1945 was not the result of its having stepped "out of the first ranks." It failed to lead Europe because British political life was divided on postwar foreign policy; and an even more gravely weakened pre-1958 France took the European lead.

In short, relative economic power is not irrelevant; but countries are "brought down" by ill-advised pursuit of hegemony or by failure to form and sustain adequate anti-hegemonic coalitions—not by the numbers.

3. *Can the United States sustain an economic base for a successful long-term balance-of-power policy?* I was pleased that Kennedy, in his letter, aligns himself with "right-wing patriots" (and Democratic presidential candidates) in calling for a renewal of the wellsprings of the nation's economic strength. But one doesn't have to go back to the Hapsburgs to perceive that the U.S. fiscal and trade deficits of the 1980s and the Third World debt problem constitute major challenges. Whether or not they and the related Japanese and German surpluses are handled wisely by the world community will evidently have far-reaching strategic consequences. Linked to these concerns is the problem of adjusting to and exploiting productively the massive and pervasive technological revolution now under way. More than any other single factor, it is the challenge of the technological revolution that explains the curious fact that "restructuring" is going on quite self-consciously in every major economy. And, as Mr. Gorbachev insists, the outcome will affect the relative Soviet power position in the world. That is true for every other major nation-state.

As for the American *perestroika*, one can be as pessimistic or optimistic as one chooses concerning a process still under way. But on the specific points Kennedy cites, the American position is somewhat better than he suggests. Manufacturing, for example, is now leading American growth; and a good many American industries virtually written off a few years back are proving internationally competitive after re-equipment and the emergence of a more rational exchange rate. We did lose a good deal of the standard mass chip market; but demand is shifting to custom chips, where our position and prospects are better. More generally, the country is alive with more than 50 substantial high-technology concentrations, each the product of a partnership among universities, industry, state or local governments, and, often, the unions. We remain a vital continental society with many centers of initiative. As for the "supreme irony" of President Kennedy's quote, the latest World Bank data indicate that in 1985 the United States produced 45.9 percent of the output of the noncommunist industrial world; France, 6.4 percent; Britain, 5.5 percent.

These are among the assets that a strong and purposeful national administration could organize to accelerate revival at home and, in cooperation with others, to rebalance a distorted international economy. As I wrote in my review, there is a place in this process of domestic and international renewal for some redistribution of the burdens of the common

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense and assistance to developing nations. But there is every reason to strengthen—not weaken—the structure of our alliances.

Does America command the resources and technological competence to sustain such a policy? Of course it does. Whether it will do so is a matter of nerve, will and leadership.

4. *Churchill v. Chamberlain and all that.* It is evident that Kennedy is preoccupied with what he regards as the failed wisdom of Chamberlain and the pre-1939 wrongheadedness of Churchill. Since none of us has a monopoly on truth, historical analysis jerkily moves forward on waves of revisionism and counter-revisionism. As one who spent 1936–38 in England, heard William Joyce ("Lord Haw-Haw") orate fascist doctrine at Carfax and Churchill urge a pact with the U.S.S.R. at the Oxford Union, was harangued by Ambassador Joseph Kennedy at Rhodes House and Nancy Astor at Cliveden on the inevitable destruction of capitalism if we were to fight Hitler, and then discussed these matters in great detail with my contemporaries, I can, perhaps, be excused if I am unimpressed by the new "historiography of the 1930s" as exemplified by A.J.P. Taylor and Paul Kennedy. There is no perspective generated by the recent revisionist literature that was not a familiar part of the intense discussion among students at the time.

I raise the issue not to reargue the past but because I believe the debate is relevant to the choice of policy before the United States. Brought up as our generation was on *Journey's End*, *What Price Glory* and other antiwar literature, none of us had any illusions about the probable costs of the war that would follow a confrontation with Hitler. Some were attracted by the time Britain might buy if, in effect, the Continent were turned over to Hitler; others by the dream of a stalemated war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. What tipped the balance for most of my contemporaries were two considerations: the longer-run consequences for Britain of accepting the status of a dependent island off a Hitler-dominated mainland; and, equally, a sense that a Britain that made such a deal would not be worth living in.

Kennedy's counsel that the United States should risk unhinging the delicate balance of its alliances to increase marginally the resources available for the domestic economy also, it seems to me, fails to take into account accelerated nuclear proliferation and other dangerous and expensive longer-run consequences of a dilution or withdrawal of our commitments to others. It also risks demeaning the quality and purposes of our national life.

W. W. Rostow
University of Texas

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

NEW FORCES, OLD FORCES AND THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLITICS. By Seyom Brown. Glenview (Ill.): Scott, Foresman, 1988, 334 pp.

As in his earlier writings, Seyom Brown displays a tempered combination of vision and common sense. Most of his book is devoted to describing those trends—physical, technological, economic and social—which are changing the nature of international relations. Looking to the future, Brown sees a world in which superpower bipolarity, the cohesion of alliances and the sovereignty of states have all eroded, moving the world toward a system of "polyarchy" with new problems and challenges. Will leaders and nations have the political creativity to deal with them? The importance of the book lies mainly in its potential for helping them to understand the underlying forces at work. Whether the author's specific suggestions point the way is an open question. He makes no exaggerated claims in that respect.

THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF WESTERNIZATION. By Theodore H. Von Laue. New York: Oxford, 1988, 396 pp. $24.95.

Large portions of this book constitute a standard summary history of the twentieth century. What gives it distinction is the way in which Von Laue plays on the dominant theme of Western power, productivity and influence as they have spread from the western edge of Europe eastward to Russia, Asia, and in time to the entire world, meeting the resistance of other cultures but also inevitably evoking imitation—Westernization by anti-Westernizers. But this Westernized world remains one of mutual incomprehension, mistrust and fear. The book is written with verve, peppered with original insights along with questionable generalizations, and it proceeds with a kind of Spenglerian sweep to its deeply pessimistic conclusions.

AN AGENDA FOR THE 21st CENTURY. Edited by Rushworth M. Kidder. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988, 216 pp. $14.95.

The main challenges of the future as seen, in brief compass, by 22 "leading thinkers" from diverse countries and walks of life. The book takes the form of interviews skillfully conducted and reported by an editor of *The Christian Science Monitor*, where they originally appeared. The issues mentioned most frequently are already quite familiar: the nuclear threat, overpopulation, degradation of the environment, the gap between the developed and underdeveloped world, the restructuring of education and the breakdown of public and private morality. Judging from the pace of invention forecast by some of the scientists in the group, there will be other challenges not now foreseen.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. Edited by Lawrence S. Finkelstein. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1988, 503 pp. $65.00 (paper, $22.50).

Professor Finkelstein and his colleagues look at all the actors involved in the U.N. and its operations—not only member states but also international bodies, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, high U.N. officials and others—all those attempting to protect their interests, gain influence and prestige, or serve their cause by playing the game of politics in U.N. forums and activities. As to where, after 40 years, the U.N. and its specialized agencies stand in respect of their structure and functions, their usefulness and their limitations, one cannot find a better and more professional review. The authors avoid overvaluation of the place of the U.N. in world politics and also the often popular extreme of dismissal and disdain.

THE RISE AND FALL OF UNESCO. By S. Nihal Singh. Riverdale (Md.): Riverdale Company, 1988, 137 pp. $25.00.

A thumbnail history of UNESCO by an Indian newspaper editor, who hits the high spots and main issues with cool realism and mercifully refrains from going at length into the budget battles and endless discussions. He is serious about the word "fall," even should America and Britain return to the fold, for "in today's atomized world it is impossible to have an intergovernmental organization honestly debate intellectual issues," much less banish war from the minds of men.

REVOLUTIONARIES AND FUNCTIONARIES: THE DUAL FACE OF TERRORISM. By Richard Falk. New York: Dutton, 1988, 211 pp. $16.95.

Professor Falk takes exception to "mainstream" definitions of terrorism and the measures often taken to counter it. The gravamen of his argument is that the terrorism of "functionaries"—of governments themselves, including the U.S. government—when they engage in violent action which harms innocent people (as in the raid on Libya in April 1986), is as culpable as that of bomb-throwing leftists or nationalist revolutionaries. He does less than justice to others who have thought and written on the subject, and his own ideas are not exactly original, but his book has something useful to say and says it forcefully.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Gregory F. Treverton

NATO AND THE UNITED STATES: THE ENDURING ALLIANCE. By Lawrence S. Kaplan. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1988, 256 pp. $24.95 (paper, $10.95).

Written as NATO approaches its fortieth anniversary—and thus not its "successor generation" but its "second successor generation"—this is as good a short history of the alliance as there is. It covers the period through the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershings at the end of 1983, and it concludes with a perceptive look backward and forward.

IRON DESTINIES, LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND THE U.S.S.R., 1945–1987. By Charles R. Morris. New York: Bessie/Harper & Row, 1988, 544 pp. $22.95.

This history of postwar arms competition and arms control between the superpowers is vividly told and richly documented.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REFORMING DEFENSE: THE STATE OF AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. By David C. Hendrickson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, 152 pp. $24.50.

This slim volume, a companion to the author's *The Future of American Strategy*, is a graceful summary of recent initiatives in military reform, especially that led by Gary Hart. Moreover, it goes on to locate that debate in the larger terrain of the civil-military, echoing Samuel Huntington's conclusion of 30 years ago that "a lesser measure of civilian control and lower standards of military professionalism are the continuing prices the American people will have to pay for the other benefits of their constitutional system." And Hendrickson's conclusions about the strategic implications of reform are provocative: it would "weaken one of the primary pillars of deterrence in Europe . . . and . . . deprive the United States of the military instruments whose use would be most consistent with the limited nature of American interests throughout the Third World."

HOW TO STOP A WAR. By James E. Dunnigan and William Martel. New York: Doubleday, 1987, 312 pp. $18.95.
WAR AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL SYSTEM. By William K. Domke. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, 209 pp. $22.50.

Dunnigan is a specialist in war games and Martel a RAND analyst. Their breezy book surveys 200 years of wars that happened and those that didn't. Its conclusions are reassuringly commonsensical: very large wars are difficult to get started, hence rare (only four in 200 years); ignorance of the enemy makes war more likely, as does ignorance of the possibility of war; the military usually recommends against military solutions; and nuclear weapons seem to have prevented major wars. Domke's data base is similar, though his purposes are more explicitly theoretical: for instance, does "interdependence" make war less likely? It does seem to; trading nations have been less likely to go to war.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s. Edited by John Simpson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 237 pp.
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD NUCLEAR ORDER. By Lawrence Scheinman. Washington: Resources for the Future, 1987, 320 pp.

That the proliferation of nuclear weapons is not higher on the international agenda is perhaps cause for modest optimism, and both these books reflect that posture. The Nonproliferation Treaty formally expires in 1995, and that event is the point of departure for the Simpson book. It brings together an impressive group of analysts from around the world; particularly interesting are Lewis Dunn's chapter on possible futures and Joseph Pilat's on a world without the NPT. Lawrence Scheinman examines the strength and weaknesses of another key part of the nonproliferation regime, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the perspective of one who knows only too well that stopping proliferation is in the end a political task, not a technical one. That realization makes his recommendations for improving the IAEA appropriately modest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SEEKING STABILITY IN SPACE: ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND THE EVOLVING SPACE REGIME. Edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and James A. Schear. Washington: University Press of America, 1987, 167 pp. An Aspen Strategy Group Publication.

INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLICY. Edited by Daniel S. Papp and John R. McIntyre. Westport (Conn.): Quorum Books, 1987, 328 pp. $47.95.

Both these volumes depart from the premise that space is the next frontier, and together they amount to a useful primer on the military and civilian uses of space. The Nye-Schear volume addresses the military dimension (satellites and weapons that might threaten them); the contributors are a roster of distinguished experts. The Papp-McIntyre book also takes up military questions but is most useful on the civil side, and, especially, in sorting out the clashing military and civilian interests in the framing of space policy.

DEADLY PARADIGMS: THE FAILURE OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY. By D. Michael Shafer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, 331 pp. $34.50.

Counterinsurgency, now joined with the newer label "low intensity conflict," is back in official fashion, but serious studies of the subject remain few. This effort to remedy that lack relies on three case studies—Greece, the Philippines and Vietnam before 1965. It is thought-provoking, much more so in its discussion of cases than in its broad conclusions, which sound like the liberal cant about Vietnam: American policymakers "have misunderstood the sources of insurgency . . . and overestimated the United States' role as an outside promoter of security and development."

ASSESSING THE VIETNAM WAR. Edited by Lloyd J. Mathews and Dale E. Brown. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987, 254 pp.

This collection of articles from *Parameters*, the journal of the U.S. Army War College, is a handy summary of the military's reappraisal of its role in Vietnam. It includes a pithy summary of Harry G. Summers' *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1982/83). His critique is broad: the United States mistook the war for a revolution and so focused on the Viet Cong instead of the real enemy, North Vietnamese regular forces. Summers' article makes intriguing reading together with Hung Nyugen's discussion of Hanoi's war plan, which argues that an enclave strategy would have played to Hanoi's Achilles' heel—the necessary links among locals, guerrillas and main force units—and also with Norman B. Hannah's *The Key To Failure* (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1988).

HEDLEY BULL ON ARMS CONTROL. Selected and introduced by Robert O'Neill and David N. Schwartz. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 302 pp.

Hedley Bull's death in 1985 at the age of 52 deprived strategy studies of one of its most unconventional, innovative thinkers. This volume is a reminder of just how great the loss was. His *The Control of the Arms Race*, published in 1962 when he was still in his twenties, is a classic; even when he turned out to be wrong—for instance, in underestimating just how stable the superpower nuclear balance would be—he reminds us how much the concepts we now take for granted owe to him. He was, as Michael Howard said, "the delight and terror of every conference he attended."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Those of us who carry the scars from his penetrating insights do so gratefully.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

TRADING PLACES: HOW WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO TAKE THE LEAD. By Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr. New York: Basic Books, 1988, 384 pp. $19.95.

Six years in the Department of Commerce and experience before that in business in Japan have given Mr. Prestowitz a collection of telling illustrations of how Japan runs its economy. The most interesting parts of the book, however, are his accounts—often firsthand—of American trade negotiations with Japan and why they have so often failed. He wants the United States to "wake up" and make economic strength a national objective. Many Japanese, he says, would like to see this as they are happier not trying to displace the United States as a leader. One can quarrel with the author on a number of points but his book cannot be brushed aside (and it is interesting to find officials of the Reagan Administration regretting the lack of an industrial policy).

JAPAN, DISINCORPORATED: THE ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION PROCESS. By Leon Hollerman. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1988, 180 pp. $19.95 (paper, $12.95).

The liberalization of the Japanese economy, domestically and internationally, has presented "a spectacle of interministerial rivalry, bureaucratic infighting, and conflict between government and business that normally would be papered over and concealed from public view." Taking advantage of this situation, one of the most acute American observers of the Japanese economy provides an interesting, complicated and often very detailed analysis of the liberalization process, with special attention to financial liberalization and the operations of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. He finds much ambiguity even where consensus is said to exist and makes good use of conflicting answers to his questions. For the future he thinks it likely that the oligopolies will reestablish themselves in government and business in an economy where "Japan, Reincorporated" will concentrate on finance, high technology, and being the headquarters for offshore production of the manufactured goods it used to export.

ADJUSTMENT, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: ASPECTS OF MONETARY COOPERATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Jozef M. Van Brabant. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 480 pp. $49.50.

In this valuable study, a leading expert on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON) deals comprehensively with the financial and monetary aspects of relations among the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. His systematic analysis, building on much past work, shows clearly why efforts at "socialist economic integration" have had such limited results. National price structures are likely to remain a persistent obstacle. There is an interesting examination of East-West economic relations and those among the socialist countries. The book

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ends with 1986 and the author leaves until next time the effort "to take more fully into account the implications of the evolving transformations in Eastern Europe."

CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM AND COEXISTENCE. By John Kenneth Galbraith and Stanislav Menshikov. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988, 225 pp. $17.95.

This recorded version of several days' talk covers most of the principal economic issues of the day, along with some comments on armaments and superpower attitudes. Mr. Menshikov, who has been an economist for the U.N. and for the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and is now an editor of the *World Marxist Review*, is a strong supporter of the Gorbachev reforms and argues that if they succeed they will produce superior socialism, not a variant of capitalism. Mr. Galbraith has some kind things to say about markets, prices and entrepreneurs, along with some suggestions for improvement (with some differences from his past views). Both are great enemies of bureaucracy, governmental and corporate. Not too much of what they say is highly original. But the book makes a good sophisticated primer about present and future issues, although the dialogue form does not really do justice to two good talkers.

IN SEARCH OF STABILITY: EXPLORATIONS IN HISTORICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Charles S. Maier. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 293 pp. $29.95 (paper, $10.95).

In this well-integrated collection of first-rate papers, a Harvard historian explores some key characteristics of Western Europe and American policy toward it after two world wars. He finds a unifying theme in the effort to create stability but is well aware of the complexity of that process, and of the concept itself.

ADMINISTERED PROTECTION IN AMERICA. By Alan M. Rugman and Andrew D.M. Anderson. London: Croom Helm/New York: Methuen, 1988, 148 pp. $45.00.

This very good indictment of the way the United States applies its laws against foreign dumping and subsidies makes detailed use of Canadian experience in fish, lumber and other products. There are a few polemical patches and some debatable distinctions between kinds of subsidies, but the two Canadian economists demonstrate that inadequate evidence, a bias in favor of domestic producers, weak concepts of "injury" and considerable exposure to political pressure often mar the extraordinarily complex American laws and procedures for countering "unfair trade."

BILATERALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY. Edited by William Diebold, Jr. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988, 206 pp. $16.95. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

How will the latest and largest example of bilateralism affect what's left of the multilateral ethos that has shaped our open trading system? Using the Canadian-U.S. free trade area as a starting point, contributors from these two countries and Mexico consider this question from various perspectives. Diebold's concluding chapter finds that bilateral actions need not always undermine multilateralism. Indeed, a suitably oriented "new bilateralism" could initiate constructive interplay between the two forms. His

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discussion underlying this position reveals intimate understanding of new realities that now limit attainable progress in international trade policy, and deserves careful consideration by those preparing its next steps.

Sperry Lea

THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: 102 OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL COMPANIES OUTSIDE AMERICA. By Milton Moskowitz. New York: Macmillan, 1987, 708 pp. $24.95.

The histories and personalities behind such refulgent names as Lonrho, Mitsubishi, Rio Tinto (sadly now renamed), Hoffman-La Roche, Krupp, Trusthouse Forte, Broken Hill, Swedish Match, and Jardine, Matheson—and the Hard Rock Café! In addition to being informative, the book is delightful reading.

Lucy Edwards Despard

BUYING INTO AMERICA: HOW FOREIGN MONEY IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION. By Martin and Susan Tolchin. New York: Times Books, 1988, 400 pp. $19.95.

Excellent exposition, limited analysis and abbreviated conclusions mark this book, which is timely, although inevitably it has not kept up with the very latest events. Comprehensive overall data are brought down to earth in a series of well-told episodes. The variety of forms of foreign investment in the United States is displayed, but not very much is made of the significance of the differences or their potential. The briefly stated recommendations for policy make a good case for better information but leave the arguments for "reciprocity," regulation and a "level playing field" without much useful exploration.

THE RISE OF THE PHOENIX: THE UNITED STATES IN A RESTRUCTURED WORLD ECONOMY. By Jack N. Behrman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 104 pp. $12.85 (paper).

After a trenchant sketch of the reasons for the decline in American competitiveness that blames business as well as the government, Professor Behrman of the University of North Carolina argues that there have to be new rules for world trade and investment. The old ones broke down because they did not provide what many countries regarded as an equitable distribution of benefits. The way out is not through new global rules, but by a series of regional and sectoral arrangements for relatively free trade based on something like an agreed allocation of production; the structure of investments is to be worked out by multinational corporations and local suppliers. The novelty and difficulty of some parts of this prescription will remind readers that the phoenix is a fabled bird.

MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES. By Charles Wolf, Jr. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988, 220 pp. $18.95. A RAND Corporation Research Study.

Economists have long had a list of "market failures" that justified government intervention, but the results of intervention have not always been good. Dr. Wolf of RAND has worked out some persuasive propositions about the nature and causes of failure when nonmarket mechanisms are used. The careful formulation is helpful; the substance is not very new.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN INDUSTRIALISM. Edited by Frederic C. Deyo. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1987, 252 pp. $29.95 (paper, $12.95).

The authors of this volume feel the need of a theoretical explanation for the remarkable economic performance of the newly industrializing countries of East Asia. They emerge from their inquiries—or at least the editor does—with the view that governments acquire a "strategic capability" to carry out effective development policies through a combination of domestic authoritarianism, good favorable links with the external world and efficient economic institutions. He hedges on Hong Kong.

THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY. Edited by Richard Portes and Alexander K. Swoboda. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 307 pp. $42.50 (paper, $16.95).

Well-designed inquiries about financial crises, government regulation and measures to reduce risk make this a most useful volume. The papers are by academics and the commentaries by bankers and officials from a number of countries.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS. Edited by A. Michael Spence and Heather A. Hazard. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988, 280 pp. $34.95 (paper, $14.95).

Although the papers are quite miscellaneous—ranging from general essays through quite technical analyses to case studies—their high quality makes this a good, if inconclusive, addition to the debate about what really counts in making industries competitive. It also shows that good economists are taking industrial policy more seriously than they used to.

RICH COUNTRIES AND POOR COUNTRIES. By W. W. Rostow. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 194 pp. $34.50.

These ten essays are more or less tied together by their relation to Professor Rostow's reexamination of the history of economic thinking about growth and his speculations about the future spread of new technologies. In spite of some repetition, the sweep of the arguments is often stimulating.

LONG CYCLES: PROSPERITY AND WAR IN THE MODERN AGE. By Joshua S. Goldstein. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, 433 pp. $45.00 (paper, $19.95).

This ambitious effort to discern past long cycles in both socioeconomic matters and in hegemonies suggests that they cannot be projected into the future with any certainty because the world is changing. Nevertheless, the next few decades will be a dangerous time if the cycles continue.

BANKING ON THE WORLD: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE. By Jeffry A. Frieden. New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 264 pp. $19.95.

Bankers have influenced American foreign policy but have also been checked by counterforces. Jeffry Frieden tells the story of the periods after the two world wars in a popular (and sometimes populist) manner. The contemporary version of the issue he finds in the familiar problems of interdependence; here his analysis is disappointingly weak and his narrative wanders into the well-trodden fields of debt, Eurocurrencies and trade.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States

Gaddis Smith

DEMOCRATIC BLUEPRINTS: 40 NATIONAL LEADERS CHART AMERICA'S FUTURE. Edited by Robert E. Levin. New York: Hippocrene, 1988, 533 pp. $19.95.

The authors are Democratic Party presidential candidates, senators, congressmen, mayors and publicists. Their essays are mostly standard speeches slightly revised. The emphasis is overwhelmingly economic: we must restore competitiveness is the reiterated cry. Difficult issues of class, race and social conflict are slighted. There is little discussion of foreign and defense issues except for some bland criticism of wasteful military expenditures, some grumbling over economic rivals, and a good piece on Third World debt by Bill Bradley. Sadly, there is almost no evidence here that Democratic leaders are thinking of America's future in a world context.

BLOWBACK: U.S. RECRUITMENT OF NAZIS AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE COLD WAR. By Christopher Simpson. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988, 398 pp. $19.95.

THE PAPERCLIP CONSPIRACY: THE HUNT FOR THE NAZI SCIENTISTS. By Tom Bower. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988, 309 pp. $19.95.

Simpson's is a bloodhound of a book. An enterprising journalist, he has used the Freedom of Information Act to unearth massive documentation on how U.S. intelligence agencies at the end of World War II secretly protected, recruited and utilized many a Nazi or Nazi collaborator with a tainted past. In establishing facts he does an impressive job—and it is not a pretty story (although certainly a fascinating one). His broader judgments, however, raise a few questions. One would hardly know from his account that the Soviet Union had anything to do with the onset of the cold war, or that the West had any legitimate concern with the suppression of freedom in Eastern Europe. The severe critique of American officials applies to everyone—from Truman, Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers (especially Allen, of course) and George Kennan down to the many operatives in the CIC, CIA and other agencies who did the dirty work—the brand of deceptiveness, cynicism, amorality and manic obsession with the Soviet threat. The book's title refers to the supposedly corrupting effect of these unsavory Nazis and collaborators on political life in America; here the case made by the author is less than convincing, more blowup than blowback.

The Paperclip Conspiracy, a similar combination of investigative journalism and historical research, deals more intensively with one aspect of the story told by Simpson: the race among the major allied powers to corral and use for their own national purposes the scientists who had contributed so much to Hitler's war effort. In the context of their phenomenal achievements, which the author describes in ample detail, it is not surprising that many military men on the Allied side were more interested in their expertise (and in keeping it out of the hands of rivals) than in their pasts. There was a legitimate question of national interest, although in practice the end was held to justify the most questionable of means. Not so shrill or indiscriminately accusatory as Simpson, Bower comes to much the same conclusions on the U.S. handling of ex-Nazis. He also goes at length into the little-known story of how some officials, mainly in the State Department, fought

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hard against the deception and law-bending that accompanied the entire process. John C. Campbell

THE PATH TO VIETNAM: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Andrew J. Rotter. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1988, 278 pp. $29.95.

A recent test of the general knowledge of American high school students asked which president led the United States into the Vietnam War. The "right" answer on the test was Lyndon Johnson. The historian's answer, as this fine book shows, must be Harry Truman. The great merit of Mr. Rotter's work lies in his demonstration of how the commitment to supporting the French in Indochina was connected to the economic reconstruction of Europe and Japan as essential elements of containment.

THE PERFECT FAILURE: KENNEDY, EISENHOWER AND THE CIA AT THE BAY OF PIGS. By Trumbull Higgins. New York: Norton, 1987, 224 pp. $17.95.

Often the passage of time makes the mistakes of yesteryear more understandable and thus forgivable. But this compact study of the Bay of Pigs debacle of 1961, synthesizing previous scholarship and making good use of archives, tells us that the latest word on it is the worst. Seldom in American history have the architects of folly been so intellectually irresponsible and procedurally screwed-up. The failure was "perfect" in that no step which might have prevented or mitigated the disaster was taken.

WILLIAM FULBRIGHT AND THE VIETNAM WAR. By William C. Berman. Kent (Ohio): Kent State University Press, 1988, 235 pp. $24.00.

Not the least of Senator Fulbright's contributions is his careful preservation of voluminous, orderly private papers and their donation to the University of Arkansas for the use of scholars. Mr. Berman has made excellent use of these papers in his fine chronicle and analysis of the senator's transformation from supporter of Johnson's Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964 to convinced and effective opponent of the war two years later.

MEETING THE COMMUNIST THREAT: TRUMAN TO REAGAN. By Thomas G. Paterson. New York: Oxford, 1988, 317 pp. $24.95.

Fourteen essays, written over the past 20 years by a leading historian of American foreign relations. Some are detailed and based on original research, others are broad interpretations; all are concerned with the reasons behind the American proclivity for exaggerating and misperceiving the communist threat.

MORTAL SPLENDOR: THE AMERICAN EMPIRE IN TRANSITION. By Walter Russell Mead. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987, 381 pp. $19.95 (paper, $9.95).

This is a brilliantly written demolition of both liberal and especially conservative shibboleths concerning the political economy of the United States, both in its domestic and international arrangements. The closing optimistic chapters on the possibility of forging a new global social contract are, alas, less convincing than the preceding excoriating criticism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A TIME OF CHANGE: A REPORTER'S TALE OF OUR TIME. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Bessie/Harper & Row, 1988, 352 pp. $19.95.

This second volume of the author's personal memoirs covers the years 1954 to the present. There is marvelous, zestful material on China, Russia, Vietnam, and the subject of being a reporter for *The New York Times*. Mr. Salisbury admires Lincoln Steffens and he works in the tradition of that great reporter: honest, witty, irreverent, bold, industrious. Wonderful reading.

FOR LUST OF KNOWING: MEMOIRS OF AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. By Archie Roosevelt. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988, 500 pp. $24.95.

The author, grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, entered army intelligence in 1942 and spent most of his career with the CIA, much of it focused on the Islamic world. He retired in 1974 to become director of international relations for the Chase Manhattan Bank. The bulk of this entertaining book deals with the 1940s—good stories by a patrician raconteur, useful footnotes to the early history of America's plunge into Middle Eastern politics. The chapter on the Kurds is especially good. Mr. Roosevelt is discreet about events of the last 25 years. Nothing here to worry the top floor at Langley.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS RECONSIDERED. By David P. Forsythe. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988, 236 pp. $24.00.

The issue of human rights considerations in foreign policy is too often debated in terms of Carter versus Reagan. This excellent, information-backed study reminds us of the initiating role of Congress. Mr. Forsythe describes congressional weakness in following up human rights legislation, but concludes that "relative to the other views of human rights that competed in U.S. foreign policy from 1973 to 1984, Congress has not done too badly."

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S QUEST FOR GLOBAL COMMUNITY: BELIEFS AND THEIR IMPACT ON BEHAVIOR. By Jerel A. Rosati. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987, 210 pp. $24.95.

This careful content analysis of major public statements by President Carter, Secretaries of State Vance and Muskie, and National Security Adviser Brzezinski reinforces the contemporary conclusions of observers and subsequent analysis. The principals in the Administration started with different views of the world and there were shifts over time in the issues that were considered most important. No surprise.

THE GUARDED GATE: THE REALITY OF AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY. By Norman L. Zucker and Naomi Flink Zucker. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987, 368 pp. $22.95.

A useful survey of the law and actual practice of admitting, excluding and treating refugees and seekers of asylum in the United States, with emphasis on the years since 1945. The authors favor opening the gate far wider to the persecuted and downtrodden. They deplore forces working for exclusion; criticize practices of detention, interdiction and denial of due

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

process; and condemn the bias toward refugees from communist countries and against those fleeing from political or economic oppression under noncommunist regimes.

ETHNIC GROUPS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Mohammed E. Ahrari. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1987, 178 pp. $35.00.

Nine well-prepared essays provide abundant data on the activities of ethnic pressure groups. The conclusion, to quote the editor, is that "the growing hyperpluralism of the American polity . . . is enabling the ethnic groups to pick up the pace of their activities without necessarily enhancing their influence."

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

NO BOUNDARIES UPSTAIRS: CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE, 1945–1958. By Joseph T. Jockel. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987, 166 pp. $15.95.

A clear historical analysis, largely based on American and Canadian archival sources, of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, NORAD, and other joint ventures. Mr. Jockel shows that the Canadian military shared U.S. assumptions and did not feel that Canada's sovereignty was being bulldozed by the United States. His discussion of the connections between continental defense and the American doctrine of nuclear deterrence is especially illuminating. The book is free of the emotionalism characteristic of so much writing on Canadian-U.S. relations. Gaddis Smith

BANANA DIPLOMACY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA, 1981–1987. By Roy Gutman. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988, 352 pp. $19.95.

Based on interviews with many of the principals, this informative study by *Newsday*'s diplomatic reporter traces the Reagan Administration's approach to Nicaragua from its obscure origins to its evident unraveling. From this breezy and detailed narrative, the overwhelming impression that emerges is that the foreign policy process during the Reagan years systematically diminished the influence of professional expertise (whether from the State Department, the Pentagon or the CIA) and enhanced the influence of ideologues and outsiders—and that U.S. policy suffered as a result. The Administration never could decide whether to pull out all the stops to unseat the Sandinistas or to negotiate with them, and therefore continued to pursue both policies despite their inherent contradiction.

IMPERIAL STATE AND REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA, 1952–1986. By Morris H. Morley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 571 pp. $59.50 (paper, $16.95).

This painstakingly detailed examination of U.S. policy toward Cuba from Eisenhower to Reagan is both illuminated and obscured by its organizing concept—that an "imperial state" creates and sustains the conditions for worldwide capitalist accumulation—and by the jargon this framework imposes. The basic argument is that the activities of the imperial state

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

typically polarize Third World societies and lead to the emergence of nationalist regimes espousing noncapitalist paths of development—and that the imperial state responds by intervening militarily, economically and politically, in order to displace or at least constrain these antagonists of imperial policy.

CUBA'S SOCIALIST ECONOMY TOWARD THE 1990s. Edited by Andrew Zimbalist. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1987, 188 pp. $28.50 (paper, $13.50).

Eleven academics evaluate Cuba's economic performance under the Castro government, focusing on agriculture, industry, labor, planning, trade and debt. Although the authors are clearly sympathetic to Cuba's experiment, this work is not propaganda but a careful, balanced, empirically grounded and reasonably up-to-date set of useful studies. As Cuba has institutionalized its system of central planning it has become apparent that greater decentralization is needed to mitigate bottlenecks, delays and general inefficiencies, as well as to promote the flow of information and improve worker and management motivation.

THE CARIBBEAN AND WORLD POLITICS. Edited by Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988, 385 pp. $49.50.

A wide-ranging symposium, involving 13 authors (mostly from the Caribbean islands), focusing on how the insertion of the Caribbean countries into the world economy and international politics has evolved in recent years, from the Cuban revolution to the intervention in Grenada. Decolonization is still in progress, dependence is still a fundamental reality, the search for viable economic approaches continues, and the central question remains how small and poor nations can best relate to an enormously large, rich and powerful neighbor so close at hand. Of particular interest are two stimulating essays by coeditor Manigat, a political scientist who became president of Haiti a few weeks before the book was published.

AIDING MIGRATION: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON HAITI. By Josh DeWind and David H. Kinley, 3rd. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 196 pp. $22.00 (paper).

Haiti has aptly been termed the "land of unlimited impossibilities." This monograph argues that neither the departure of the Duvaliers nor substantial international development assistance to Haiti assures a brighter future for the country; that international aid in the 1980s may actually have worsened conditions for the impoverished population; and that an export-led development strategy cannot solve the deep problems that impel mass migration from Haiti. The proposed alternative is longer on rhetoric than on specifics, however.

THE SOFT WAR: THE USES AND ABUSES OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID IN CENTRAL AMERICA. By Tom Barry and Deb Preusch. New York: Grove Press, 1988, 304 pp. $18.95.

In the first half of the 1980s, U.S. economic assistance to Central America increased five times as fast as military aid. This muckraking study argues that U.S. economic aid is "intervention with a smile"; that the poor majorities of Central America would be far better off without U.S. economic aid; and that U.S. assistance programs help make peaceful revolutions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

impossible and violent ones inevitable. The approach reflects the extreme polarization of the national debate on Central America.

BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FUTURE: By Julian M. Chacel, Pamela S. Falk and David V. Fleischer. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 287 pp. $38.00.

Twenty-six brief chapters on contemporary Brazil, two-thirds of them by Brazilians, provide an illuminating composite picture by focusing on the role of political parties, the military, the church and women in politics, and by examining Brazil's economic problems and potential from a variety of angles. Although several essays seem ephemeral and perhaps superfluous, this is a useful and reasonably up-to-date collection on an important country.

URUGUAY: DEMOCRACY AT THE CROSSROADS. By Martin Weinstein. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 160 pp. $29.95.

Uruguay's image as the Switzerland of South America was based on a reality that began to fade 30 years ago. This concise introduction to Uruguay's present concentrates on the decline of the country's "exceptionalism"; the origins, nature and effects of its military dictatorship; and the problematic effort to reconstruct stable democracy in the 1990s. Because Uruguay's economy is stagnant and its redemocratization in the 1980s has been much more a restoration than a renovation, the country's future is in doubt.

DEVELOPMENT AND EXTERNAL DEBT IN LATIN AMERICA: BASES FOR A NEW CONSENSUS. Edited by Richard E. Feinberg and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, 281 pp.

LATIN AMERICA'S DEBT CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE? Edited by Robert A. Pastor. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1987, 176 pp. $24.00.

Two fine symposium volumes on Latin America's economic and financial crisis of the 1980s and how to escape the debt trap. The Feinberg and Ffrench-Davis volume, based on papers prepared for the Inter-American Dialogue, mainly provides the views of Latin American economists about the nature and causes of the debt crunch and how it has affected particular countries; the Pastor collection, based on presentations made at the Carter Center, includes policy proposals by economists, bankers and political figures from both the United States and Latin America. Both volumes suggest that a consensus is emerging among economists (and some bankers and political figures) that Latin American recovery will require economic reforms in the region and renewed credit as well as some measure of debt relief from the industrial countries, but that most U.S. commercial bankers and political leaders still resist that conclusion.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. by Michael Ledeen. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1988, 310 pp. $34.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A misleading title for a book that focuses primarily on American attitudes toward the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from wartime assessments to the early 1980s, with particular emphasis on American judgments on Eurocommunism. Based on published sources and interviews with people who often demanded anonymity, the book is full of damaging, unsubstantiated remarks—about the relations of the PCI to the Red Brigades, for instance—including this allegation apparently concerning the Aldo Moro kidnapping: "and on at least one occasion, [Enrico] Berlinguer learned something quite interesting about the Red Brigades, but failed to communicate it to Italian authorities." The book offers some shrewd observations, but reads like a concealed polemic against the American intellectual establishment and its "remarkably uncritical treatment" of Eurocommunism—a characterization Ledeen substantiates by relating that, when Berlinguer aide Sergio Segre was denied a visa in 1976, "members of the Council on Foreign Relations, along with Kissinger's former colleagues at Harvard University, roundly denounced the action . . . . " *All* members of the Council? *All* colleagues at Harvard? The hero of the book is Henry Kissinger, whose version of realpolitik deserves a better assessment than this flawed work.

L'IMAGE PUBLIQUE D'UN HOMME SECRET: MICHEL JOBERT ET LA DIPLOMATIE FRANÇAISE. By Mary Kathleen Weed. Paris: Editions Fernand Lanore, 1988, 282 pp. Fr. 90.

A revised Paris doctoral thesis, based heavily on interviews with Jobert and his colleagues, both in France and abroad. Frenchman from Morocco, a graduate of the École Nationale d'Administration, Jobert served French premiers in various functions, most notably, of course, as Pompidou's foreign minister from 1973 to 1974. The book concentrates on the dramatic events of the early 1970s. During the October war of 1973 he gained worldwide attention with his battles with Henry Kissinger (the author notes that the two men resemble each other in some ways) and with American policies. At that time he gained the sobriquet "Jobert of Arabia." From 1981 to 1983, he was Mitterrand's minister for foreign trade. An informed, sympathetic account of a complex and very private person, an ambitious, nonconformist political actor and reformer, and a novelist.

BORN GUILTY: CHILDREN OF NAZI FAMILIES. By Peter Sichrovsky. New York: Basic Books, 1988, 178 pp. $17.95.

Interviews with children of Nazi criminals: different reactions to the—usually late and accidental—discovery of parental culpability and absence of remorse. "My generation is the generation of the bad conscience." Responses range from filial anger to filial loyalty, but almost always tell of a disturbed and often uncomprehending existence of permanent unease. Poignant, minor raw material concerning some of the most troublesome issues of the Nazi past.

A MAN OF INFLUENCE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF S. G. WARBURG. By Jacques Attali. Washington: Adler & Adler, 1987, 444 pp. $22.50.

Siegmund Warburg, scion of an old banking family, an early exile from Hitler living in London, became a preeminent presence in international banking in the post-1945 world. Jacques Attali, writer and adviser-attendant to President Mitterrand, has produced a superficial account of an austerely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crafted, brilliant career. The book is filled with errors and unpersuasive judgments.

THE SECRETS OF THE SERVICE: A STORY OF SOVIET SUBVERSION OF WESTERN INTELLIGENCE. By Anthony Glees. New York: Carroll & Graf, 1987, 447 pp. $21.95.

Yet another account, rather poorly organized, of Soviet moles in British intelligence, with the thesis that these moles not only transmitted information to the Soviet Union but had important influence on British policymaking—which in turn failed to see Stalin's farflung plans for Soviet expansion in the postwar world.

CHANGING DIRECTION: BRITISH MILITARY PLANNING FOR POST-WAR STRATEGIC DEFENCE, 1942–1947. By Julian Lewis. London: Sherwood Press, 1988, 475 pp. £ 30.00.

An intriguing narrative of the debate during World War II between the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff over two questions: which country would pose a threat to Britain after the war, and what the nature of future warfare would be. Some in the Foreign Office (but not all, and not Anthony Eden) argued that the Soviet Union would be the major threat, while the military (also divided) was still worrying about a postwar threat from Germany; it was not until 1946 that "Foreign Office apprehension about post-war Soviet intentions had come into line with C.O.S. apprehension about post-war Soviet capabilities." The book contains a large number of contemporaneous top-secret documents, including a few acid memos on the reliability of the Americans. William G. Hyland

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GERMAN QUESTION SINCE 1945. By Frank Ninkovich. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1988, 224 pp. $24.95 (paper, $10.95).

A workmanlike review of German-American relations in the postwar years, based principally on secondary works. The number of misprints exceeds even the dreariest of norms.

THE PARADOX OF SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY. By Benny Pollack with Graham Hunter. New York: St. Martin's, 196 pp. $27.50.

A superficial survey of Spain's foreign policy from Franco to the present, with particular attention to Spanish policies toward Latin America and the Middle East.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

RUSSIA AND THE WEST. By Jerry Hough. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988, 287 pp. $19.95.

As with his earlier writings, you can count on Jerry Hough to come up with original and controversial conclusions. Time and again in this book he questions the conventional wisdom of many "Western observers" and then proceeds to state his own contrary views. In the process he manages to cover the course of Soviet history from the standpoint of where power lay and how it was exercised, against the background of social and generational change over the years. He makes a particular point of pressures, including

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those of the bureaucrats, which are driving Gorbachev in the direction of radical reform. The book is more about Russia than about "Russia and the West," but Hough sees the direction of Soviet foreign policy as organically linked to changes at home, and his views are relevant to the ongoing debate in the West about policy toward the U.S.S.R.

THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE. Edited by Henry S. Rowen and Charles Wolf, Jr. New York: St. Martin's, 1988, 346 pp. $37.50 (paper, $14.95).

The "empire" includes the inner core (U.S.S.R.), the contiguous bloc (Eastern Europe), and the assorted and more remote associates and dependencies (Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia and others). To assess the strengths, weaknesses and prospects of this aggregation of territories is a daunting task which only the most ambitious or foolhardy would undertake; in this case the ambition of the editors and authors is for the most part justified by the results. The chapters on the U.S.S.R. itself follow the lines of many other Western assessments but are done with exemplary professional competence. Of possibly greater interest are the chapters on the "extended empire" in the Third World, its economic and other costs, and the possibilities of Soviet retraction or retreat.

GORBACHEV AT THE HELM: A NEW ERA IN SOVIET POLITICS? Edited by R. F. Miller, J. H. Miller and T. H. Rigby. London: Croom Helm/New York: Methuen, 1988, 251 pp. $47.50.

Another estimate and analysis, this one by Australian scholars, of plans and prospects as the Gorbachev era unfolds. The vantage point is the 27th Party Congress, seen through its major policy documents: Gorbachev's report and the new party program. The three principal authors (and four others) subject these statements and the current state of Soviet affairs to a rigorous critique, which nevertheless leaves many questions open. They tend to stress the weight of continuity in the system and to be cautious in their predictions as to the success of radical reforms.

SOVIET SUCCESSION STRUGGLES. By Anthony D'Agostino. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 274 pp. $45.00.

An inquiry into the nature of Soviet politics at the top: how power has been seized, contended for, transferred and denied, not just at intervals but continuously from Lenin's time forward. The bulk of the book, covering the 1920s and early 1930s, presents a kaleidoscopic picture of debates and intrigues in which Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and others were engaged in official collaboration combined with deadly struggle amid changing alignments and a mixture of issues. The issue of world revolution versus socialism in one country is much too simple a guide to the Trotsky-Stalin relationship in the 1920s—despite what Trotsky wrote about it later—as the author shows by reference to contemporary material. The latter part of the book is sketchier and less interesting; the author posits, but does not prove, a decisive role for Suslov in all the power struggles from the late Stalin period until the 1980s. It is a curious book, remarkable for its research and originality, but not free of error and at times dizzying in its effects on the reader.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KHRUSHCHEV AND KHRUSHCHEVISM. Edited by Martin McCauley. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, 243 pp. $29.95 (paper, $10.95).

With Khrushchev's restoration to a place in the history of the U.S.S.R. and a new era of reform brewing there, there is ample reason for both Soviet and Western observers to reevaluate him and his years in power. The time perspective helps. In this volume several British specialists review his achievements and failures in various fields of domestic and foreign policy. The editor poses the question whether Khrushchev's was a transitory, transitional or original leadership, and the authors give a variety of answers. It may be that "Khrushchevism" is not capable of clear definition, but in any case the book gives a good picture of the whole muddled combination of serious reforms, ideological innovation, "harebrained schemes" and personal idiosyncrasies which marked the Khrushchev decade.

REFORMING THE SOVIET ECONOMY. By Ed A. Hewett. Washington: Brookings, 1988, 404 pp. $36.95 (paper, $16.95).

Hewett's masterly study does much more than sketch out the Gorbachev reform plans adopted in July 1987 and speculate on their chances of success. It gives a clear description of the Soviet economy since Stalin's time, both the formal economy and the system as it actually operates. He analyzes the earlier attempts at reform (those of Khrushchev, the Kosygin reforms of 1965, and the later ones in the 1970s); these efforts largely failed, but an understanding of them and why they failed helps to explain the magnitude and risks of Gorbachev's task. Among other things, Hewett argues, Gorbachev has to find a tolerable balance between improved economic performance and the widespread desire in Soviet society for equality and security, for to have both in full measure is impossible. Hewett's book invites comparison with other recent studies on the subject. In general he digs deeper, is clearer in analysis, and is cautious about predicting the future.

SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY. By William R. Kintner. Fairfax (Va.): Hero Books, 1987, 273 pp. $24.95.

A classic restatement of the hard-line position on the Soviet threat. It might be called vintage Ronald Reagan; more accurately, the views of Reagan (first term, that is) were vintage Kintner, who has been consistent in his views since the beginning of the cold war in the 1940s. Here he lays out the aims and grand strategy of the Soviet leaders from Lenin and Stalin to Gorbachev, clearly set forth in their own public statements, for changing the balance of forces in the world to the advantage and ultimate victory of communism. He then reviews the "operational record" of how Moscow, by force, intimidation, terrorism and other means, has expanded its power, its influence and its empire. Little is said about any limitations. Much of the record is indeed as he describes it, although the account leans toward simplification and overstatement.

SOVIET AGRICULTURE. By Zhores A. Medvedev. New York: Norton, 1988, 464 pp. $27.50.

Medvedev, the eminent Russian scientist now living in London, writes like an insider because of his knowledge both of the Russian past and of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the problems that have beset Soviet agriculture since the October Revolution. The first part of the book is summary history, from the prerevolutionary regime to Khrushchev's attempts at reform. The author then reviews the subsequent period (1965–1986) from the standpoint of all the relevant specifics of policy (investment, production, mechanization, fertilizers, incentives, private plots, prices), with a view to explaining the relative success and the continuing failures. The latter were not inevitable, he concludes; alternatives were available. But can the system tolerate the measure of liberalization he sees as necessary?

THE SOVIET STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Allen Lynch. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 197 pp. $34.50.

Since the time of Khrushchev, Soviet scholars have begun to write on the nature and system of international relations in new ways, paying heed to the realities of world politics and even to some of the writings current in the West, and adding new dimensions to the standard Leninist line without abandoning it. Allen Lynch has done an excellent job of summarizing and analyzing this literature, which certainly reflects some real changes in official thinking and not just the random musing of academics. The questions—whether and how these ideas have influenced Soviet foreign policy—which the author refrains from exploring, remain for further study.

THE SOVIET UNION IN TRANSITION. Edited by Kinya Niiseki. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (in cooperation with the Japan Institute of International Affairs), 1987, 243 pp. $34.50.

American, European and Japanese authors write on current trends in the U.S.S.R. and on some aspects of Soviet foreign relations. While the "trilateral" approach to world problems is not new, this particular example is to be welcomed because of what it shows of the development of Soviet studies in Japan. In content there is not much unsaid elsewhere by the same or other experts, but those chapters dealing with the Soviet Union and its neighbors in East Asia are of more than passing interest.

GLASNOST: HOW OPEN? A Discussion moderated by Leonard R. Sussman. New York: Freedom House, 1988, 142 pp. (Washington: University Press of America, distributor, $17.50; paper, $7.75).

Two roundtable discussions, the first with a group of prominent Soviet dissidents now in emigration, the second with East European dissidents and American scholars of East European origin. Leonard Sussman, the moderator, asks many questions, about Gorbachev, reform and change, which are pertinent but, at this stage, not subject to precise answers. The result is a mélange of ideas, opinions, *obiter dicta* and unstructured conversation, not without interest because of the special knowledge and past experience of the participants. As might be expected, the prevailing view of the Soviet reforms is skeptical.

REFLECTIONS OF A PIONEERING SOVIETOLOGIST. By John N. Hazard. New York: Oceana, 1987, 188 pp.

This new edition of the autobiography of one of the foremost Western experts in Soviet law expands the material given in the first edition on Moscow in the 1930s and also adds a new closing chapter of "reflections."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD SOCIALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INSIDER'S VIEW. By Silviu Brucan. New York: Praeger, 1987, 208 pp. $37.95.

The socialist (communist) states, a Romanian witness contends, will never make it in the postindustrial era unless they get rid of their Stalinist heritage and make major changes in economic structure and policy and toward political pluralism, which he sees as quite consistent with the maintenance of socialism and a one-party (though not a totalitarian party) system. A former ambassador, now a professor in Bucharest, Brucan writes as a self-described Marxist, although he is hardly any longer an "insider" in his own country, having incurred the displeasure of the Ceaușescu regime for his unorthodox views.

EASTERN EUROPE AND COMMUNIST RULE. By J. F. Brown. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1988, 562 pp. $48.50 (paper, $15.95).

Ever since *The New Eastern Europe* appeared more than 20 years ago, J. F. Brown has been a well-known and well-respected authority on the region. His new book is wide ranging, informative and sprinkled with judgments that are measured without being pallid. It should stand for some time without rivals as the best comprehensive one-volume work in the field. In addition to dealing separately with developments in the individual countries and with the main common trends in the area as a whole, the author never loses sight of how these "local" matters tie into the larger issues of East-West relations. He knows that the Western nations cannot ignore Eastern Europe, even if they cannot do much about it.

SHOW TRIALS: STALINIST PURGES IN EASTERN EUROPE. By George H. Hodos. New York: Praeger, 1987, 216 pp. $39.95.

Obviously no one can write a definitive history of the purge trials of East European communist leaders in the late Stalin years, since the records of the Soviet and satellite governments of the day have remained closed (except for a brief period in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring). George Hodos has done well, however, in gathering material from other sources to show how the trials were conducted in all seven satellite countries, where the pattern differed from one country to another, and how all the threads led back to Stalin. He makes much of the point that Rajk, Kostov, Slansky, Gomulka and the others were not really "national communists," or Titoists, or Zionists, but loyal Stalinists. Some did, however, have a nationalist coloration (particularly Gomulka) and all were potential Titoists in Stalin's eyes. The Rajk trial is the centerpiece of the volume, as the author observed and experienced the purge in Hungary at first hand; his account of his own arrest, trial and imprisonment adds to the impact of the book.

THE VELVET PRISON: ARTISTS UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. By Miklós Haraszti. New York: Basic Books/New Republic Books, 1987, 162 pp. $14.95.

In the softer form of communism well represented by contemporary Hungary, writers and artists are not repressed, constrained and censored in the traditional style of a totalitarian dictatorship—they are coopted and given a stake in the prevailing state culture. The censorship largely becomes self-censorship; censors and artists are entangled in a mutual embrace. Haraszti, a dissident sociologist and poet who still lives and writes in Hungary but has clung fiercely to his creative freedom, gives us a number

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of variations on this theme in a brilliant essay which was first published in France (1983) and has circulated underground, in the Hungarian original, in Hungary itself.

DEMOCRACY IN A COMMUNIST PARTY: THE POLISH EXPERIENCE SINCE 1980. By Werner G. Hahn. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 368 pp. $24.00.

A remarkable aspect of the Polish events of 1980–81 was what happened to the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party itself. It did not stand firm for the status quo, nor did it totally disintegrate as the Hungarian party did in 1956, but underwent a change of character through a process of democratization under pressure from below, largely from Solidarity. The story is told here through extensive use of the provincial press in addition to the central party publications. The party congress of July 1981, in the way delegates were chosen and decisions were made, was like no other such gathering in any communist country. Since December 1981, of course, that is all over although, as the book shows, some traces remain. Whether the party can ever again be an effective instrument of governance is another question.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

THE EAGLE AND THE LION: THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS. By James A. Bill. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, 520 pp. $25.00.

Professor Bill has written a searching study of America's relations with Iran since World War II. The book is a history but it is also an indictment—of the shah's regime, of American officials in Washington and in the field, and of the "Pahlavi lobby" of powerful people in the United States (the Rockefellers, Henry Kissinger and others) who pushed for support of the shah to the bitter end. The fact that the author names names and pulls no punches in telling who was wrong (almost everybody on the American side) adds interest and flavor to the book. Some, especially those who are the targets of his critique, will have contrary views, and many have already had their say in print. This is, in any case, a powerful book that should be widely read and taken seriously; its arguments by and large are supported by the historical record. The suggested and implied correctives sound logical, even obvious, but they seem to require a foreign policy made and carried out by an elite of scholar-politicians and scholar-diplomats (not the Kissinger-Brzezinski type, but the Bill type), hardly a likely possibility in the untidy and unruly American democracy.

THE U.S. PRESS AND IRAN: FOREIGN POLICY AND THE JOURNALISM OF DEFERENCE. By William A. Dorman and Mansour Farhang. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, 272 pp. $29.95.

A review of press coverage of Iranian events from the Mossadeq period to the revolution of 1978. The authors find it seriously deficient in comprehending Iran's political culture and the nature of the shah's regime, and they deplore the failure of the press, its views warped by ideology and deference to the establishment, to counter the equally deficient official

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assessments. The research is carefully done, but the argument as to what American journalists can and should know, and what the obligations of the media are for sound foreign policy, is overblown.

IDEOLOGY AND POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE LENCZOWSKI. Edited by Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1988, 530 pp. $57.50 (paper, $19.95).

Although the real glue holding this book together is the esteem in which all the authors, as colleagues and former students, hold George Lenczowski, the editors have made a serious and fairly successful effort to organize the contributions around the themes of ideology and political power. They are, for the most part, studies of developments in individual countries or political movements, but they are not made to conform to any set pattern or to add up to a textbook survey of the region; thus, most authors are able to make good use of their own specialized research and analysis. The book has its ups and downs but overall maintains a high standard.

THE SOVIET-AMERICAN COMPETITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Steven L. Spiegel, Mark A. Heller and Jacob Goldberg. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1988, 392 pp. $42.00.

The University of California's Institute on Global Conflict chose two academic institutes in Israel as its partners in a projected study of the nature of superpower competition in the Middle East and possible means of controlling it. In 22 essays the team covers almost every conceivable aspect of the historical record and current problems; every aspect, that is, that seems relevant to scholars conversant with the interests and policies of the United States and Israel. Soviet and Arab interpretations, not represented here, would be somewhat different—less objective perhaps, but adding new dimensions that might help illuminate the problems. That is not to say that these pages do not show a keen understanding of Soviet, as of American, policy; they do, and they are especially good on specifics, as in the analysis of arms transfers and patron-client relations.

U.S. POLICY ON JERUSALEM. By Yossi Feintuch. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1987, 184 pp. $37.95.

Settlement of the problem of Jerusalem has eluded all parties to it. Indeed, because it would probably be the last and most difficult item on the agenda of any negotiations for settlement, would-be mediators such as the United States—especially since the *corpus separatum* voted by the United Nations in 1947 became a dead letter—have preferred not to try to work out any solutions. Meanwhile the fate of Jerusalem has been determined by the fortunes of war and, since 1967, by Israeli decisions, with U.S. policy reacting by adjustment or by protest. Feintuch's book is a well-researched and competent monograph, laboriously going through the many and often inconsequential debates on the subject in the U.N. Following the course of U.S. policy over the years, he finds it ill defined and bumbling. It is hard to disagree with that conclusion.

TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE. Report of a Study Group. Washington: Brookings, 1988, 42 pp. $3.95.

A comparable Brookings report issued in 1975 has been credited with giving an impetus to the Carter Administration's efforts to bring about

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peace in the Middle East. This one is intended for the use of the new president taking office in January 1989, the Reagan Administration having done so little in the way of active diplomacy in this area. Now Secretary Shultz has been belatedly spurred by events into action (incidentally along the lines of this report), but there is sure to be something for the next administration still to do. The report contains the agreed (and some unagreed) conclusions of a diverse group of American experts, including some quite closely associated with either Israeli or Palestinian claims and interests; the remarkable fact is that they agreed on as much as they did in devising well-conceived and reasonable policies and strategies.

SECRET EXODUS. By Claire Safran. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987, 188 pp. $17.95.

The story of the migration, under conditions of extreme secrecy, of some 16,000 Ethiopian Jews to Israel, in which Israeli intelligence agents, American diplomats, international refugee organizations and Sudanese officials all had vital roles. It is told by a *Readers' Digest* roving editor who calls it "the story of a good deed that even today almost no one wants to take credit for."

CLASS AND POWER IN SUDAN: THE DYNAMICS OF SUDANESE POLITICS, 1898–1985. By Tim Niblock. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, 370 pp. $44.50 (paper, $18.95).

A splendid study of Sudan's political history in which developments since independence in 1956 are illuminated by searching inquiry into the period of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. The author digs deeply into the economic and social forces behind the various currents of the nationalist movement and the changing political alignments. In spite of the record of political instability, economic failure and unceasing rebellion in the south, he remains strangely optimistic about the country's future. Readers interested in Sudan's international relations will be disappointed to find almost nothing on that subject.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE DRAGON AND THE WILD GOOSE: CHINA AND INDIA. By Jay Taylor. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1987, 289 pp. $37.50.

This is a very rich comparison of Indian and Chinese societies and cultures and the factors that have shaped their approaches to modernization. It also offers some acute observations on Chinese and Indian foreign policies and on the attitudes of Americans toward the two countries. It can, in short, be read on a variety of levels, and it is very well written. Taylor argues that China and India, who share the most densely populated corners of the world, will tend in the long run toward rivalry, and this will encourage each to seek security with a different superpower. India's policy of close association with the Soviet Union has contributed in some degree to China's link to the U.S.—a link that fosters pragmatic policies in Beijing, helps stabilize East Asia, and contributes to a world balance of forces unfavorable to Moscow. With regard to political development in the two countries, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

author sheds light on how and why India gave birth to a remarkable democracy while China was undergoing the debacle of Maoism. The future danger to China is not another seizure of irrationality like the Cultural Revolution, but rather a backlash against the current liberalization and a return to a quasi-Stalinist regime. In India, the main threat to the political system is the explosive potential created by communal and regional disputes as well as tensions between haves and have-nots.

NEW TIDES IN THE PACIFIC: PACIFIC BASIN COOPERATION AND THE BIG FOUR (JAPAN, PRC, USA, USSR). Edited by Roy Kim and Hilary Conroy. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1987, 232 pp. $37.95.

This is a curious volume. Although it is true, as John Stephan points out in one essay, that there has been little serious discussion in the United States of Gorbachev's efforts to legitimize the Soviet Union as a Pacific power, this volume does little to clarify the complex issues involved. It includes two essays by Soviet officials and none by their American counterparts. The essay by Eugene Primakov, an influential figure in the Soviet foreign policy establishment, lays most of the blame for Soviet-American tensions in the Pacific on the U.S. government. The essay on Sino-Soviet relations is little more than a tirade against "mainstream experts" (including this writer), but the essay is a caricature of "mainstream" views. It praises Mao's "genius" for having aroused the collective consciousness of the Chinese people in the 1950s, and expresses doubts about whether "the market system, as the 'experts' seem to assume, is an eternal and self-evident good." Rather, it suggests, "the people themselves actually demand more socialist relations of production." Moreover, most of Deng Xiaoping's reforms—the adoption of professional management, promotion of technocrats, adoption of new hiring, firing and plant-closing policies, the dawn of a consumer mentality—are all written off as "American-style" reforms.

THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. Edited by Jae Kyu Park and Byung-joon Ahn. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press/Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1987, 274 pp. $35.00.

This collection originated in a conference in South Korea convened to discuss the implications of SDI for the Asia-Pacific region. Few of the essays have much worthwhile to say on the subject. However, one probing essay by Bonnie S. Glaser and Banning N. Garrett on the Chinese reaction says that the Chinese believe that SDI has contributed to a shift in the balance of power in favor of the U.S. Moscow's preoccupation with the American technological challenge has increased the incentive for the Soviet Union to improve relations with China as well as with Japan, Western Europe and the United States. Beijing sees a "window of opportunity" for China during the next 15 years in which the balance of power will continue to favor the U.S. and provide a peaceful international environment. During this period, the Chinese predict that the Soviets will refrain from launching a new round of expansionist activity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ANZUS: THE UNITED STATES AND PACIFIC SECURITY. By Henry S. Albinski. New York: The Asia Society/Washington: University Press of America, 1987, 62 pp.

This Asia Society report traces the history of the treaty alliance among Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) from its founding in 1952 through the recent crisis caused by New Zealand's refusal to provide port facilities for U.S. nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels.

EAST ASIAN CONFLICT ZONES. Edited by Lawrence E. Grinter and Young Whan Kihl. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 254 pp. $37.50.

This is an unusually strong collection of essays on the trouble spots in East Asia, along with some sensible suggestions by the editors on how to reduce tensions in the region. Among the many good essays are: Edward Olsen on competition among the great powers in the Sea of Japan; Peggy Falkenheim on Japanese-Soviet relations and the prospects for a settlement of their territorial problems; and an excellent analysis of the Thai-Vietnamese rivalry in Indochina by William S. Turley.

ARMING THE DRAGON: U.S. SECURITY TIES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. By A. James Gregor. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988, 140 pp. (Washington: University Press of America, distributor, $19.95; paper, $7.95).

The author disapproves of the "creative ambiguity" that has papered over differences between China and the United States regarding Taiwan. He wants to do away with this ambiguity by making the Republic of China on Taiwan a U.S. defense partner. Taiwan's ports and airfields, he suggests, could be an alternative to U.S. bases in the Philippines. The author does not consider the likely consequences of such a drastic reversal of America's "one China" policy—a policy now carried out by four American presidents. It is hard to conceive of a move more likely to disrupt U.S.-P.R.C. relations and endanger the political stability of Taiwan.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE RACE TO FASHODA. By David Levering Lewis. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987, 304 pp. $22.50.

For the first time, a major history of the European colonial movement in Africa tells the story of the African resistance while also giving a parallel account of the European side. At the hands of an extraordinarily versatile American historian, happily blessed with a lively prose style, both receive their due: Africa's underarmed legions in the Congo and Sudan display determination and tactical intelligence while facing certain doom in the face of European firepower and sometimes brilliant buccaneer leaders. Most impressive, however, is Menelik, the Ethiopian emperor who outfoxed all comers, European and African, eventually pulverizing Italy's armies with French arms and Russian artillery instructors.

THE AFRICAN POOR. By John Iliffe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 387 pp. $49.50 (paper, $14.95).

This book should become a classic. In it a noted historian takes a sweeping look at poverty in Africa over the last several hundred years, examining a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

variety of African attitudes toward the poor and ways of dealing with them—largely without public institutions. In scope, the author goes far beyond his stated intention, depicting economic and social differentiation within various African settings—in effect describing class and caste stratification in Africa before and after the advent of the Europeans. Further, he contrasts poverty in land-rich Africa with that in land-poor Europe. While acknowledging that the difference is now breaking down, he scants the implications of the change; he does, on the other hand, point out the ways in which the mortal effects of crisis-induced poverty have been mitigated by modern health care and famine relief.

HOW CAN AFRICA SURVIVE? By Jennifer Seymour Whitaker. New York: Harper & Row, 1988, 256 pp. $19.95.

Jennifer Whitaker has done all those who care about Africa a great service in providing a fascinating, multilayered analysis of what has gone wrong and some sensible guidelines to putting things right. While she pulls no punches in blaming corruption, nepotism, inefficiency and misguided economic policies for Africa's development failures, she probes deeper into geographic, social and cultural causes, and takes a hard look at the role of foreign aid, public and private. Drawing on her long experience of Africa, beginning as a Peace Corps teacher in eastern Nigeria in the 1960s, Mrs. Whitaker has written an elegant and thought-provoking account of the human enigma in Africa. John de St. Jorre

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC POWER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. By Ronald T. Libby. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, 361 pp.

This study largely finesses the issue of the dependence of southern African countries on South Africa and deals mainly with domestic politics and economic directions in each southern African country. As a result, what emerges is a series of discrete cases—illuminating as sources of information about the individual countries and bound together chiefly by an argument against overemphasis on regional ties. The authoritative update on the interplay of political and economic forces in southern Africa has yet to be written.

AN APPETITE FOR POWER: BUTHELEZI'S INKATHA AND SOUTH AFRICA. By Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, 261 pp. $35.00.

Often viewed in the West as the leading candidate for head of state of a black-ruled South Africa, Chief Buthelezi emerges here more as a supporter than an opponent of government policy toward blacks. The authors detail the attitudes and actions which have set Buthelezi at odds with virtually all other black political leaders in the republic today, including: the Zulu tribal identification of his political movement, Inkatha; his reliance on the government for direct financial support and patronage; and his de facto alliance with the government in suppressing black trade union organizers, student activists and consumer boycott activists. Impressively dense or well-nigh impenetrable, depending on the reader's taste, the book has an important message for outside observers of South Africa: what may seem to Westerners as appealing "modernization" is, in the context of mainstream South African black politics, beyond the pale.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MECHANIZATION AND MAIZE: AGRICULTURE AND THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN EAST AFRICA. By Constance G. Anthony. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 178 pp. $25.00.

Against a background history of international agricultural research institutions over the past several decades, the author discusses the complexities of political, ecological, institutional and technical problems in developing new farm technologies for Africa in relation to two major cases, Kenya and Tanzania. In Africa, she concludes, egalitarianism works less well than elitism for diffusing agricultural technologies, and poor governments can ill afford the development and distribution of new seeds and techniques on a large scale.

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. By Arye Oded. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1987, 244 pp. $29.50.

A senior lecturer at Tel Aviv University fills in the familiar outlines of this subject with abundant and illuminating detail—on African links to the Arab world and resistance to Arabization; on Arab gains since 1973; on the politics of terminating and resuming relations with Israel; on prospects for change. In most of Africa he sees a trend toward increased tolerance for pluralism regarding Israel and stabilization of ties with the Arab states.

NIGERIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST SYSTEM. Edited by Toyin Falola and Julius O. Ihonvbere. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1988, 154 pp. $19.50.

A group of Nigerian scholars review their country's foreign policy since independence in light of its economic ties to the West. Although their separate analyses decry Nigerian dependency and its determining effects on policy, they do not argue strenuously for alternatives; nor, as they present the choices facing the different regimes, do they show that Nigeria's leaders had any other real options besides the ones they seized.

ANTHILLS OF THE SAVANNAH. By Chinua Achebe. New York: Doubleday, 1988, 216 pp.
SEARCH SWEET COUNTRY. By B. Kojo Laing. New York: Morrow, 1986, 301 pp.

Twenty years after his last novel, Nigeria's maestro of modern fiction takes a long breath and digs deeply into the darker recesses of contemporary African politics and society. He tells a tale of betrayal of friends and ideals as power corrupts a country's highest leaders and the confusions of modern life disorient his people. Dealing with a world as yet so imperfectly formed, Achebe's smooth touch sometimes falters, yet his broader vision successfully reflects the larger, more complex realities that any chronicler of Africa today must try to apprehend. Ghanaian poet Kojo Laing, in his first novel, breaks new ground for the genre, scoring a prodigious symphony of life in contemporary Accra. He develops his characters' lives as separate themes, alternating realistic days with surreal nights, as they juggle African traditions and Western values, tribal loyalties and national consciousness. A powerful and original stylist, Laing should become a major voice in Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOURCE MATERIAL

Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.:* Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities:* 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 100th Congress.

Africa

OVERSIGHT of the administration's implementation of the Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act of 1986 (Public Law 99–440) and an assessment of recent South African political and economic developments. Hearing, Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, and on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, June 16, 1987. Washington, 1988. 296 pp.

U.S. minerals supply and South Africa: issues and options. Oversight hearing, Subcommittee on Mining and Natural Resources, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House, Dec. 10, 1987. Washington, 1988. (Ser.No.100–16.)

Asia and the Pacific Ocean

L'ASEAN: vingt ans d'existence, by Sophie Boisseau du Rocher. Paris, La Documentation Française, 1987. 144 pp. (Notes & Etudes Documentaires, No. 4847.) FR.48.00.

DEFENSE of Japan 1987. Tokyo, The Japan Times (for the Defense Agency, Japan), 1987. 345 pp.

THE INDO-Sri Lankan agreement. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Aug. 6, 1987. Washington, 1988. 42 pp.

THE VESSEY mission to Hanoi. Hearing, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 30, 1987. Washington, 1988. 134 pp.

Commercial Policy and Trade

TECHNOLOGY transfer. Hearing, Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House, Oct. 12, 1987. Washington, 1988. 194 pp.

UNITED States trade relations with Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. Hearing, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic Policy and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Oct. 28, 1987. Washington, 1988. 101 pp.

Disarmament

SOVIET compliance with arms control agreements. Hearing, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 12, 1987. Washington, 1987. 299 pp.

Eastern Europe

GORBACHEV's economic plans. Study papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress, Nov. 23, 1987. Washington, 1987. 2 vols. (Jt.Com.Print.)

THE REAGAN-Gorbachev summit and its implications for United States-Soviet relations. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Dec. 16, 1987. Washington, 1988. 123 pp.

THE SOVIET economy: a new course? Colloquium, April 1–3, 1987, Brussels. Brussels, Information Directorate, NATO, 1987. 352 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Financial Policy

AGENCY for International Development policy on the use of cash transfer: the case of Egypt. Hearing, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Dec. 10, 1987. Washington, 1988. 232 pp.

COMPENDIUM of selected studies on international monetary and financial issues for the developing countries. Geneva, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1987. 328 pp. (E.87.II.D.3.)

DEVELOPING country debt: the budgetary and transfer problem, by Helmut Reisen and Axel van Trotsenburg. Paris, Development Centre, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1988. 195 pp. (Development Centre Studies.) FR.120.00.

EXTERNAL debt: definition, statistical coverage and methodology; a report by an international working group on external debt statistics. Basle, The Bank for International Settlements; Washington, International Monetary Fund; Paris, OECD; Washington, The World Bank, 1988. 178 pp.

GEOGRAPHICAL distribution of financial flows to developing countries: disbursements, commitments, economic indicators, 1983/1986. Paris, OECD, 1988. 296 pp. FR.160.00.

MULTILATERAL development banks. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, Apr. 2-May 20, 1987. Washington, 1987. 417 pp. (Ser.No.100–13.)

Foreign Aid and Underdeveloped Areas

FOREIGN assistance and related programs appropriations for fiscal year 1988. Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, on H.R.3186, Feb. 24-Aug. 7, 1987. Washington, 1987. 5 pts.

SECURITY and development assistance. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Feb. 24-Mar. 26, 1987. Washington, 1988. 2 vols.

Human Rights

IMPLEMENTATION of the Helsinki Accords. Hearing, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Oct. 22, 1987. Washington, 1988. 99 pp. (CSCE 100–1–21.)

Middle East

SYRIA: fragile mosaic of power, by Martha Neff Kessler. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1987. 142 pp.

U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf: cost and policy implications. Report to the Committee on Appropriations, Senate, January 1988. Washington, 1988. 18 pp. (Com.Print.)

WAR in the Persian Gulf: the U.S. takes sides. A staff report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Nov. 1987. Washington, 1987. 49 pp. (Com.Print.)

Military Policy

ALLIANCE and defense capabilities in Europe. Hearings, Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Aug. 4-Nov. 17, 1987. Washington, 1988. 388 pp.

CREATING strategic vision: long-range planning for national security, by Perry M. Smith and others. Washington, National Defense University Press, 1987. 133 pp.

DISCRIMINATE deterrence: report of The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Washington, The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (for The Secretary of Defense and The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), 1988. 69 pp.

INSURGENCY and counterinsurgency: American military dilemmas and doctrinal proposals, by Dennis M. Drew. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., Air University Press, 1988. 57 pp.

NATIONAL security strategy of the United States. Washington, The White House, 1988. 41 pp.

NATO defense and the INF Treaty. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Jan. 25–27, 1988. Washington, 1988. 314 pp.

Terrorism

COUNTER-TERRORISM policy and embassy security in Eastern Europe. Report of a study mission to Eastern Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Mar. 11, 1988. Washington, 1988. 13 pp. (Com.Print.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States

CONGRESS and foreign policy 1985–86. Report by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House. Washington, 1988. 199 pp. (Com.Print.)

CONTINUING oversight of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Hearing, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, House, Oct. 21, 1987. Washington, 1988. 251 pp. (Ser.No.28.)

FOREIGN Relations Authorization Act. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 17-Apr. 30, 1987. Washington, 1988. 437 pp.

POSSIBLE violation or circumvention of the Clark Amendment. Hearing, Subcommitee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs. House, July 1, 1987. Washington, 1987. 155 pp.

WOMEN'S perspectives on U.S foreign policy: a compilation of views. Report of a women's foreign policy council, informal congressional hearing, at National Women's Conference, Washington, DC, Nov. 19, 1987, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House. Washington, 1988. 46 pp. (Com.Print.)

WORLDWIDE review of status of U.S. extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties. Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Oct. 29, 1987. Washington, 1988. 69 pp.

Western Europe

ROUNDTABLE discussion on United States policy toward Europe. Hearing, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Dec. 2, 1987. Washington, 1988. 42 pp.

Western Hemisphere

CANADA year book, 1988. Ottawa, Publications Sales and Services, Statistics Canada (for the Minister of Supply and Services), 1987. v.p.

THE CARIBBEAN Basin Initiative: Caribbean views. Report of a congressional study mission and symposium on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, September 18–19, 1987, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Dec. 1987. Washington, 1987. 21 pp. (Com.Print.)

THE CENTRAL American peace process. Hearings, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Oct. 20–21, 1987. Washington, 1987. 124 pp.

CURRENT directions for United States policy toward Chile. Hearing, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, July 21, 1987. Washington, 1987. 165 pp. (Ser.No.100–28.)

HUMAN rights and political developments in El Salvador, 1987. Hearings, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Sept. 23–29, 1987. Washington, 1988. 193 pp.

TRANSITION to democracy: upcoming elections in Haiti. Hearing, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Nov. 18, 1987. Washington, 1988. 60 pp.

UNITED States-Mexico economic relations. Hearings, Subcommittee on Economic Resources and Competitiveness, June 12–13, 1987. Washington, 1988. 313 pp.

II. OTHER PUBLICATIONS

THE A-NZ-US TRIANGLE, by Alan Burnett. Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1988. 224 pp.

THE ARAB GULF STATES: STEPS TOWARD POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, by J. E. Peterson. N.Y., Praeger (with The Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1988. 155 pp. (The Washington Papers, 131.)

ARABS, ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS: MEDIA IMAGES AND THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION: THE SHIRLEY AND BURT HARRIS SYMPOSIUM ON MIDDLE EAST COMMUNICATION, with Ehud Yaari, Rami Khoury and David Ignatius. Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1987. 30 pp.

ARCTIC ARMS CONTROL: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, by Ronald G. Purver. Ottawa, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1988. 80 pp. (Occasional Papers, 3.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARMS ACROSS THE PACIFIC: SECURITY AND TRADE ISSUES ACROSS THE PACIFIC, by Malcolm McIntosh. N.Y., St. Martin's Press, 1988. 177 pp. $39.95.

THE ARMS CONTROL DELUSION, by Malcolm Wallop and Angelo Codevilla. San Francisco, Ca., Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1987. 220 pp. $16.95.

ASEAN AT THE CROSSROADS: OBSTACLES, OPTIONS & OPPORTUNITIES IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION, ed. by Noordin Sopiee and others. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1987. 577 pp. $25.00.

ASIAN SECURITY 1987–88, comp. by the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo. Washington, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987. 195 pp.

BEYOND SANCTIONS: REORIENTING U.S POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, by Michael Clough. N.Y., Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 32 pp. (Critical Issues, 1988:3.) $3.95.

BREAKING THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT DEADLOCK, by Shafiqul Islam. N.Y., Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 27 pp. (Critical Issues, 1988:2.) $3.95.

BRITISH-GERMAN DEFENCE CO-OPERATION: PARTNERS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, ed. by Karl Kaiser and John Roper. London, Jane's Publishing Co. (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1988. 308 pp.

BRITISH SECURITY POLICY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1990s, by Martin Holmes and others. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers (for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), 1987. 140 pp. (Special Report.)

BRITAIN'S SECURITY POLICY: THE MODERN SOVIET VIEW, by Robbin F. Laird and Susan Clark. London, Alliance Publishers Ltd. (for the Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies), 1987. 74 pp. (Occasional Papers, 31.) $8.00.

THE CAMBODIAN AGONY, ed. by David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood. Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 1987. 418 pp.

THE COMMONWEALTH AND BRITAIN, by Dennis Austin. N.Y., Routledge & Kegan Paul (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1988. 83 pp. (Chatham House Papers, 41.)

COOPERATION—A KEYSTONE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, by Karl Otto Pöhl. N.Y., The American Council on Germany, 1987. v.p. (First Annual Arthur F. Burns Memorial Lecture.)

DEFENDING PEACE AND FREEDOM: TOWARD STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE YEAR 2000, ed. by Brent Scowcroft and others. Lanham, Md., University Press of America (for The Atlantic Council's Working Group on Strategic Stability and Arms Control), 1988. 216 pp.

EGYPT AND U.S. INTERESTS, by Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr. Washington, Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1988. 21 pp. (FPI Policy Briefs.)

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN HISTORY, ed. by Ainslie T. Embree. N.Y., Charles Scribner's Sons (under the auspices of The Asia Society), 1988. 4 vols. $325.00.

ETHIOPIA: TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, by Mulatu Wubneh and Yohannis Abate. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 224 pp.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, by Leon Hurwitz. N.Y., Greenwood Press, 1987. 267 pp. (Contributions in Political Science, 181.) $55.00.

A EUROPEAN NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS, ed. by Harald Müller. N.Y., Oxford University Press, 1987. 416 pp. $84.00.

EUROPE'S FUTURE IN SPACE: A JOINT POLICY REPORT. N.Y., Routledge & Kegan Paul (for The Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1988. 224 pp. (Chatham House Special Paper.)

EVOLVING PATTERNS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS 1933–1986. Washington, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1987. 61 pp. (A Conference Report.)

EXTREMIST SHIITES: THE GHULAT SECTS, by Matti Moosa. Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1988. 580 pp.

FOREIGN CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA, ed. by Richard D. Robinson. N.Y., Praeger, 1987. 191 pp. $39.95.

FORMALIZING THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: THE NEXT STEP IN U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONS, by Stuart E. Eizenstat. Washington, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988. 34 pp. (Policy Papers, 9.)

FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS: NEGOTIATING ARMS CONTROL AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, by John Borawski. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988. 260 pp.

GLOBAL TELEVISION AND FOREIGN POLICY, by James F. Larson. N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1987. 72 pp. (Headline Series, 283.) $4.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA, by Tom J. Farer. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1988. 294 pp. $39.95.

INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, by Simcha Bahiri. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press (for The West Bank Data Base Project), 1987. 92 pp. (Research Report.)

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? ed. by R. Michael Gadbaw and Timothy J. Richards. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 412 pp. (Economic Competition among Nations Series.)

INTERNATIONAL ETHICS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, ed. by Robert J. Myers. Lanham, Md., University Press of America (for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs), 1987. 369 pp. (Ethics and Foreign Policy Series, 4.)

INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ed. by Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard. N.Y., Greenwood Press, 1987. 495 pp.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY C. WALLICH, by Paul A. Volcker and others. Princeton, N.J., International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1987. 90 pp. (Essays in International Finance, 169.) $4.50.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT, by Nicholas A. Sims. N.Y., Oxford University Press (for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 1987. 158 pp. $27.50.

THE IRAN-CONTRA PUZZLE, ed. by Patricia Ann O'Connor. Washington, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1987. v.p.

IRAN: THE REVOLUTION WITHIN, by Dilip Hiro. London, The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1988. 24 pp. (Conflict Studies, 208.) $10.00.

JAPAN AND ARMS CONTROL: TOKYO'S RESPONSE TO SDI AND INF, by Peggy L. Falkenheim. Ottawa, Ont., The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1988. 31 pp. $12.00.

JAPANESE-SOVIET RELATIONS UNDER GORBACHEV, by Roy Kim. Pittsburgh, Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1988. 75 pp. (The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, 608.)

KHOMEINI, THE FUTURE, AND US OPTIONS, by Richard W. Cottam. Muscatine, Iowa, The Stanley Foundation, 1987. 44 pp. (Policy Papers, 38.)

LATIN AMERICAN DEBT AND THE ADJUSTMENT CRISIS, ed. by Rosemary Thorp and Laurence Whitehead. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987. 359 pp.

LEGITIMACY AND FORCE, by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. New Brunswick, Transaction Books, 1988. 2 vols. $60.00 (paper, $30.00).

MANAGING THE FROZEN SOUTH: THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM, by M. J. Peterson. Berkeley, Ca., University of California Press, 1988. 283 pp. (Studies in International Political Economy, 20.) $35.00.

MEETING THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, by Peter Morici. Washington, Canadian-American Committee, 1988. 61 pp.

MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY, VOL. IX, 1984–85, ed. by Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press (for The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, The Shiloah Institute, Tel Aviv University), 1987. 735 pp.

MOSCOW'S "NEW THINKING" AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY, by Françoise Thom. Toronto, The Mackenzie Institute for the Study of Terrorism, Revolution and Propaganda, 1987. 38 pp. (Mackenzie Papers, 4.) $4.50.

NATO AND U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY: DIVERGING INTERESTS OR COOPERATIVE EFFORT, ed. by Ellmann Ellingsen. Oslo, The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1987. 136 pp.

NATO TO THE YEAR 2000: CHALLENGES FOR COALITION DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. Washington, The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1988. 43 pp. (A report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Future of NATO.)

NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS: PROHIBITION OR LIMITATION? ed. by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox. N.Y., Oxford University Press (for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security), 1988. 423 pp.

NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE, by Arlene Idol Broadhurst. Ottawa, Ont., The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1987. 53 pp. $12.00.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY: REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE TASK FORCE ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988. 134 pp. $6.95.

PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, by Charles D. Smith. N.Y., St. Martin's Press, 1988. 308 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PEACE, POWER AND PROTEST: EASTERN EUROPE IN THE GORBACHEV ERA, by Michael Waller. London, The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1988. 27 pp. (Conflict Studies, 209.) $10.00.

PEACE THROUGH SECURITY: A TOTAL DEFENCE APPROACH, by William J. Yost. Ottawa, Conference on Defence Associations, 1987. 172 pp.

POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION: A NEW DIMENSION IN ASEAN-JAPAN RELATIONS? ed. by Frances Fung Wai Lai and Charles E. Morrison. Tokyo, The Japan Center for International Exchange, 1987. 103 pp. (The JCIE Papers.)

THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: DIVERSITY AND UNITY, ed. by Shireen T. Hunter. Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1988. 303 pp. (Indiana Series in Arab and Islamic Studies.) $35.00 (paper, $12.95).

THE POLITICS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID, by George M. Guess. N.Y., St. Martin's Press, 1987. 297 pp.

RESPONDING TO INTERNATIONAL OIL CRISES, ed. by George Horwich and David Leo Weimer. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1988. 313 pp. $24.50.

REVOLUTIONARY AND DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, ed. by Henry W. Degenhardt. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Co., 1988. 466 pp. $140.00.

REYKJAVIK AND BEYOND: DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF ARMS CONTROL. Washington, National Academy Press (for the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences), 1988. 70 pp.

SOUS L'OEIL DU DRAGON: LES RELATIONS DE LA CHINE AVEC LES PAYS DE L'ASEAN, by Jacques de Goldfiem. Paris, Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1988. 317 pp. FR.140.00.

SOURCES OF CURRENT TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION—SCOPE AND PROSPECTS OF "PERESTROIKA" IN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY. Belgrade, Center for Strategic Studies, 1987. 96 pp. (CSS Papers, 2.)

SOUTH AFRICA IN TRANSITION TO WHAT? ed. by Helen Kitchen. N.Y., Praeger (with The Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1988. 201 pp. (The Washington Papers, 132.)

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, by Kurt M. Campbell. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988. 77 pp. (Adelphi Papers, 227.)

SOVIET AGRICULTURE: THE BREZHNEV LEGACY AND GORBACHEV'S CURE, by Alec Nove. Los Angeles, Ca., The RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1988. 57 pp.

THE SOVIET DEFENCE ENIGMA: ESTIMATING COSTS AND BURDEN, ed. by Carl G. Jacobsen. N.Y., Oxford University Press (for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 1987. 189 pp. $47.00.

SOVIET UKRAINIAN DISSENT: A STUDY OF POLITICAL ALIENATION, by Jaroslaw Bilocerkowycz. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1988. 242 pp. (Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.)

SOVIET UNION: THE THREAT TO EUROPE, ed. by William J. Yost. Ottawa, Ont., Conference on Defence Associations, 1987. 111 pp.

SRI LANKA: THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR PEACE, ed. by L. Piyadasa. London, Marram Books, 1988. 139 pp.

STRATEGISCHE ROHSTOFFE: RISIKEN FÜR DIE WIRTSCHAFTLICHE SICHERHEIT DES WESTENS, by Hans W. Maull. Munich, R. Oldenbourg Verlag (for the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1988. 301 pp. (Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, 53.)

TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1988. 49 pp. (Report of a Study Group.)

UNILATERALISM, IDEOLOGY, & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: THE UNITED STATES IN AND OUT OF UNESCO, by Roger A. Coate. Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988. 182 pp. $26.50.

THE UN ASSESSING SOVIET ABUSES, by Juliana Geran Pilon and Ralph Kinney Bennett. London, Alliance Publishers Ltd. (for the Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies), 1988. 53 pp. $8.00.

THE USSR AND MARXIST REVOLUTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD. Washington, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1987. 51 pp. (A Conference Report.)

WAR IN AFGHANISTAN, by Mark Urban. N.Y., St. Martin's Press, 1988. 248 pp. $45.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WELTRAUM UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, ed. by Karl Kaiser and Stephan Frhr. von Welck. Munich, R. Oldenbourg Verlag (for the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1987. 661 pp. (Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft, 54.)

WEST GERMANY'S ECONOMY: ORIGINS, PROBLEMS, AND PERSPECTIVES, by Norbert Walter. Washington, The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1987. 31 pp.

WESTERN INTERESTS AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Washington, The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1988. 51 pp. (The Atlantic Council of the United States and The Middle East Institute Policy Paper.)

WORLD SURVEY OF STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTRES, by John Chipman and Nicoline van der Woerd. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988. 111 pp.

WHY THE SOVIETS VIOLATE ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, by Joseph D. Douglas, Jr. Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988. 202 pp. $32.00.

YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AFFAIRS 1987: PARTIES AND REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, ed. by Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Ca., Hoover Institution Press, 1987. 640 pp. (Hoover Press Publications, 365.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS INDEX TO VOLUME 66

Back issues and reprints of articles are available from *Foreign Affairs*,
Reader Services, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021. Telephone: (212) 734-0400.

NO. 1—FALL 1987

The Summer of 1987 1
Reagan-Gorbachev III ..... *William G. Hyland* 7
Military Security in Europe ..... *Jonathan Dean* 22
Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy ..... *Galia Golan* 41
Assad and His Allies: Irreconcilable Differences?
Christopher Dickey 58
Asia's Future ..... *Robert A. Scalapino* 77
The Choice in Central America ..... *Susan Kaufman Purcell* 109
The Outlook for Latin American Debt .... *Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski* 129
A Turning Point in U.S.–Canadian Relations
Adam Bromke and *Kim Richard Nossal* 150
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited
James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and *David A. Welch* 170
Recent Books on International Relations 189
Source Material 209

NO. 2—WINTER 1987/88

The CIA and Foreign Policy ..... *Robert M. Gates* 215
The President and the Secretary of State ... *Theodore C. Sorensen* 231
A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy ..... *Richard G. Lugar* 249
A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy ..... *Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.* 263
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution ..... *Louis Henkin* 284
Struggle for Southern Africa ..... *Robert G. Mugabe* 311
Panama: Disaster or Democracy ..... *Ricardo Arias Calderón* 328
The Coming U.S.-Japan Crisis ..... *George R. Packard* 348
Invisible Indonesia ..... *Donald K. Emmerson* 368
The Bolshevik Revolution Turns 70 ..... *Wolfgang Leonhard* 388
DOCUMENT:
The 70th Anniversary Address ..... *Mikhail S. Gorbachev* 410
Correspondence ..... *George P. Shultz* 426
Recent Books on International Relations 429

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO. 3—AMERICA AND THE WORLD 1987/88

Coping With the Lippmann Gap . . . . . *Samuel P. Huntington* 453
A European Perspective on the Reagan Years . . . *Michael Howard* 478
The Superpowers: Dance of the Dinosaurs . . *Marshall D. Shulman* 494
The Economics of Illusion and the Illusion of Economics
Robert B. Reich 516
The World Economy and Technological Change
W. Michael Blumenthal 529
Soviet and Chinese Economic Reform
Marshall I. Goldman and *Merle Goldman* 551
Israel at 40: Looking Back, Looking Ahead . . . . . *Yitzhak Shamir* 574
Peace in Central America? . . . . . *Linda Robinson* 591
The 1988 Election: U.S. Foreign Policy at a Watershed
George McGovern 614
Comment and Correspondence 630
Source Material 632
Chronology 1987 638

NO. 4—SPRING 1988

Introduction 677
America's New Geostrategy . . . . . *Zbigniew Brzezinski* 680
Arms Reductions and Deterrence . . . . . *Caspar W. Weinberger* 700
Lessons of the INF Treaty . . . . . *Lynn E. Davis* 720
Defending Post-INF Europe
Jeffrey Record and *David B. Rivkin, Jr.* 735
The Kremlin and SDI . . . . . *Benjamin Lambeth* and *Kevin Lewis* 755
Toward Peace in the Holy Land . . . . . *Walid Khalidi* 771
Taiwan After Chiang Ching-kuo . . . . . *Selig S. Harrison* 790
Cambodia: Sihanouk's Initiative . . . . . *Gareth Porter* 809
The Case for Practical Internationalism . . . . . *Richard N. Gardner* 827
The Dollar and the Defense of the West
David P. Calleo, Harold van B. Cleveland and *Leonard Silk* 846
Book Review Essay . . . . . *W. W. Rostow* 863
Recent Books on International Relations 869
Source Material 893

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO. 5—SUMMER 1988

Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy
Henry Kissinger and *Cyrus Vance* 899
Afghanistan: The Accords . . . . . *Rosanne Klass* 922
The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis . . . . . *David Segal* 946
Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising . . . . . *Don Peretz* 964
The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later . . . . . *Milan Svec* 981
Gorbachev and the Soviet Military . . . . . *F. Stephen Larrabee* 1002
Managing Strategic Weapons
Sidney D. Drell and *Thomas H. Johnson* 1027
Arms, Aid and the Superpowers . . . . . *Stephanie G. Neuman* 1044
Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices . . . . . *Michael Clough* 1067
The End of America's Postwar Ethos . . . . . *Michael Vlahos* 1091
Comment and Correspondence . . . *Paul Kennedy, W. W. Rostow* 1108
Recent Books on International Relations 1114
Source Material 1141
Index—Volume 66 1148

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HOW TO CARE FOR THE NEW BASE COAT/CLEAR COAT FINISH ON YOUR CAR.

TRY A LITTLE TENDERNESS.

Base coat/clear coat painting is a better way to paint cars. Instead of the old single layer of lacquer or enamel color coat, General Motors now uses two layers of paint on most of our models. The base layer contains the pigment or color, and the top layer is a clear coat of acrylic polymer to bring out the brilliance of the color and give a glossy, mirror-like finish.

The principle is like that of a mirror: the clear coat functions like the glass.

With single coat finishes, the color is exposed to the atmosphere, so sun, water, wind and dirt can cause deterioration. With base coat/clear coat paint, the color is not exposed to the atmosphere, so the desirable characteristics of the finish last longer.

Base coat/clear coat finishes require less maintenance, but they, like all paints, are susceptible to abrasives, which will scratch the finish or give it a hazy appearance, reducing both its gloss and imaging (mirror-like) qualities.

Wash any base coat/clear coat finish with gentle, non-abrasive cleaners, rinsing away all loose dirt with plenty of water before sponging on the soapy solution.

Rinse the cloth or sponge or change it frequently to avoid scratching the finish with dirt or grit. If you use a commercial tar or bug remover, read the instructions carefully, then try it out on an inconspicuous area first.

If you use a commercial car wash, look for one that uses a soft scrub system. A few car wash systems employ harsh brushes, which may scratch the clear coat finish.

Base coat/clear coat paint need not be polished as often as a lacquer or enamel to remove the grime and effects of weathering. When you do polish it (once or twice a year), use a mild cleaning wax, not an abrasive. Polish gently, by hand.

Avoid mechanical polishing or sanding of the surface.

Don't use a scrub brush on the paint or on the wheels, if they're aluminum mag wheels with clear coat paint on them.

You can help maintain the finish on your car by parking and driving wisely. Try not to park under trees, where bird droppings or sap, which contain compounds that can injure the finish, may fall onto your car. Try to park upwind from industrial areas. If you get cement dust or fly ash on your car from any fire or smokestack, rinse it off immediately.

When you drive, go easy on the gas pedal to keep stones from flying up and chipping the paint during quick starts. When traveling on dirt or gravel roads, put some extra distance between you and the car ahead to avoid running into stones thrown into the air by that car's tires.

If you get a scratch or chip in the finish, and it's a deep one, you should probably seek expert repair advice on how to keep it looking good and to avoid exposing bare metal to the elements. If the scratch is small, auto supply stores and GM dealers offer two-step touch-up paints to repair the underlying color coat and the clear coat finish.

General Motors has made this better finish standard for all colors on most models of cars and trucks. Consult your owner's manual or ask your dealer whether your car has base coat/clear coat paint.

If you have this new finish, try a little tenderness, and your car will look better for a long, long time.

This advertisement is part of our continuing effort to give customers useful information about their cars and trucks and the company that builds them.

GM
MARK OF EXCELLENCE

Chevrolet • Pontiac
Oldsmobile • Buick
Cadillac • GMC Truck

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How junk bonds helped provide 50,000 people with a living room and 20,000 people with a living.

They helped by providing Hovnanian Enterprises with the capital they needed to develop affordable famil housing. Capital they would've had a hard time getting from commercial banks. Or any place else, for that matter. Because Hovnanian, like 95% of all American companies with annual sales in excess of $25 million, wa considered non-investment grade, or "junk," by the major bond rating agencies.

The fact is, without high yield bonds provided by Drexel Burnham, Hovnanian would still be a small, family run construction company. Instead of the second largest developer of for-sale multifamily homes in the country.

To date, Hovnanian has built more than 20,000 condominiums, townhouses and single family home throughout New York, New Jersey, Florida and New Hampshire. Planned residential communities that hav become so synonymous with quality affordable housing that they typically sell out in a single weekend. Makir them the envy of the housing industry. Not to mention the place where 20,000 people have made their livin And 50,000 people have made their home.

Drexel Burnham
Helping People Manage Change

Member SIPC © 1987 Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED